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Sensing-through Architectural Scenographies:  
Tactility, Language and Natural History in the Work of Walter Benjamin 
 
Anat Messing Marcus 
 
In its consideration of the work of the senses, notions of truth and language and political 
aesthetics in Walter Benjamin’s epistemology of images, this thesis takes as its touch-stone 
Benjamin’s somewhat overlooked meditations on the sensorial faculty of tactility (“das 
Taktische”). According to the first version of the “Work of Art” essay, along with the 
distinctive structures of perception of the new modes of reproduction, film and photography, 
architecture is the artistic domain which tactility most intimately inhabits, in which it is at 
home, “more originally”. The nexus between tactility, through figures of touch, and affect as 
the absence of intentionality informs the Benjaminian settings of “natural history”. These are 
scenographic sites permeated with “creaturely life” and perceived by way of melancholy and 
lament, as explicated in the early work The Origin of the German Baroque Trauerspiel. In 
this constellation, the sensual realm, mediated through the allegorical mode and the more 
non-intentional dimensions of signification, bears deepest affinity to the linguistic grounds of 
philosophical representation in Benjamin’s terms.  
The thesis develops this argument in a set of interlinked moves and theoretical 
directions, organised in three parts. Firstly, Benjamin’s conceptualisation of architecture “as 
more than origin” is subjected to encounter with Hegel’s account of architecture as symbolic 
art. In as much as tactility is indeed more originally “in der Architektur zuhause”, this 
formulation also provides an intimation of the “Unzuhause”, leading to Freud’s interrelated 
theories of the uncanny and the articulation of the death drive, beyond the pleasure principle. 
Secondly, a reconstruction of Theodor W. Adorno’s arguments set out in “The Idea of 
Natural History” exposes the juncture between Benjamin’s and Martin Heidegger’s 
approaches to the “secularisation of history” and the politico-theological dimension of 
historicity. The spectral character of spatiality in works by Kafka and Rilke, as mediated 
through the philosophical writings of these thinkers, proves significant for the scenographic 
thinking of this polemic on the essence of historical time. The third move explores auditory 
and tactile motifs at the border of language as they outline both Benjamin’s essay on 
translation and his autobiographical writing in Berliner Kindheit. The core premise 
underlying these different moves is that sensorial experience “in tactility” bears on what this 
thesis takes as a persistent architectonic figure reverberating through Benjamin’s work: the 
towering, ruinous logic of Babel. 
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The Image  
 
The category of the image is perhaps the most perplexing of theoretical constructs underlying 
Walter Benjamin’s thought, and it has accordingly proved to be a persistent concern of 
scholarship engaging with his work, including some of the most trenchant. The epistemological 
significance of visual perception has been accounted for by Sigrid Weigel in her reading of 
Benjamin. “For Benjamin”, Weigel notes, “images are not the object, but rather the matrix and 
medium of his theoretical work.”1 According to Weigel’s designation, Benjamin’s figurative 
way of thinking is underscored by an “image-like” or “image-based (bildliche) epistemology”.2 
It is an epistemology which is both complex and ambivalent. Alison Ross has shown that, 
throughout Benjamin’s writings, the epistemological significance of visual perception unfolds 
in conjunction with a rigorous critique of the integrity of the image defined as “material or 
sensuous presentation of meaning”.3 At the same time, Winfried Menninghaus gave an account 
of Benjamin’s “active production of the imageless”, his “action of breaking with aesthetic 
phenomenality” in pointing to the fact that the bildlos aspect of the visual or the idea of 
Scheinlosigkeit have their roots in the Jewish prohibition of the image. As Menninghaus also 
remarks, “God’s imagelessness has counted as a paradigm of aesthetics of the sublime since 
Kant and Hegel”, and accordingly, the Judaic ban on graven images “informs almost all areas 
of Benjamin’s thought: his theories of art and of language, moral philosophy and 
anthropology”.4  
According to Rebecca Comay, the inescapable imbrication of law and transgression 
prescribed by the Bilderverbot incites a desire for the manifestation of an absence and therefore 
an immersion within the imaginary, a dialectic reaction to the Judaic predominance of language 
over vision.5 Accordingly, the image of an incorporeal God is the source which inevitably 
engenders an intensification of images. What is enhanced, however, is the sensuous body, the 
 
1  Weigel, Body- and Image- Space, Rereading Walter Benjamin, trans.  Georgina Paul with Rachel McNicholl 
and Jeremy Gaines (London: Routledge, 1996), p. ix.  
2  Weigel, “The Flash of Knowledge and the Temporality of Images: Walter Benjamin’s Image-Based 
Epistemology and Its Preconditions in Visual Arts and Media History”, trans. Chadwick Truscott Smith and 
Christine Kutschbach Critical Inquiry 41.2 (2015), 344-366. 
3 Ross, Walter Benjamin’s Concept of the Image (London: Routledge, 2014), p. 9.  
4 Menninghaus, “Walter Benjamin’s Variations of Imagelessness”, Critical Horizons 14.3 (2013), 407-428 (p. 
408).  
5 Comay, “Materialist Mutations of the Bilderverbot”, in Walter Benjamin and Art, ed. Andrew Benjamin, 
(London: Continuum, 2004), pp. 32-59 (p. 36; p. 35).   
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body that, according to same tradition, was created in the image of God. And yet the image 
ban, integral to Benjamin’s writings, is subject to further displacement. This has been indicated 
by Helga Geyer-Ryan who evaluates the transgressive essence of Benjamin’s use of images in 
positioning the latter in relation to language, the site of the symbolic order. As she observes, 
“Benjamin’s fundamental violation of taboos consists of reintroducing images, both as object-
representation and as tropes into the very territory of the logos: the written language.”6 
Installing the image in the place of language provides the grounds for the logic of the 
scenography, a term extrapolated from Benjamin’s meditations on the German Baroque setting 
or Schauplatz. This is the place of showing and looking, but also, the place whose scenic logic 
is worked through allegorical speech, through lament, and, through what Benjamin calls 
“expressionlessness”.  
Primarily, the image operates as a substitute for physical presence and bears on degrees 
of embodiment, in its relation to externality and otherness. Grounded on the exclusion of touch 
and restricted to the visual, what is to be embodied in the image is dialectically abstracted into 
that which is not only untouchable, but also rendered as a trace. This twofold displacement – 
from touch to sight and from presence to trace – mounts Benjamin’s fundamental 
understanding of the image as bearing on an inconspicuous spot, or the place without the 
capacity of Schein – the “unscheinbare Stelle” – as it is formulated in “Kleine Geschichte der 
Photographie” (1931) (GS II:371, SW 2:510). According to the theory of allegorical 
“contemplative immersion” developed in Ursprung des deutschen Trauerspiels, it is the “abyss 
between image-being and meaning” (GS I:342, O 173) that emerges as a space subject to re-
embodiment. The irrevocable gap incited by the economy of the image is a making room for 
the allegorical ‘speaking otherwise’, as the etymology of allegory denotes. The interpenetration 
of speech and sound in the image, and with this, linguistic transmission, is therefore the focal 
point that comes to be manifested in Benjamin’s epistemology of images. Moreover, the image, 
glossed as a visual, “image-being”, calls on the ineliminable spatial attribute of allegory, 
namely its etymological indication of a materialised setting – a scenography – for the speaking 
other within the agora. This place of a collective assembly is the political space that is also 
organised around an inconspicuous spot – the interior space of the home, namely, the oikos, 
not least the space concerning gender, procreation and sexual difference.  
The disfigurement of a particular way of speaking enacted by allegory informs the focal 
figure of the image in Benjamin’s later conceptualisation of the image in the context of a new 
 
6 Geyer-Ryan, “Effects of Abjection in the Texts of Walter Benjamin”, MLN 107.3 (1992), 499-520 (p. 516).  
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way of thinking historical time as set out in the Passagen-Werk and in “Über den Begriff der 
Geschichte”. For precisely, it is (linguistic) ambiguity – “Zweideutigkeit” – that is the “law” 
constitutive of the “dialectical image”; and therefore, “language”, in turn, is “the place”, “der 
Ort”, wherein the “(dialectical) image” is “encountered” ([N2a,3], GS V:577, AP 462). To the 
extent that “Bild ist Dialektik im Stillstand”, the thinking that is prompted by the “dialektische 
Bild” renders the present of the one who experiences it as a sequence of singular ‘nows’, 
pertaining, that is, to the intransmissibility of time. As the much-cited definition has it,  
 
The dialectical image is an image that emerges suddenly, in a flash. What has been is 
to be held fast-as an image flashing up in the now of its recognizability. The rescue 
[Die Rettung] that is carried out by these means – and only by these – can operate solely 
for the sake of what in the next moment is already irretrievably lost. [N 9, 7]  
(GS V:592, AP 473) 
 
The dialectical image, an image enflamed by dint of an optical exposure to the blinding, 
flashing light that it entailed, releases moments of corporeal danger and crisis. This experience, 
also designated as “Erlebnis”, draws away from the linear conception of time, from the 
experience defined as “Erfahrung” (an idea already set out in the early essay Goethes Die 
Wahlverwandtschaften, GS I:190, SW 1:347). The dialectical framing of the futile “rescuing” 
of that which inevitably succumbs to oblivion amounts to a “prophetic gaze that catches fire 
from the summits of the past”, as Benjamin remarks in ending the above-cited entry from the 
Passagen-Werk.  
What is recorded in the dialectical image or in the thinking image that is classically 
constructed around it, is the experience of intransmissibility and incommunicability.7 This 
negation of the semiotic functioning of language is nevertheless a dialectical attestation to its 
magical, immediate and mimetic side, namely, the paradisiac language prior to its fall, the 
underlying idea of Benjamin’s programmatic essay on language of 1916, “Über Sprache 
überhaupt und über die Sprache des Menschen”. The pertinence of the image to resemblance 
and likeness conveys a reference to the arbitrary meanings of sensual forms and therefore to 
the “bourgeois view of language”, the fallen language underscored by the prevalence of signs 
over names. Against semblance, Benjamin systematically sets forth the linguistic stance of the 
“expressionless” or “das Ausdruckslose” (for example in the early essay on Goethe), the 
 
7 See Sigrid Weigel, Walter Benjamin, Images, the Creaturely, and the Holy, trans. Chadwick Truscott Smith 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2013), p. 140.   
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corollary of that which is bildlos on the level of the visual. The visual or the scopic might be 
displaced into the sphere of thinking, but this all the same means that thought is arrested into a 
configuration of “shock”, as it is famously stated in “Über den Begriff der Geschichte”.8 The 
shuddering experience of tremor or shock, of “Erschütterung”, bears on the broken gaze (that 
of “Das brechende Auge”) which is the “ur-phenomenon of sinking semblance 
[verlöschende[n] Schein[s]]” (GS V:402, AP 302, translation modified), as Benjamin writes in 
one of the entries in the Passagen-Werk, in the convolute dedicated to Baudelaire. Not only do 
the image-like structures of Benjamin’s thinking need to be seen even as they are thought, but 
the fact that the images eradicate themselves suggests that they cannot break away from their 
manifestation within the sensory bounds of the lived body. And this, in turn, necessitates a 
critical consideration of the relation between images and the sensorium beyond the visual.   
 
The Tactile  
 
This study’s aim is to pursue the complexities of Benjamin’s concept of the image by an 
examination of the various ways in which what is construed here within the notion of “tactility” 
– “im Taktischem”, to use Benjamin’s idiom – operates in them. This undertaking involves 
bringing into one focal point two of Benjamin’s most salient theoretical positions. On the one 
hand, there is the assumption regarding the image’s adherence to sensory experience beyond 
the visual. On the other – language’s trait of communicability beyond designation and 
difference. That Language performs the function of pure “Mitteilung” is disclosed by the 
disparity between “language as such” and the language of human beings.  
The exploration of the tactile departs from one of Benjamin’s explicit formulations 
regarding the discrepancy of the aesthetic object, as cast between the optical and the tactile. 
According to the first version of the “Kunstwerk” essay, along with the distinctive structures 
of perception of new modes of reproduction, of film and photography, architecture is the artistic 
domain which “the tactile dominance” most intimately inhabits, in which it is at home, “more 
originally”, as the first version of the “Kunstwerk” essay has it. According to this essay, 
tactility, assigned to the medium of architecture in various historical and conceptual ways, 
partakes in Benjamin’s contention regarding modernity’s new political conditions shaped by 
the spatio-temporal displacements within the system of the sensorial, as it is prominently 
 
8 “Thinking involves not only the flow of thoughts, but their arrest as well. Where thinking suddenly stops in a 
configuration pregnant with tensions, it gives that configuration a shock, by which it crystallizes into a monad”. 
(GS I:702-703, SW 4:396).   
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epitomised by the phenomenon of the decaying aura. Against the backdrop of the proliferation 
of reproducibility in the form of the image, the sensory character of architecture, according to 
Benjamin, is in no way limited to the visual; the meanings produced by architectural forms are 
equally, indeed more particularly, accessible to the more corporeal sense of touch.  
In keeping with this fundamental disposition of the architectural, the scope of the three 
parts comprising this thesis is confined – albeit in a broad sense – to Benjamin’s treatment of 
architectural representations, spatial formations and significances permeating through his 
writings and to which a particular attentiveness seems to be ascribed. As I shall demonstrate, 
not only is the idea, or the medium, of architecture the persistent aesthetic site in Benjamin’s 
oeuvre that provides an insight into an evaluation of the sensuous body beyond the domains of 
the visual. Also, in posing the question of the tactile, what is opened up is a purview of 
Benjamin’s concept of life, or, more precisely, of “the question of the relationship of works of 
art to historical life”,9 a question addressed most lucidly in his essay on translation, as we will 
see here in Part Three.   
Despite the centrality of Benjamin’s reconstruction of the image being contiguous with 
an elaboration of a historically conditioned body whose envelope is a tactile flesh,10 his thought 
has been curiously inapparent in much of the more recent discourse on aesthetics and the 
politics of touch.11 It is surprisingly absent, for instance, from Derrida’s genealogy of 
corporeality and the tactile in his On Touching – Jean Luc Nancy.12 Nor does tactility play the 
role it would warrant in scholarly interpretations of the significance of the category of the image 
 
9 As Benjamin writes in a letter to Florence Christian Rang, December 9, 1923: “I have been reflecting on the 
way in which works of art relate to historical life. In so doing, I proceed from the conviction that there is no 
such thing as art history. In human life, for example, not only does the concatenation of temporal events contain 
essential causal links, but we may also say that, were there no such links to constitute development, maturity, 
death, and similar categories, human life as such would not really exist. With works of art, on the other hand, 
the position is quite different. Art is in essence ahistorical.” (SW 1:388).  
10 Some of Benjamin’s early fragments such as “Wahrnehmung und Leib” (1918/1920-1921) draw on the 
phenomenological distinction between the lived and the simply physical body (Leib /Körper). For Benjamin’s 
theme of “Eros of distance” which also informs these explorations, see Sigrid Weigel, “Eros”, in Benjamins 
Begriffe, eds. Michael Opitz & Erdmut Wizisla (Frankfurt a.M: Suhrkamp Verlag, 2000), pp. 299-340. Gerhard 
Richter’s Walter Benjamin and the Corpus of Autobiography (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 2000) 
provides an analysis of Benjamin’s rhetoric of corporeality. See especially the section on the “problem of touch” 
as underlying Benjamin’s “Moscow Diary”, pp. 146-150.  
11 See also my “’Im Taktischen’: Figures of Touch in the Work of Walter Benjamin”, The Germanic Review: 
Literature, Culture, Theory 93.3 (2018), 298-316 (p. 299).  
12 In tracing sights of non-seeing in Memoirs of the Blind, on the other hand, Jacques Derrida does discuss the 
figuration of portraits and self-portraits with reference to Benjamin’s account of the baroque ruin in the 
Trauerspiel book. According to Derrida’s notion of the deconstruction of the depicted face by the very gaze of 
the draftsman, wherein visibility is “eaten away”, this gaze, mediated by the hand, is aligned to the 
incompleteness of the visible monument and so binds visual perception to recollection and to history. See 
Derrida, Memoirs of the Blind: The Self-Portrait and Other Ruins, trans. Pascale-Anne Brault and Michael Naas 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993), p. 69.    
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in Benjamin’s oeuvre. A case in point would be the paradigmatic scene of childhood play: the 
hand that repetitively retrieves a rolled-up sock from its pocket. According to this emblem of 
the unraveled sock, evoked in Benjamin’s essay on Proust (“Zum Bilde Prousts”, 1929), the 
disfigured relations of the similarities between “form” and “content”, and the “veil” and “what 
is veiled” release the “third” – “the image” (GS II:314, SW 2:240). In Berliner Kindheit um 
1900 (1934/1938), where this childhood scene also appears, Benjamin adds, with a nod to 
Goethe’s literary autobiography: “It [the sock play] led me to draw truth [Wahrheit] from 
literature [Dichtung] as carefully as the child’s hand retrieves the sock from ‘the case’” (GS 
IV:977-978, SW 3:374, translation modified). The image, as is made explicit in the structure of 
these scenographies of child’s play, could be given only by an active intervention of physical 
contact. However, it is this logic of touch that underscores the loss of the object, the loss 
henceforth inscribed into the very presence of the image. Furthermore, coupled with “truth”, 
the image is underpinned by the double-sidedness of the German Sinnlichkeit, a word already 
marked by the ambiguous split between the system of the sensorium and intellectual 
knowledge.13  
Part One of the thesis, “Body meets Architecture in Benjamin’s Thinking of the Image”, 
explores the rupture between tactile, corporeal immediacy and the more optical figural 
presentation as it is accounted in the “Kunstwerk” essay’s thesis on optical and tactile 
architecture. The intimation of touch, together with the set of terms that surrounds the remarks 
on architecture – namely habit, the close-up view, collective distraction and the disintegration 
of aura in the experience of shock – are constituted by this medium as a counter-movement in 
the direction of the optical. According to the “Kunstwerk” essay, the double significance of 
architecture is the medium’s relatedness to origin and to the more mythical, archaic sensation 
of the ‘tactile’. This part of the thesis addresses the dialectics of origin that consist in this 
medium according to Benjamin, in relation to three main threads. The first concerns 
Benjamin’s early explorations of the limitation of bodily perceptions and their link to myth; 
the second focuses on G.W.F. Hegel’s definitions of architecture as “pre-art”, and as art’s 
“symbolic form” as the earliest form of sensuous representation, as well as on architecture’s 
dismissal as an artform apposite to the development of spirit, as set out in his Vorlesungen über 
die Ästhetik; and the third turns on Freud’s articulation of das Unheimliche and the uncanny 
 
13 In his 1993 book Le sens du monde, Nancy gives an account of sense (“sens”) as a concept denoting 
sensuality, sense as meaning, and sense as “the movement of being-towards” – all meanings that are inescapably 
intertwined with one another. In the chapter on “Sense and Truth” it is noted that according to the its German 
etymology, the word ‘Sinn’ “first signifies ‘the process of carrying-oneself-toward something’”. See Nancy, The 
Sense of the World, trans. Jeremy Libbett (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997), p. 12. 
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dis-inhabitation of space. This threefold foreclosure at stake here – that of myth, of architecture 
as aesthetic form and of space as such – recalls Benjamin’s attentiveness to the “refuse of 
history”, the paradigmatic methodological procedure of the Passagen-Werk.14    
The primal architectural scene identified by Hegel stems from “the double architecture” 
presented by the pyramids (VÄ I:459, LA I:356). Their ambiguity, as will be discussed in Part 
One, subsists in the Hegelian characterisations of these structures as “enormous [ungeheure] 
crystals” and “unconscious symbolism” (VÄ I:418, LA I:323). For Hegel, the pyramids stand 
for an external surroundings (“Umgebung”) in which an inner meaning rests in concealment 
(VÄ I:460, LA I:356). Not only did the pyramids anticipate, in their very shape, the unfolding 
of the optical out of the tactile, as established by Alois Riegl in his grounding of the history of 
art on the changing degrees of optical and tactile forms of reception (to be discussed also in 
Part One). But neither is the ideality, construed as a freedom from sensuousness and hence 
from the somatic body, to which the pyramids aspire, the pure optical point of their tip, a 
“positive construction”, but rather, as Hegel stresses, a “removal of a negative” (VÄ II:289, LA 
II:649). What is removed and thus sublimated is an excavated architecture, the foundational 
subterranean spaces that lie underneath the towering monumental structures, the underground 
housing a corporeal refuse, the matter of natural historical life.   
Part Two, “Sites of Ruins, Ruination of Time: The Stimmungen of Natural History”, is 
focalised around Theodor W. Adorno’s 1932 lecture “Die Idee der Naturgeschichte” (“The 
Idea of Natural History”). The mood of Unheimlichkeit, Dasein’s un-homely being, as it has 
been explicated in the work of Martin Heidegger, is one of the lecture’s critical targets. 
Heidegger’s conceptualisation of Being is employed in Adorno’s appraisal of Benjamin’s 
Trauerspiel study as an “ontological reorientation of the philosophy of history: the idea of 
natural history” (NG 355, NH 117). It is in exposing the affinity and the divergence between 
Benjamin and Heidegger, however, that Adorno here provides a further understanding of 
‘tactility’ in the context of his uncovering – in drawing on Benjamin – of the allegorical 
structure of Naturgeschichte. The arguments in this part largely evolve out of Adorno’s figure 
of a “world densely walled up by/from sense [Sinn]”, an emblem cast into an architectural 
imagery that remarkably unfolds Benjamin’s understanding of the chiasmic exchange between 
history and nature. The shattered transcendence exposed by the Germen Baroque Trauerspiel 
and with it, the intensifications of (tactile) attachment to the optical, worked through with the 
 
14 “To grasp the construction of history as such. By way of commentary. The refuse [Abfall] of history” (GS V: 
575, AP 461). 
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desire for images, bring into the open the entanglement of bare or creaturely life and the 
redemptive undertone as it configures Benjamin’s idea of natural history.  
Part Two also gives an account of the acoustical sphere (the Stimme drawn from 
Stimmung) surrounding Benjamin’s description of the sensuous withdrawal of history into the 
setting. The key auditory dimension of lament was coupled with the Schauplätze of 
architectural ruins, the quintessential objects that populated the stages of the German 
Trauerspiele. Lament expunges the ‘place of showing and looking’, as sight is subject to a 
sensory displacement. The final thinking image of Benjamin’s Ursprung des deutschen 
Trauerspiels is that of a ruined palatial construction that bears upon the disclosure of fallen 
language and mute nature as the allegorical expression of history. The reconstruction of the 
rapport between Benjamin and Heidegger and the polemic of Stimmung, or moods, evoked by 
it, is further explored in this part not only through reference to the Baroque architectural ruin 
but also through other architectural imageries – the burrow qua construction (“Der Bau”) and 
a remnant of a wall – surfacing in the work of Franz Kafka and Rainer Maria Rilke and treated 
by Benjamin and Heidegger respectively.  
The reading of the selected architectural references featuring in the three parts of this 
thesis is viewed as operating within the frame of what Benjamin’s calls in the Passagen-Werk 
the “science of thresholds” (“Schwellenkunde”). These are constellations in which the setting 
into place of temporal or historical relations is concretised as a topos, a site of textual 
construction. As thresholds, however, these settings are – in a particular sense – topological in 
nature; they put forward an optics of spatio-temporal displacements of those elements which 
have been separated by the threshold that also binds them and by reason of which they cannot 
break away from their other. A key architectural feature that sets forth the “science of 
threshold” is the balcony. A projected, imaginary balcony, an uninhabitable space for viewing 
and for being seen, is the allegorical and architectural site upon which Benjamin’s final 
passages in the Trauerspiel book are configured. An architectural element of a ‘real’ balcony 
described in the segment “Der Mond” from Berliner Kindheit um 1900 generates the ultimate 
Schauplatz discussed in the final part of this thesis.  
Part Three, “The Crypt, the Funnel and the Presentiments of Myth in Berliner 
Kindheit”, explores auditory and tactile motifs at the border of language as they outline both 
Benjamin’s essay on translation and his autobiographical writing in Berliner Kindheit. In 
focusing in particular on three sections in the latter (“Todesnachricht”, “Die Mummerehlen” 
and “Der Mond”), I show how the merely acoustical trait of language is linked in these texts to 
the tactile dimension of the mimetic beyond resemblance and to repetition and to the uncanny 
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sensation of the ‘having-been’. In “Der Mond”, in particular, it is the bourgeois constructions 
of habitation, the focal point of Berliner Kindheit as a whole, that are subject to an uncanny 
deformation of a vortex-space, a foundation of ruin, carried out by the focal figure of the funnel. 
The allegorical device of the funnel, a figure that is also, interestingly, used by Adorno in “Die 
Idee der Naturgeschichte” as a dialectical component in his construal of mythic “Schein”, 
additionally underscores Benjamin’s thinking-image of divine, “law-destroying violence”. In 
“Zur Kritik der Gewalt”, the swallowing ground in the story of Korah, as evoked by Benjamin, 
is the exact ‘geological’ negative in the direction of the sensuous image of mythic violence: 
guilty Niobe who has been transformed into a weeping rock. “Der Mond” ends with the moon’s 
striking violence of pulling apart the ground. It swallows up “everything”, including the frozen 
bodies standing on the allegorical balcony, the threshold between the interior space of the 
bourgeois flat and the city. And what is exposed by the funnelled, violent movement of the 
moon, is the substratum of experience, the primal history of modernity.   
 
The Architectural  
 
At this juncture, it is worth considering an abridged view of the place of architecture in 
Benjamin’s oeuvre, as well as the contribution of Benjamin’s writings to architectural theory. 
Architecture plays a role in Benjamin’s writings most evidently through the figure of the 
covered interiors of the Parisian passages and through the new technologies of space and image 
such as the diorama and the panorama.15 The arcades, urban interior passageways covered by 
iron construction and glass panels and illuminated by gaslight, were created at the beginning 
of the nineteenth century as places for commodity display. Neither inside nor outside, the 
arcades signified the ‘modern’ while being already on the verge of disappearance, as 
Haussmann’s grand boulevards swallowed up most of the arcades by the end of the century. 
The arcades, when grafted onto Benjamin’s figurative language, remain caught between 
sensual perception and recollection.16 Architectural scholarship has responded to Benjamin’s 
 
15 For an account of the cityscape and modern metropolis as a site of phantasmagoria and myth in Benjamin’s 
work see Graeme Gilloch, Myth and Metropolis: Walter Benjamin and the City (Cambridge: Polity Press, 
1996).   
16 “All this is the arcade in our eyes. And it was nothing of all this. The arcades radiated through the Paris of the 
Empire like fairy grottoes. For someone entering the Passage des Panoramas in 1817, the sirens of gaslight 
would be singing to him on one side, while oil-lamp odalisques offered enticements from the other. With the 
kindling of electric lights, the irreproachable glow was extinguished in these galleries which suddenly peered 
from blind windows into their own interior; it was not decline but transformation. All at once they were the 
hollow mould from which the image of ‘modernity’ was cast. Here, the century mirrored with satisfaction its 
most recent past” (GS V:1045, AP 874).   
 10 
thought predominantly in regard to his critique of modern experience. In this frame, Anthony 
Vidler employed Benjamin’s theory of modernity in his remarkable account of the functioning 
of space and of architecture in relation to psychoanalytical theory.17 Andrew Benjamin’s 
philosophical accounts of architecture and of the politics of space and of time are a ‘working 
through’ of Walter Benjamin writings.18 The critique of architecture as a medium underwritten 
by new means of cultural production mostly prompts the reading of architectural productions 
as material objects and the viewing of architecture as a prominent site for cultural signs.19 
Benjamin’s writings on the proximity of film and architecture have informed theoretical 
discussions on architecture, technicity and art,20 and his writings on the experience of 
architecture in a state of distraction substantially shape architectural theory’s debates on (post-
) critical architecture and on architecture’s autonomous disciplinary status.21  
Benjamin’s attentiveness to the aesthetic and the semiotics significances of architecture 
is most discernable, however, in one of his preparatory notes for his study on Kafka: “No 
human art appears as deeply compromised as the art of building in Kafka. None is more vital, 
and none makes perplexity more perceptible [vernehmbarer, also more audible]. (‘The Great 
Wall of China’, ‘The City Coat of Arms’ and ‘The Burrow’)” (GS II:1219, my translation). In 
this commentary, Benjamin alludes to the confusion of hearing and to the blockage of linguistic 
comprehension, the subject matter of these Kafkan short stories and fragments, parables in 
which Kafka revises and explores the biblical tale of the Tower of Babel. The story “Der Bau”, 
in which the act of building reveals itself as the activity of digging brings to mind the “digging 
 
17 Vidler, Warped Space: Art, Architecture, and Anxiety in Modern Culture (Cambridge, Mass., London: MIT 
Press, 2001), pp. 81-97, 114-118.  
18 To mention but a few of these works: Andrew Benjamin, “Porosity at the Edge: Working Through Walter 
Benjamin’s ‘Naples’”, in Walter Benjamin and Architecture, ed. Gevork Hartoonian (London: Rutledge, 2010), 
pp. 39-50 and Style and Time, Essays on the Politics of Appearance (Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern 
University Press, 2006).   
19 See Andrew Benjamin and Charles Rice, “Walter Benjamin and Architecture”, Journal of Architecture, 12.5 
(2007), 471-475.      
20 For my paper (together with Carmella Jacoby Volk) that reflects on the critical potential of diagrammatic 
thinking for architectural design, an argument that largely builds on Benjamin’s distinction between the optical 
and the tactile, see “Haptic Diagrams: From Cinematography to Architectural Performance”, Journal of 
Architectural Education, 62.3 (2009), 71-76.    
21 See for example, Andrew Benjamin, “Passing Through Deconstruction: Architecture and the Project of 
Autonomy”, Hilde Heynen, “A Critical Position for Architecture?”, Patrick Keiller, “Film as Spatial Critique” 
and Charles Rice, “Critical Post-Critical Problems of Effect, Experience and Immersion”, in Critical 
Architecture, eds. Jane Rendell, Jonathan Hill, Murray Fraser and Mark Dorrian (London: Routledge, 2007), pp. 
40-47, pp. 48-56, pp. 115-123, pp. 261-268, respectively. For the treatment of Benjamin’s thesis regarding the 
“politization of aesthetics” in the context of architecture, see David Cunningham, “Architecture and the Politics 
of Aesthetics: Autonomy, Heteronomy, and the Philosophy of Art”, in The Missed Encounter of Radical 
Philosophy with Architecture, ed. Nadir Lahiji (London, New York: Bloomsbury 2014), pp. 35-54. 
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of the pit of Babel” mentioned in another related parable, “Der Schacht von Babel”.22 Buildings 
and social praxis, the organisation of the senses and the comprehensibility of the aesthetic 
object, as they are put into play by Kafka – all these are the motifs informing the architectural 
intimations in the “Kunstwerk” essay. Pointing to the idea of a collective state of distraction, 
the architectural references are critical to the decipherment of the theses on media 
reproducibility as they are developed in the essay, as it will be reviewed in Part One.  
Architectural activity as the symbolic and physical organisations of the social order is 
also the theme of Benjamin’s review of Paul Scheerbart’s novel “Lesabéndio: ein Asteroiden-
Roman” (published in 1913, Benjamin wrote his review in 1917 and in 1919). The novel’s 
narrative construct “focuses on nothing but the building of the tower” by the humans 
(“Menschen”) on this star, “creatures” from whom, as Benjamin observes, any indication of 
sex (“Geschlecht”) is consistently absent. In Benjamin’s set of notes related to this review, we 
read that Scheerbart’s “utopia of the body is linked to its eccentric rebellion against its 
convention”. Here Benjamin also accords the idea that “architecture becomes the canon of all 
productions [Architektur wird der Kanon aller Hervorbringungen]” with his undertaking 
aimed at the “blasting of the contemplative in art [Sprengung des Kontemplativen in der 
Kunst]” (GS VI:148, Benjamin’s italics, my translation). For Benjamin, it is significant that the 
architectural activity in Scheerbart’s novel exposes an aesthetic “law” as it traverses the space 
between “art” and “mythical forms”, between cognitive sense and the sensual as such. “The 
law runs [Das Gesetz heißt]: true interpretation grasps [erfaßt] the outer surface of things, their 
purest sensuality [reinste Sinnlichkeit]; interpretation is the overcoming of sense [Sinn[es]]” 
(GS II:618, my translation).   
In the essay Goethes Die Wahlverwandtschaften (written between 1919 and 1922, 
published 1924-1925), in distinguishing between two modes of interpretation: “Kommentar” 
and “Kritik”, Benjamin refers to historical distance as that which increases the power or the 
violence (“Gewalt”) of the work. “Critique”, he writes,  
 
seeks the truth content of a work of art; commentary, its material content. The relation 
between the two is determined by that basic law of literature according to which the 
more significant the work, the more inconspicuously and intimately its truth content is 
bound up with its material content. If, therefore, the works that prove enduring are 
precisely those whose truth is most deeply sunken in their material content, then, in the 
 
22 Franz Kafka, Parables and Paradoxes, in German and English, ed. Nahum N. Glatzer (New York: Schocken, 
1975), p.35.  
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course of this duration, the concrete realities rise up before the eyes of the beholder all 
the more distinctly the more they die out in the world. 
                      (GS I:125, SW 1:297) 
 
The decaying life of the work, Benjamin also writes, is comparable to a “burning funeral pyre” 
– “flammenden Scheiterhaufen”. He continues the comparison between commentary and 
critique by comparing the commentator to a chemist who is left only “with wood and ashes as 
the sole objects of his analysis”. The critic, by contrast, is compared to an alchemist who is 
concerned only with the enigma of the flame itself: “the enigma of being alive” (GS I:126, SW 
1:298). For the critic, the flame, the work, do not denote any meaning or entail any memory 
traces. The work of the critic is engaged with an awareness of a failure (the Scheitern that is 
compounded in the “Scheiterhaufen”23). And if “consciousness arises in place of the memory 
trace”, as Benjamin cites Freud in “Über einige Motive bei Baudelaire”, and “the real work of 
Eros [is] thanatos”, as is noted in the essay on Goethe (without reference to Freud), then 
alchemical Kritik is inescapably allegorical. The critic, for whom the flame blurs any 
distinction between life and death, arrives at a new conception of life that is released from fate 
and guilt (“the mythical essence” of Goethe’s novel, according to Benjamin), a life conceived 
of as “natural history”.  
In the review “Strenge Kunstwissenschaft” (1933), the same claim regarding the 
mortification of works is reproduced, albeit that now the law of critiquing literary works is 
displaced into a critique of the visual in the context of art history. According to this review, in 
which Benjamin speaks highly of Carl Linfert’s dissertation on the topic of the “borderline 
case” of architectural representation, Linfert is regarded as “the new type of researcher” that 
holds the “capacity to be at home in marginal domains”, that is, amongst natural historical 
figures of finitude, immersed within the loss of semblance. The architectural manifestations in 
drawings, as Linfert analyses these, produce architecture which is not primarily “seen” but 
rather experienced, in Linfert’s words, as a “sensing- or tracing-through of structures 
[Durchspüren]”, as it is cited by Benjamin (GS III:368, SW 2:670, translation modified). In Part 
Two, Linfert’s reference to Benjamin’s theory of allegory in his study serves to illuminate the 
architectural imageries used by Benjamin to capture the Baroque allegorical Schauplatz. The 
 
23 This has been pointed out to me by Sabine Gölz. The semantics of Benjamin’s reception of Kafka is imbued 
with terminology of unsuccessfulness: “an understanding of Kafka’s productions involves, among other things, 
the simple recognition that he was a failure” (as Benjamin writes in a letter to Gershom Scholem, quoted in 
Hannah Arendt’s introduction in Walter Benjamin, Illuminations, trans. Harry Zorn (New York: Schocken 
Books, 1968), p. 22. In my conclusion remarks I will tease out Benjamin’s critical evaluation of Kafka by 
drawing on Kafka’s architectural Imaginaries in light of Benjamin’s construal of Kafka as a literary “failure”.    
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allegorical cogency of these visual representations as the passages between the pictorial and 
the architectural, is weighed up by a discussion of Linfert’s thesis regarding the “sensing-
through” non-optical manner by which architectural drawings are experienced.  
Howard Caygill, in focusing upon Benjamin’s early reflections on painting and in 
reading the latter as informed by the Kantian structure of experience, articulates “the colour of 
experience” as the underlying idea of Benjamin’s oeuvre, in which “chromatic differentiation” 
is to be considered in place of linguistic signification. As Caygill comments,  
 
instead of the visual being regarded as an appendage to the linguistic, as in the many 
readings of Benjamin’s theory of allegory, it is here given its proper dignity, shifting 
the motivation of Benjamin’s work from problems of signification and expression to 
those of inscription and the mark.24  
 
From his early writings, signs and marks partake in Benjamin’s conceptualisation of forms of 
interruptive expressionlessness, as his early set of remarks on painting and graphics conveys. 
In the two essays “Malerei und Graphik” and “Über die Malerei, oder Zeichen und Mal”, 
written in 1917, painting is defined as a compositional set of marks given to the act of naming. 
These reflections not only anticipate, in their articulations of the “absolute sign [Zeichen]” and 
the “absolute mark [Mal]”, the foiled communication of the (dialectical) image, but also make 
it possible to identify the ethical function of the body and of corporeality in Benjamin’s method 
of thinking in images between signs and marks. For Benjamin, as these perplexing passages 
indicate, the act of thinking visual objects is indissoluble from politico-theological contents. 
The picture or image, “das Bild”, is constituted upon mythical and theological orders, and 
although these orders incessantly evade human perception, the shifting relations between signs 
and marks render them perceivable in the realm of pure Schein.    
Significant to this argument is Benjamin’s claim that both sign and mark resist their 
resemblance to something else. The “absolute sign”, Benjamin writes, is “the line that has its 
magical character as such not the line made magical by whatever it happens to represent” (GS 
II:603, SW 1:83). By this, the visual is brought into close proximity to his theory of language 
formulated a year earlier in 1916, in the essay “Über Sprache überhaupt und 
über die Sprache des Menschen”. The mark too, though operating within a sphere of a medium 
(the Mal in Malerei) is manifest – “ist im Erscheinen” – without resembling something other 
 
24 Caygill, Walter Benjamin: The Colour of Experience (London: Routledge, 1998), p. xiii.  
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than itself: “nichts anderem ähnlich”. In analyzing Benjamin’s remarks on signs and marks 
Andrew Benjamin commented that “here, both the object and its projective quality – its having 
that quality is, of course, part of its magic – both form part of the object. It is as though the 
object now has a thickness.”25 Acquiring density, a perception more associated with touch 
subdues the predominance of sight to the extent that the mark demonstrates a mode of being 
(Sein) bereft of semblance (Schein). The corporeal impact of the being of the mark is also made 
evident by Benjamin’s contention that the absolute form of the mark appears on the outer 
surface of a living body as the manifestation of guilt or shame: “the mark appears principally 
on living beings (Christ’s stigmata, blushes, perhaps leprosy and birthmarks)” (GS II:605, SW 
1:84). 
Notably, underlying these characteristically condensed and encrypted reflections is the 
idea that there is a spatial, ‘architectonic’ mode of representation that subsists in any pictorial 
creation. In “Malerei und Graphik”, Benjamin uses an architectural terminology of longitudinal 
and cross sections, the “two sections” that cut through the “substance of the world 
[Weltsubstanz]”. The first, the “Längsschnitt”, is related to marks, to the method of working in 
painting and to the pictorial space which is more descriptive or representational in nature 
(“darstellend”). The essence of the second, the cross section or the “Querschnitt”, is graphic 
and symbolic. The cross section is underscored by an abbreviated perspective which Benjamin 
also likens to the act of viewing mosaic on which the beholder’s feet are placed (GS II:603, SW 
1:82). This more ‘spatial’ nature of the sign is bound to the conjuration it entails. “Über die 
Malerei, oder Zeichen und Mal” ends with a reflection on the functioning of the mark in spatial 
creations (“räumlichen Gebilden”), after a reference to drawing – “Zeichnung” – has already 
been given. There Benjamin notes that the graphic line, by the opposition it forms with the 
surface (“Fläche”), gives rise to a “metaphysical significance” which is not given to the bare 
eye or gaze (“bloßem Auge”) for which this significance is not distinguishable, 
“unterscheidbar[er]” (GS II:604, SW 1:83). Precipitating that which is imperceptible within the 
visual, the medium of the drawing discloses the manner in which it is the more architectonic 
and spatial significances of the line that are indifferent to the aesthetic experience of Schein.  
In ending the short essay “Über die Malerei, oder Zeichen und Mal”, Benjamin turns to 
accounting for the meaning of the mark within spatial artistic productions with particular 
 
25 Andrew Benjamin, “Framing Pictures, Transcending Marks: Walter Benjamin's ‘Paintings, or Signs and 
Marks’”, in Walter Benjamin and the Architecture of Modernity, eds. Andrew Benjamin and Charles Rice 
(Melbourne: Re:press books, 2009), pp. 129-142 (p. 134).   
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resonance for the architectural. “Das Mal im Raum”, he notes, is evidently bound up with the 
“sphere of the mark”, and this through “architectonic meaning” and yet in a way that still 
remains open to exploration. “Above all”, Benjamin thus concludes, marks in space “appear as 
monuments to the dead or gravestones [Toten- oder Grabmale], but these are marks in the exact 
meaning of the word only if they have not been given an architectonic and sculptural shape” 
(GS II:607, SW 1:86). Neither sculptural shape, which does not lend itself to bodies to dwell 
(only to spirit, according to Hegel),26 nor architectonic meaning in the primal sense of 
providing cover to the human body, but only its direct opposite, namely, housing the remains 
of the dead, can count as marks in space. As Benjamin’s reflections on painting, signs and 
marks convey, the architectural or the spatial mark is intimately connected to the atmosphere 
of violence and to the dimension of corporeal refuse, the ideas surrounding the figuration of 
allegory in the Trauerspiel book, as is expounded here in Part Two through the key figure of 
the ruin.  
  
The Natural Historical 
 
According to Benjamin’s theory of language, it is from nature’s muteness – “Stummheit”, that 
a disclosure of a melancholic (“traurig”) acoustical trait is set forth. With this suggestive 
characteristic, Benjamin seems to set the demarcation line between the human and the non-
human (also rendered as the earthly profane and the theologically sacred), the limit that 
powerfully intervenes between those domains, but also, that which brings them most closely 
into accord. This postulation reaches a comparable point in Heidegger’s “Grundbestimmung” 
of his ontological thought: namely, Dasein’s fundamental existential moods, or Stimmungen. 
This intricate relation between the order of language and the sensuous, worldly aspect of 
experience, at play in the perceptual conditions of mood (Heidegger) and, in particular, the 
melancholic mood of the Baroque (Benjamin) – forms the focal point of Adorno’s 
conceptualisation of Naturgeschichte.  
The dialectical relation of nature and history as outlined by Adorno is also reflected in 
Giorgio Agamben’s explication of the term “form-of-life”. This concept refers to a life that 
 
26 For Hegel, as Rebecca Comay notes, “the role of classical sculpture is to provide a visible proof of both the 
necessity and the possibility of spirit’s own embodiment. It demonstrates that the human body is the ultimate 
dwelling place [Wohnsitz] for spirit, the site of nature’s essential transparency to spirit and vice versa.” Comay, 





cannot be separated from its form, “a life in which it is never possible to isolate something such 
as naked life”.27 In his articulation of the idea “form-of-life” Agamben uses the Aristotelian 
terms of zoe (natural life, the fact of being) and bios (political life, the habitual way of life). 
These terms, just as in Adorno’s theoretical move with natural history, overlap and accordingly 
disavow conceptual stability and identification; they can only collapse (in both senses of the 
word), just as in the mutual falling apart of nature into history, of history into nature. By the 
very same token, natural creaturely existence crosses over into the historical sphere from which 
it was originally barred. As Eric L. Santner notes, this state of exception immanent to the law 
as uncovered by Agamben, is the dimension of “creaturely life” that pervades Benjamin’s 
thought. Benjamin’s work, as Santner also points out, represents the ways in which creaturely 
life “comes to be transmitted and disseminated through the political, economic, and cultural 
institutions of modernity, becomes embodied in its objects, enters the texture of their 
materiality, becomes the very substance of their ‘mattering’.”28 In his review on the Swiss 
anthropologist Johann Jakob Bachofen (written in French in 1934-1935), Benjamin provides a 
pinpoint description: it is “death”, says Benjamin, that “in the final analysis, [is] the prudent 
mediator between nature and history: that which had been historical finally falls back, through 
death, into the domain of nature; that which had been natural finally falls back, through death, 
into the realm of history” (GS II:222-23, SW 3:14). 
In his study on the concept of “creaturely life”, Santner explicates Benjamin’s view of 
natural history by stressing that “we truly encounter the radical otherness of the ‘natural’ world 
where it appears in the guise of historical remnant”.29 According to this, Naturgeschichte refers 
“not to the fact that nature also has a history but to the fact that the artifacts of human history 
tend to acquire an aspect of mute, natural being at the point where they begin to lose their place 
in a viable form of life (think of the process whereby architectural ruins are reclaimed by 
nature)”. “Natural history” aims to evoke, as Santner further notes, the “space between real 
and symbolic death.”30 Naturgeschichte thus embodies the recourse to the moment of Spirit’s 
differentiation from nature. For Hegel, it was architecture as an aesthetic symbolic form, as we 
will see in Part One, that was left forever as a sediment of a failure, namely, an aesthetic object 
caught up in the relay between nature and history.  
 
27 Agamben, “Form-of-life”, in Means without End, Notes on Politics, trans. Vinccnzo Binetti and Cesare 
Casarino (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2000), pp. 3-12 (p. 4). 
28 Santner, On Creaturely Life: Rilke, Benjamin, Sebald (Chicago, London: University of Chicago Press, 2006), 
p. 86.   
29 Ibid., p. xv.   
30 Ibid., pp. 16-17.  
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Natural history illuminates the paradox that lies at the origin of “absolute knowledge”, a term 
that persistently functions as an indissoluble reminder for spirit’s not being at home. In drawing 
on Benjamin’s configurations of the melancholic gaze, Julia Reinhard Lupton has noted that 
he “identifies the creaturely with a peculiar form of consciousness, impelled by idealism yet 
forever earthbound by the weight of corporeality, at once sullen angel and pensive dog”.31 
What underlines Reinhard Lupton’s observation here is the fundamental opposition that seems 
to infuse Benjamin’s procedure of thinking in images. This divide is portrayed through 
vocabularies of the perspectival optical, of infinite erotic distance on the one hand, and through 
extreme closeness and touch on the other. And yet, this disparity seems to eventually coalesce 
in the groundless abyss, the inconspicuous space of the underground. This is mostly expressed 
in the trope of “under-going” (“Untergang”, also “going down into”) of a decayed or sinking 
living thing, the paradigmatic site of “beautiful semblance” (“schönen Schein”), an idea that is 
constitutive to the dialectic of the image and unfolds in the analysis of Goethes Die 
Wahlverwandtschaften. It is the emergence or cropping up of corporeality into the sphere of 
the image that is one of the profound underlying ideas set out in this essay on Goethe.   
 Relevant as well to this configuration of the imagistic in relation to the symbolic nature 
of the architectural sign (Hegel), is Rebecca Comay’s comment regarding the perplexity that 
imbues Benjamin’s theory of allegory. As Comay observes, 
 
Hegel’s own determination of the symbol in the Aesthetics would correspond more 
precisely to Benjamin’s notion of allegory, insofar as it exemplifies the gap or 
discrepancy between ‘meaning’ and ‘shape,’ Bedeutung and Gestalt — in Benjamin’s 
terms, the ‘abyss between visual being and meaning’ – and thus stands as a cipher of 
radical non-reconciliation.32  
 
Adorno’s lecture, as we will see, culminates with a rejection of domesticity and with the 
alliance of natural history to the sensation or mood of Das Unheimliche (as shown by Freud 
and Heidegger). Adorno’s contention is that “the promise of reconciliation” (between the 
subject and the object) is implicated in a “world” whose sense or intelligibility is always 
already related to the senses, to the system of the sensorium.     
 Relegated to the “sign-script of transience” (“Zeichenschrift der Vergängnis“), natural 
history is an expression not only of what Benjamin conceptualises as “creaturely life” 
 
31 Reinhard Lupton, “Creature Caliban”, Shakespeare Quarterly 51.1 (2000), 1-23 (p. 5).  
32 See Comay, “Materialist Mutations of the Bilderverbot”, p. 254, footnote 36.      
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(“kreatürliches Leben”), but also of creatureliness that is always concerned with 
“Schöpfungsstand”, with the condition of being created. And creation, according to Benjamin, 
bears the significance of the linguistic. What here grounds the reconstruction of the concept of 
natural history is Benjamin’s focalisation in the Trauerspiel book of “the allegorical 
physiognomy of natural history” (GS I:353, O:188) around the figure of the architectural ruin 
(in a section entitled “Die Ruine”). Benjamin employs Hegel’s aesthetic-historical theory in a 
dialectical manner: “Architecture”, he writes in the “Kunstwerk” essay, “has never had fallow 
periods” (GS I:465, AW 33). For Hegel, architecture is the artform in which the idea of an 
original act of impressing meaning on meaningless material becomes discernible. And yet, in 
its symbolic phase, architecture, by dint of its very presence, cannot cross the threshold of its 
essence of non-signifying object. At its origin, architecture does not represent; it can only exist 
– and hence signify nothing other than itself – as a shelter. This idea is played out in Benjamin’s 
review of Linfert’s study on architectural drawings. The “architectures” featuring in this study 
are made “present in the first place” by the images (“Sie [sie Architekturen] geben sie 
allererst”); they do not represent – “wiedergeben” (GS III:373, SW 2:669, Benjamin’s 
emphasis). As a cover, the essence of architecture is primarily attached to its material presence 
and its content cannot be “unveiled”, to use here one of the key tropes that Benjamin uses in 
his articulation of art criticism. Thus, in the essay on Goethe, we read: “the task of art criticism 
is not to lift the veil but rather, through the most precise knowledge of it as a veil, to raise itself 
for the first time to the true view of the beautiful” (GS I:195, SW 1:351).  
Architectural objects, when they are, as Hegel says, “strictly symbolic or independent”, 
are bereft of any meaning outside their own being. This point illuminates the degree to which 
the “life of creaturely things” as denoted by Benjamin in his discussion of melancholy in the 
Trauerspiel book – is mostly embodied in architecture. It is of significance for the arguments 
unfolded in this thesis regarding the indispensability to Benjamin’s thought of the set of ideas 
that assemble into the constellation of ‘tactility’ that for Hegel, it is the tower of Babel that is 
the most succinct expression of symbolic architecture. Hegel accentuates the social function of 
the tower (VÄ II:276, LA II:638), the labour of its building that was made possible by the unity 
of speech. As we read in Genesis: “all the earth was one language, one set of words [‘one lip’ 
is the literal translation of the Hebrew phrasing]”.33 The consideration of Naturgeschichte as 
an idea that has its origin in an architectural undertaking thus prefigures this medium to be the 
artform that paradoxically encompasses both the “naming language” of man and the 
 
33 Genesis 11:1 in Robert Alter, Genesis: Translation and Commentary (New York, NY: Norton, 1996), p. 46.   
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arbitrariness of the sign; both the symbolic and the allegorical, or, put in the terms of the 
“Kunstwerk” essay: the “optical and tactile”. As will be detailed in this thesis, the logic of 
decay that is set forth with the purview of Naturgeschichte is also the working of the tactile 
within the economy of the sinking Schein of the image. And this correlates with the status of 
translation within the functioning of language. As is demonstrated in Part Three, the “fore- and 
after-history” of translation could be gleaned from the logic of natural history. This is the logic 
that lies at the foundation of the tale of the Babylonian tower; the cry for a “name”, as we read 
in Genesis, is set against the fear of the dispersion of family lineage, the fear of assimilation 
and of exile. Analogously, translation, in Benjamin’s terms, is concerned with the ‘organic’ 
survival (“Uberleben”) of the original, as the rhetoric of natural growth and “unfolding” 
(“Entfaltung”) in the translator essay suggests (GS IV:11, SW 1:255). 
 
The critical treatment of architectural sensing-through is advanced in the following three parts 
of the thesis through a series of reconstructions of spatial configurations or scenographies and 
architectural sites that cut through Benjamin’s oeuvre in both horizontal and vertical fashions, 
as both marks and signs. These scenographies are regarded as material contents that bind us 
closer – by the act of reading them critically, in the proper sense of Kritik – to the “truth 
contents” of Benjamin’s own mode of applying critique. The analysis that is advanced here 
also calls for a montage-like approach, as prescribed by Benjamin.34 Thus, it is not a single text 
that is subject to discussion in what follows, but rather the trajectory of architectural signs and 
marks across diverse writings and fragments. By weaving them together, the thesis sets out to 
precipitate the critical conditions for the semantics of tactility to come into view – or, perhaps, 
to be ‘sensed-through’. While there is a logic of interweaving at work here, the discussion is 
not without focal points of organisation. Thus, as already mentioned, particular attention is 
given to Benjamin’s theory of language as it was set out in the early essay on language and in 
“Die Aufgabe des Übersetzers”. It is through the prism of these meditations on translation, 
language and the theory of the name, informed by the “twists and tropes” of the architectural 
edifice of Babel (but also of the subterranean labyrinths of the pyramids) that the after-life of 
cultural artefacts or material contents are grasped as affectively persistent in their tenacity as a 
ruin.35 Viewed from this stance, there is an elective affinity between the key figure of the 
 
34 “Notes on montage in my journal. Perhaps, in this same context, there should be some indication of the 
intimate connection that (exists) between the intention making for nearest nearness [nächste Nähe] and the 
intensive utilization of refuse [Abfalls] – a connection in fact exhibited in montage” (GS V:1030, AP 861). 
35 “Des Tours de Babel”, the title of Derrida’s essay on Benjamin’s translation essay, conveys the meanings of 
‘turn’ and ‘trope’ residing in the French word tour which also means ‘tower’. “Des Tours de Babel”, in Psyche: 
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cinematic ruin-scape of second nature that makes an appearance in the “Kunstwerk” essay and 
the failed project of Babel that wanders – nameless, as an incremental heap of rubbish and 
refuse – into the field of view of the angel of history in the Ninth Thesis.    
What I aim to show in the thesis, following on from what has been outlined in this 
introduction, is that the “dominant feature” of tactility, which is “more originally” at home in 
architecture, as it is formulated in the “Kunstwerk” essay, is to be regarded as the residue of 
Naturgeschichte in the sphere of the image and in the thinking that is configured by its 
dialectics. What flows from this is that tactile reception is the predicament upon which the 
bonds and links between ethics, life and aesthetics are hinged. Benjamin’s concept of life, in 
drawing away from salvation history, or Heilsgeschichte, is displaced into “messianic passing 
away”. Framing tactility, therefore, would also correspond to what Weigel systematically 
uncovered as “motifs of a dialectic of secularization” in Benjamin.36 Just as with the fatal flame 
which is an expression of a new signification of life inferred by the commentator, the 
motivating contention here is that the architectural semantics that run throughout Benjamin’s 
whole work – from the settings of ruins of the Baroque to the etuis of the bourgeois subject – 
are to be read as a cipher for the force of removal that Hegel attributed to the subterranean 
spaces of those “enormous”, but also monstrous or uncanny (“ungeheure”) “crystals”, the 
Egyptian pyramids. The architectural sites of sensing-through unfolded in this thesis testify to 
a set of banishments that are critically enacted in the scenographies deployed by Benjamin: the 
banishment of the corporeal within the symbolic, of the tactile within the optical, and, of the 





Inventions of the Other vol.  I, eds. Peggy Kamuf and Elizabeth Rottenberg, trans. Joseph F. Graham (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press ,2007), pp. 191-225. In Hegel’s writings on the Egyptian architecture he glosses the 
underground spaces of the pyramids as spaces marked by “twisting and turning” which are “not designed for the 
silly problem if finding the way out, but for an intelligent wandering amongst symbolic riddles” (LA II:647).  
36 See for example the chapter “On the Threshold between Creation and the Last Judgment” in Walter Benjamin, 





Body Meets Architecture in Benjamin’s Thinking of the Image 
 
Erstens steht als der durch die Sache selbst begründete Anfang 
die Architektur vor uns da.  
[In the first place what stands before us, as the beginning 
grounded in the matter itself, is architecture.]  
           – Hegel, Vorlesungen über die Ästhetik  
 
in Ursprünglicher ist sie [die taktische Dominante] in der 
Architektur zuhause.  
[More originally it [the tactile dominant] is at home in 
architecture] 
   – Benjamin, “Das Kunstwerk” essay (first version)  
 
According to “Das Kunstwerk im Zeitalter seiner technischen Reproduzierbarkeit” (written in 
three versions between 1935 and 1939), along with the distinctive structures of perception of 
new modes of reproduction, of film and photography, the idea of ‘tactility’ is most succinctly 
articulated, by the medium, or the idea of architecture, through its domination by this 
perceptual faculty. Architecture, posited in close proximity to film, is an artistic discipline by 
which Benjamin’s central premise – namely, the historicity of the medium of perception and 
its organisation – is made manifest. As Benjamin states, architecture is generally associated 
with collective “Rezeption in der Zerstreuung”, the laws [Gesetze] of such reception are “most 
instructive [sind die lehrreichsten]”, and buildings, and with them this mode of distracted or 
dispersed reception, “have accompanied human existence since primeval times [ihrer 
Urgeschichte]” (GS I:465, AW 33). The sensuous experience of architecture is predicated on 
the “laws” of perception. And with the following allusion to Lehre, translated as doctrine, in 
the superlative “lehrreichsten”, architecture, in Benjamin’s terms, verges on the paradox of 
tradition and transmission, between laws and their teaching. At the same time, reception in 
distraction draws away from the assumption that architecture is above all received as an optical 
phenomenon; in the sphere of the arts it is the proper object in which the disintegration of 
appearances is transmitted, mediated. According to a passage in the first version of the 
“Kunstwerk” essay, a passage that was omitted from the succeeding two versions, while it is 




“optical”, resides within architecture in a concealed form. Architecture is the artistic domain 
which tactility inhabits in a particularly intimate way, in which it is at home “more originally”.  
This first part of the thesis starts from this constellation of architecture, “das Taktische”1 
and origin, aiming at its decipherment by accounting for possible returns to a self-effacing 
origin, to what is more original. These returns, as they are specified in Benjamin’s view of this 
category (to which we shall come back in Part Two), are in themselves endless. The category 
of origin, which is not “purely logical” but “historical”, as is argued in the “Erkenntniskritische 
Vorrede” to the Trauerspiel book (GS I:226, O 25), does not signify an unequivocal, actual 
spatio-temporal beginning.2 Origin, strictly speaking, inescapably points to its own 
incompleteness; it is therefore always already an excess, more than origin.  
Hegel’s Vorlesungen über die Ästhetik (delivered between 1818 and 1829 and first 
published in 1835), although clearly attributing the category of origin to architecture, at the 
same time give an account of this medium as ‘more original’, to borrow Benjamin’s construal 
of the concept, a comparative to be viewed here also as ‘more than origin’. In Hegel’s lectures, 
architecture is positioned at the beginning of art, at the stage of the “properly symbolic” (“Die 
eigentliche Symbolik”), an origin exemplified by the sensory sign system of the Egyptian 
pyramids. And yet the symbol, in the sense given by Hegel in the context of his historicity of 
the aesthetics, is also designated as “pre-art” (“Vorkunst”); the symbol is not yet the union 
between inner meaning and external form, a unity accomplished in classical art with the idea 
of “beautiful semblance”. It is the conceptualisation of the decline of the latter, of “schöner 
Schein” – most prominently epitomised through the concept of the aura	–	that the “Kunstwerk” 
essay grapples with. Framed by architecture’s dialectic of origin as argued by Hegel, 
Benjamin’s deployment of the sensory experience of tactility and of the notion of the “optical 
 
1 Tobias Wilke bases his interpretation of “tactility” set out in the “Kunstwerk” essay on the semantic ambiguity 
of the word “taktisch” which could also be read as referring to the field of military “tactics”. This reading is 
grounded in the fact that in Benjamin’s French translation of the essay, published in his lifetime and authorized 
by him, the word “taktisch” had been translated as the French word “tactile”, and hence, the editors of 
Benjamin’s Gesammelte Schriften replaced the German adjective taktisch that holds the twofold meaning of 
tactical and tactile, with the single adjective taktil. See Wilke, “Tacti(ca)lity Reclaimed: Benjamin's Medium, 
the Avant-Garde, and the Politics of the Senses”, Grey Room, 39 (2010), 39-55. In alignment with this 
ambiguity, the translation of the first version presents “the shifts between the two English terms tactical and 
tactile, depending on which of the two meanings takes relative precedence at any given point in Benjamin's 
text” as the editors and the translators explain. See Michael W. Jennings and Tobias Wilke, “Editors’ 
Introduction Walter Benjamin's Media Tactics: Optics, Perception, and the Work of Art”, Grey Room 39 (2010), 
6-10. Based on Benjamin’s early writings, in which the tactile is situated in alignment with other sensual 
faculties, such as the optical and the acoustical, and in line with the German text of the first version of the essay, 
I have kept the translation of the word “taktisch” as “tactile” in all cases. However, the semantics of tactics with 
its connotative connection to notions of concealment and veiling are still held within the interpretation of the 
tactile that this thesis advances.   
2 Benjamin’s conceptualisation of origin inverses Hermann Cohen’s analysis of the concept of origin set out in 




unconscious” may be seen to be informed by “symbolic architecture”, posited at the threshold 
of art, as we will see. In the chapter on independent and symbolic architecture, drawing on the 
proximity of language to what he defines as symbolic or independent art, Hegel evokes the 
tower of Babel as an exemplary “masterpiece” of symbolic architecture (VÄ II: 276, LA II:639). 
According to this primal architectural scene of both material and linguistic destruction, 
architecture, in its connection to the sacred, binds human beings together and enables them to 
act collectively. Significantly, the Hegelian evocation of the story of Babel brings the idea or 
the medium of architecture into close proximity to Benjamin’s theological account of language, 
which is constitutive as well for the construal of the faculty he names “tactility”.   
In as much as “die taktische Dominante” is indeed more originally “in der Architektur 
zuhause”, this formulation is also an intimation of what we could call the ‘Unzuhause’. The 
argument here would be that this architectural thinking image evidently points to Freud’s 
interrelated theories of the uncanny and the articulation of the death drive, beyond the pleasure 
principle. That the tactile is a corporeal sensation or affect that is unheimlich in kind could be 
gleaned from Benjamin’s portrayal of this sensual faculty to be more originally at home in 
architecture. Apparently dispossessed of any sense of unsettlement, it is in fact not self-
identical as origin, only ever comparatively more original. As such it is uncannily suspended 
between being at the beginning of a historical process and the bearer of immemorial time. 
Being outside of historical time, on the side of myth, it is barred from what is ‘new’. As a note 
in the Passagen-Werk has it, “Architecture as the most important testimony to latent 
‘mythology’” (GS V:1002, AP 834), and herein lies the archaic unsettlement of the architecture 
of modernity, as epitomised by the arcade and the dream logic housed in it.3 When framed by 
Freud’s theory of das Unheimliche, what is revealed to be “in der Architektur zuhause”, at once 
conspicuous and concealed, is the prefix “un-”, “the token of repression” according to Freud.4  
Building on these purviews, the Hegelian and the Freudian, Benjamin’s thinking image 
of the tactile can be read against the backdrop of his consideration of the mythic. In the seminal 
study Goethes Wahlverwandtschaften, the mythic is evoked in relation to the erotic and to the 
unattainability of bringing things closer under the imposition of the image. Here the mythic is 
also played out in some points of architectural significance that surface in or are dispersed 
through the essay. More particularly, these architectural allusions and the evocation of the 
 
3 The note from the Passagen-Werk continues: “And the most important architecture of the nineteenth century is 
the arcade. – The effort to awaken from a dream as the best example of dialectical reversal. Difficulty of this 
dialectical technique” (GS V:1002, AP 834). 
4 Freud, “The Uncanny”, in The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, vol. 




archetype of the house – all converge in the focal point of Benjamin’s analysis: Goethe’s 
heroine Ottilie. Ottilie’s death, the intention of which is concealed and unpronounced, 
inconspicuous and expressionless, could not be considered a moral choice according to 
Benjamin’s argument. Moral choice, he emphasises, has no existence outside the order of 
human language; it is always an object of pronunciation and of transmission (GS I:176, SW 
1:336). Nevertheless, this feature of expressionless unleashes the perceptibility of the “mythic 
powers of the law” (GS I:130, SW 1:301). Ottilie’s living body, Goethe’s exemplar of the 
aesthetic construction of beautiful semblance, brings about the “truth content” of the novel 
according to Benjamin: the fading away of semblance, a sunken Schein. Taking its cue from 
this constellation, this part of the thesis focuses on Benjamin’s deployment of the sensorial 
level of tactility and of architecture in his theory regarding the deteriorative quality of 
“beautiful semblance”. A comprehensive reading of the range of meanings unfolded by what 
is postulated here as the architectural-tactile shows how this category is also in play in different 
configurations across Benjamin’s writings.   
  
I. Architecture and the Teaching of Distraction/Dispersal 
 
It is towards the end of the “Kunstwerk” essay, in its eighteenth thesis, entitled “Taktile 
[Taktische] und Optische Rezeption”, that the commentary on architecture appears. Here 
Benjamin attempts to elucidate the social phenomenon of the distracted masses and their 
refrained mode of “collection” (“Sammlung”) in relation to the artwork. For, so Benjamin 
argues, it is common to lament (“Man klagt”) the fact that the masses seek distraction in the 
artwork which is no longer considered as an object for private worship; the masses see it as a 
cause for entertainment (“Unterhaltung”, also conversation). Still, this apparent opposition 
(“Gegensatz”) of “Zerstreuung und Sammlung” requires a closer look, says Benjamin. He uses 
the legend of the “Chinese painter who disappeared into his own painting while viewing it” as 
the paradigmatic example of the distanced yet absorbed singular viewer of the auratic art object, 
such as painting in its classical mode, which has declined. This is performed through “close 
collection” – “mit Sammlung nahe”: an individual, self-possessed yet absorbed mode, the mode 
of reception that is said to oppose the distracted form of reception associated with the masses 
and, mediated through architecture – with tactility. And yet the word “Sammlung”, recalling 
indeed a scenography of religious congregation, is also characteristic of the assembled yet 
distracted masses. The masses, therefore, in accordance with the dialectical relation between 




concentration or cognition. The distracted/dispersed masses (“die zerstreute Masse”) absorb 
into themselves, “for their part”, the artwork; “they play around it [umspielt] with their 
breaking waves [Wellenschlag] and encompass it with their tide” (GS I:465, AW 33, translation 
modified).  
 It should be noted that the figures of thought used by Benjamin in order to portray the 
masses’ reception of buildings seem to suggest reference to Ludwig Klages’s interrelated 
tropes of “Eros der Ferne”, “der Wirklichkeit der Bilder”, and “Rausch” as a “wave of life” – 
“Lebenswelle”.5 In Vom Kosmogonischen Eros (published in 1922), Klages speaks of an all-
encompassing “electric” and “magnetic charge”, a “stream”, stating that “Eros is elemental or 
cosmic” since it has the power to unify “all events that separated bodies, space and time” into 
this “omnipresent element” of an ocean.6 In ecstasy, being out of itself, the individual returns 
to a more primordial state linked to the “soul”, which, for Klages, stands for the opposition of 
“Geist” (as he stated in Der Geist als Widersacher der Seele, published in 1929). “In the soul” 
he writes, “the individual is not truly an individual, but a cosmic wave.”7 The drawing closer 
character of Eros is imagined as an all-pervasive ocean, and yet, “whoever seeks to negate 
distance is characterized by a possessiveness that is fatal to Eros, to the glowing nimbus of the 
world, and, ultimately, to actuality itself.”8 If “the glowing nimbus of the world” – the ‘aura’ 
in Benjamin’s terms9 – is actuality in the sense of the nearness of what is most distant in 
Klages’s disposition, then Benjamin’s thesis regarding the “decimation of the aura” is directed 
at exposing this double stance of nearness and distance amidst the historical conditions of the 
reproducibility of the image.10 
According to the passage just cited from the “Kunstwerk” essay, the measure for an 
aesthetic object which in effect is absorbed by the masses (the collective body portrayed by 
Benjamin as an inhuman veil of water) – the object which is experienced in tangible proximity, 
yet still is not consumed in this process of the destruction of contemplation – is architecture. 
“This [the oceanic metaphor] is most obvious with regard to buildings” (GS I:465, AW 33). 
 
5 See Ludwig Klages, Vom Kosmogonischen Eros (Bonn: Bouvier Verlag, 1963). In a passage discussing the 
content of intoxication (“Rsusch”) and its conditions, Klages says that “by nature, any intoxication” endows the 
spectators in the crowd with “an overflowing wave of life [überströmenden Lebenswelle]”, p. 75.   
6 See the chapter “Der elementare Eros” in Vom Kosmogonischen Eros, pp. 49-58 (p. 56). On “Der Eros der 
Ferne” see pp. 90-94.  
7 Ludwig Klages, Cosmogonic Reflections, trans. Joseph D. Pryce (London: Arktos, 2015), p. 24.  
8  Ibid., p. 80.   
9 On the tracing of the lineage of Benjamin’s concept of the aura to Klages’s theory of the image see Miriam 
Bratu Hansen, “Benjamin’s Aura”, Critical Inquiry 34.2 (2008), 336-375. 
10 On the departure and differentiation of Benjamin from Klages, see Irvin Wahlfarth, “Walter Benjamin and the 
Idea of a Technological Eros. A Tentative Reading of Zum Planetarium”, in Perception and Experience in 




Architectural buildings are material objects producing – through a particular constellation with 
the masses – what the essay “Der Sürrealismus, die letzte Momentaufnahme der europäischen 
Intelligenz” (1929) delineates as an “image-space” (Bildraum”) which is the outcome of a 
“dialectical justice”. Although this particular concomitance of image, space and body 
(“Leibraum”) “can no longer be measured out by contemplation”, the image, defined as the 
“long-sought image sphere” that opens up when “nearness [Nähe] looks with its own eyes”, is 
indispensable to what Benjamin calls the world of actuality: “die Welt allseitiger und integraler 
Aktualität”. This world, in which there is no more “Parlour” (the bourgeois “gute Stube”), is 
where body and image, interiority and its expulsion in the form of bodily dismemberment reach 
their touching point: until “no limb remains untorn” (GS II:309, SW 2:217).  
 This thinking image of collective-corporeal dispersion brings us back to the postulation 
of architecture in the context of the theses that Benjamin develops in the “Kunstwerk” essay. 
The experience of architecture by the masses dialectically retains the aesthetic experience of 
the Chinese painter whose body, contrary to the intensification of corporeality felt by the 
masses, disappeared completely into his painted surface. The object in the mode of 
architectural reception is perceived in the course of the abolition of distance and as a shared 
activity, to the extent that the contemplative posture of the individual body dissolves into a new 
body-image. Therefore, what is indicated, is not that the auratic experience entailed and 
required by the traditional art object has disappeared. Rather, it is its deformation, the somatic 
experience of its decay, its “Verfall” – famously designated by Benjamin as ‘breathing’ (GS 
I:440, AW 15)11 – that calls forth the critical attention to the historical significance of this 
phenomenology of self-consummation. For, as is also argued in the “Kunstwerk” essay, “The 
way in which human perception is organized – the medium in which it occurs – is conditioned 
not only by nature but by history”. This idea regarding the organisation of perception is derived 
from the “great scholars of Viennese school”, Alois Riegl (to whom we will return shortly) and 
Franz Wickhoff, who were able to conceptualise human perception and forms of embodiment 
in historical terms, as a transition from the late-Roman to the classical era (GS I:440, AW 15).  
To the extent that the human relation to aesthetic objects is transformative, and so 
historical, this relation finds its expression most succinctly in architecture, according to the 
 
11 The aura of the artwork, whose loss is ambivalently lamented in Benjamin’s essay, is explained in the 
following claim: “in even the most perfect reproduction, one thing is lacking, the here and now of the artwork –
its unique existence in a particular place.” And this loss of the artwork’s distinct place, its unique presence in 
space, is further followed by another sense of spatial loss, namely the withdrawal of space as such: “every day 
the urge grows stronger to get hold of an object at close range in an image [Bild], or, better, in its reproduction 




commentary on this medium. And yet, as Benjamin nonetheless claims, regardless of the 
historical changes in human perception, now modelled on the different mode of existence 
(“Daseinsweise”) of the historical collective, architecture has forever served as a “prototype of 
an artwork”. Its featuring of “Rezeption in der Zerstreuung”, as enacted “through the 
collective”, has been the gesture of architecture “from time immemorial” (“von jeher”). 
Architecture is an aesthetic form that is intimately tied, in Benjamin’s words, to Lehre – a 
teaching, doctrine or tradition, also in the religious sense, so that “Die Gesetze ihrer Rezeption 
sind die lehrreichsten” (GS I:465, AW 33).12 The ‘teaching’ of the law of architectural reception 
might proceed from the fact that, as an intimation of timelessness, architecture seems to lack 
any “historical index” and as such, it never reaches “readability” (“Lesbarkeit”), to invoke the 
terminology set out in the Passagen-Werk.13 Yet all the same, and for that very reason, 
architecture is an expression of transience and therefore – of history, or, to be more precise, of 
what will be extensively discussed here, following Adorno’s observations on the topic, that is, 
“natural history”.  
Claudia Brodsky Lacour, in her reconstruction of the significance of architecture in 
Hegel’s Aesthetics, notes that the symbolic form of architecture as represented by the Egyptian 
pyramids, “those enduring, self-determined structures and first representations of 
‘immortality’, take on the aspect of passing phenomena in a history of spirit surpassing all 
phenomenal manifestation”.14 What she characterises as the act of representing death in 
 
12 Benjamin’s reflections on the concepts of tradition and transmission are formulated through the semantics of 
modern architecture: “The twentieth century, with its porosity and transparency, its tendency toward the well-lit 
and airy, has nullified dwelling in the old sense” (GS V:292, AP 221). And it is the very way of dwelling framed 
by steel and glass, as he informs us in “Erfahrung und Armut” (1933), that modernity’s rhetoric of progress, 
functionalism, liberation and purity renders the expression of loss and the loss of expression, captured with the 
emergence of modern architecture (GS II:213-219, SW 2:731-736).  
13 In an earlier version of this section, Benjamin attempts to ascribe such a “historical index” to architecture by 
associating it with advertising: “Wie steht es mit unsern heutigen Bauten? Sie sind, wie sich in der Großstadt 
erkennen läßt, zu Trägern der Reklame geworden” (GS I:1043). Benjamin had reflected upon the long lost 
“Verfall der Kritik”, whose false lamentation is evoked in one of the aphorisms in Einbahnstraße (1928). 
“Kritik,” the matter of “right distancing”, “was at home in a world where perspectives and prospects counted 
and where it was possible to take a standpoint […] ‘ingenuousness [Unbefangenheit]’ and the ‘autonomous 
gaze’ have become a lie […]. Today, the most real, mercantile gaze into the heart of things is the advertisement. 
It tears down the stage upon which contemplation moved” (GS IV:131-132, SW 1:476, translation modified). In 
viewing architecture as the physical bearer of advertisements, Benjamin sets out a double negation, of both 
secularisation and theology entailed by “world historical constellation”. The “attitude of collection in front of 
the work of art” could, at any time (“jederzeit”), come to be transformed back into the sphere of religion, while 
the distracted one, whose experience remains at any time that of the mass, is therefore related to political 
attitude. This, “for the time being”, Benjamin says, “must be confirmed in the statement that in the world 
historical constellation, extremes touch each other (“in weltgeschichtlicher Konstellation die Extreme einander 
berühren”). Therefore, “in front of the poster, just as before, in front of the image of devotion [Andachtsbilde]”, 
“there is neither art lover nor philistine” (GS I:1043-1044, my translation).   
14 Brodsky Lacour, “From the Pyramids to Romantic Poetry: Housing the Spirit in Hegel”, in Rereading 




symbolic form that signals “the principle of freedom”, namely, the dialectics of origin instated 
by Hegel in his consideration of these architectural housings of preserved corpses, can also be 
discerned in the following comment on architecture made in the “Kunstwerk” essay. 
“Buildings”, Benjamin writes,  
 
have accompanied human existence since its primal history [Urgeschichte]. Many art 
forms have come into being and passed away. Tragedy begins with the Greeks, is 
extinguished along with them, and is revived centuries later. The epic, whose origin 
lies in the early days of the tribes, dies out in Europe at the end of the Renaissance. 
Easel painting is a creation of the Middle Ages, and nothing guarantees its 
uninterrupted existence. But the human need for shelter is permanent. Architecture has 
never had fallow periods. Its history is longer than that of any other art, and its effect 
ought to be made present in any attempt to account for the relationship of the masses 
to the work of art according to its historical function.  
(GS I:465, AW 33) 
 
 The ephemeral singularity of life and the most immutable entities within human creation are 
circumscribed within architecture. This art form, according to Hegel, in its symbolic form – 
designated by Hegel also as “unconscious”15 – of the pyramids, expresses the ascendancy of 
matter over spirit. For Benjamin, architecture is the form in the field of perception most 
apposite to the historical condition marked by “Verfall”, the collapse or withering away of the 
aura, which he associates with the functioning of ritual and cult in the course of the artwork’s 
reception. And yet, what is also indicated in architecture is mythic time, the mere repetition of 
what has always been, a temporality more associated with ‘nature’. And this, in turn, brings to 
the fore the historical function of the artwork. In Hegel’s terms, art’s task is historical: to make 
conspicuous, by means of sensory experience, the “freedom of spirit”. And yet, it is in the 
dissolution of the natural within aesthetics as initiated with architectural activity, as the 
symbolic form of “the immortality of the soul”, that the latter “lies very close” to this “principle 
of freedom”. This is why, symbolic forms – and by implication (symbolic) architecture – are 
ahistorical in nature. For, what Hegel designates as ‘symbol’ is a not yet, what Benjamin would 
call, a ‘readable’ sign:  
 
 




The symbol, in the meaning of the word used here, constitutes the beginning of art, 
alike in its essential nature and its historical appearance, and is therefore to be 
considered only, as it were, as the threshold of art. It belongs especially to the East and 
only after all sorts of transitions, metamorphoses, and intermediaries does it carry us 
over into the genuine actuality of the Ideal as the classical form of art. 
            (VÄ I: 393, LA I:303) 
 
What Benjamin glosses as architectural ‘timelessness’, associated with myth and 
repetition, is not in keeping with the time of the physical body (“der Körper”), the body which 
is limited in time but also in space by its connectedness to nature, according to the fragment 
“Schemata zum psychophysischen Problem” (written 1922-1923). These “outlines” present the 
intersected meanings that traverse the definitions of Seele, Geist, Leib and Körper, which can 
be translated as the soul, spirit or mind, the lived-body (that which signifies both the dwelling 
place for the spirit and the sphere of its sensuous embodiment), and the corporeal, substance-
body. This body, according to these reflections, cannot be perceived as a totality, for all forms 
of delimitation (“Begrenzung”) belong to the lived, historical body – “Der Leib”.16 As 
Benjamin also notes, in contrast to what is perceived by touch or through a sensation aroused 
in the skin – “Tastwahrnehmung” – the limitless Körper finds its counterpart within the realm 
of perception (“Wahrnehmung”) in the dimension of the visual. “Gesichtswahrnehmung” is the 
sense “least bound by limitation”, adhering that is, to spirit’s “freedom”. This indicates the 
substantial body to be, “if not without limits then at least with fluctuating, formless boundary” 
(GS VI:79, SW I:394). This body, charged with affective sensations, is akin to a state of spirit-
less intoxication or “Rausch”, a term Benjamin uses here with a reference to Klages, whose 
writings serve as the theoretical backdrop to these “outlines” (GS VI:84, SW 1:398). 
Establishing the ambiguity of the split between Körper and Leib seems to be the undertaking 
of this early fragment. The limitless substance body incites a tactile image-space borne by the 
fact that the outer surface of the body as Körper subjects the inwardly embodied body, the 
Leib, to be spatially dispersed, unbounded and unlimited, and thus, put in terms of the 
“Kunstwerk” essay – distracted. With this, the historical function of the body unfolds between 
a concentrated mode of reception and a distracted one.  
 
16 This opposition, between the physical and the lived, experiencing body, was set out first by Max Scheler and 
then, more rigorously, by Edmund Husserl. See Donn Welton, “Introduction: Foundations of a Theory of the 
Body”, in The Body: Classical and Contemporary Readings, ed. Donn Welton (Malden, Mass., Oxford: 




The idea of a tactile reception and its interdependency with what is visually perceived also 
leads to the ground-breaking theory of art history of the Austrian art historian Alois Riegl. 
Riegl’s influence on Benjamin’s oeuvre has received considerable scholarly attention and is 
also well documented by Benjamin himself.17 In his 1901 book Die spätrömische 
Kunstindustrie, Riegl presupposed the extremities of the tactile and the optical as the sensory 
dimensions first setting into motion his attempts to historicise the fine arts through the 
categorisation of different epochal forms of “Kunstwollen”. “Kunstwollen”, glossed here as 
will-to-art, also carries a resonance of the will of art, a double sidedness in which the 
incompletion of the ongoing movement between the subject and object, history and nature, is 
therefore inscribed. Going beyond the question of the beautiful and the conditions for its 
judgment (pace Kant), at issue, according to Riegl, is pictorial art’s “will-to-art”. This, in turn, 
is made visible to the historian by “the appearances of objects as form and colour on the plane 
or in space”, as they are manifested by the artistic means of an era. This notion of art’s striving 
for its own self-identity, until the point of its own absorption, is already expressed in the 
Hegelian Idea of the spirit’s development towards its own pure self-knowing. With the final 
stage of “an und für sich”, absolute spirit is in touch with itself, transparent to itself, only by 
means of overcoming any signifying sensuousness, the sensory matter that is produced by the 
body designated as “Leib”, the proper body inhabited by “Geist”.18  
The tactile is designated as the first level of the Kunstwollen characterising ancient 
Egyptian art in Riegl’s chapter on architecture. As follows from this assertion, the persistent 
element in any aesthetic creations is that they presuppose the beholder as located at a ‘touching’ 
distance in their acts of vision, just as they can only appear through the relations they constitute 
with one another within the image space. Riegl classifies these relations by degrees of bodily 
proximity in optical terms, as “nah-sichtig”, “normalsichtig”, and “fern-sichtig”.19 Yet tactility 
pertains not only to the expression of an extreme connection of the eye or the body to the plane. 
 
17 The opposition of the optical and the tactile is also found in other studies in aesthetics read by Benjamin, for 
example Heinz Werner’s Grundfragen der Sprachphysiognomik (1932), as pointed out in Fredric Schwartz, 
Blind Spots: Critical Theory and the History of Art in Twentieth-Century Germany (New Haven, Conn.: Yale 
University Press, 2005), p. 228. On Benjamin’s reception of Riegl’s theory of art history, see Wolfgang 
 Kemp, “Fernbilder: Benjamin und die Kunstwissenschaft”, in 'Links hatte sich noch alles zu enträtseln ...’ 
Walter Benjamin im Kontext, ed. Burkhardt Lindner (Frankfurt a.M: Syndikat, 1978), pp. 224-228.   
18 See Jacques Derrida’s remarks on Husserl for whom “the body of the sign [is] animated by the intention of 
signification, just as a body (Körper) when inhabited by Geist becomes a proper body (Leib).” Derrida, “The Pit 
and the Pyramid: Introduction to Hegel’s Semiology”, in Margins of Philosophy, trans. Alan Bass (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1982), pp. 69-108 (p. 82).  
19 Alois Riegl, Late Roman Art Industry, trans. Rolf Winkes (Rome: G. Bretschneider, 1985), pp. 24-25. These 
are discussed as historically distinct modes of perception from Classical architecture, sculpture, painting and the 
decorative arts. Riegl emphasised that already in late Roman art the development of the modern, optical mode of 




The category of the tactile is originated in an unattainability of the void, a void that is to be 
covered and blocked, put out of sight. According to Riegl, architectural-tactile beginnings 
manifested the manner in which the art of building was more involved in the restriction of the 
spatial (“Raumbegrenzung”), therefore concealing and literally “pushing back” any space that 
has been created, any “Raumbildung”,20 and this by creating external surfaces of covering. 
Within these manifestations of “close vision” – “Nahsicht”, the mutually exclusive sensorial 
orders of touch and sight lie buried together.  
In a pivotal passage of the “Kunstwerk” essay, the mutual interspersing of the optical 
and tactile receptions entailed by architecture – is weighed up. As Benjamin observes:    
 
Buildings are received in a double fashion: through usage and through perception 
[Wahrnehmung]. Or better: the tactile [taktisch] and the optical [optisch]. There can be 
no conceiving of such reception if it is thought of according to the model of collection 
as is routine for instance for travelers standing in front of famous buildings. For, on the 
tactile side, there is no counterpart to what contemplation stands for on the optical side. 
Tactile reception comes about not only by way of attention [Aufmerksamkeit] but also 
by way of habit [Gewohnheit]. The latter largely determines even the optical reception 
of architecture, which by its nature [von Hause aus] comes about less in the form of a 
tense observation [gespannten Aufmerken] but rather by way of a casual noticing 
[beiläufigen Bemerken]. Under certain circumstances, this form of reception shaped by 
architecture acquires canonical value. For the tasks of the perceptual apparatus 
[Wahrnehmungsapparat] at historical turning points cannot be formed by way of mere 
opticality [Optik]; these tasks cannot be resolved by way of contemplation. They are 
mastered gradually, taking their cue from tactile reception through habit.  
       (GS I:505, AW 34, translation modified) 
 
For Benjamin, tactility’s adherence to the removal of distancing bears upon an abbreviated 
mode of perception in condensation. It is within this nexus that architecture is capable of 
transmuting the habit of attentive contemplation into new habitual and collective forms of 
bodily distraction/dispersal – Zerstreuung. The distinction between attention and habit 
discloses how opticality assumes an uncustomary attentiveness, as it is captured in the scene 
of the “congregated” or “gathered” – “gesammelten” – travellers, situated at a contemplative 
 
20 “Thus we must conclude that in antiquity, architecture at least at the beginning gave preference to and 
foregrounded limitation of space whenever possible, while it must have suppressed and concealed its other 
responsibility, the creation of space.” Ibid., p. 21, Riegl, Die spätrömische Kunst-Industrie nach den funden in 




aesthetic distance in front of famous buildings. Its counterpoise, the tactile, constitutes the more 
corporeal contact with the materiality of the perceived phenomenon, beyond the aesthetic realm 
of the beautiful. To the extent of having no counterpart to what contemplation is on the optical 
side, what the “tactile side” foreshadows is the sensuous apprehension or intuition of non-
opticality. This countervails the phenomenon of aura: instead of “the unique appearance of a 
distance, however near it may be” (GS I:440, AW 15), for all the proximity the tactile bestows 
on experience, in the tactile mode of reception beyond the visible there is no presence to be 
sensed. It is a counterpart (“Gegenstück”) whose content is rendered inconspicuous, 
unscheinbar. Therefore, it is the kind of distraction carried out in the sphere of art by tactility 
and habit (a concept that will be further elaborated below by turning again to Hegel) that 
secretly and privately (“Unter der Hand”, also connected to that which is heimlich) makes it 
possible to envision the historical “new tasks of apperception” (GS I: 466, AW 34).  
 
1) Architecture and Film  
 
Notably, architecture participates in accounting for the distinctive structures of perception of 
the new modes of reproduction, of film and photography, through its domination by tactility:  
 
Reception in distraction – the sort of reception which is increasingly noticeable in all 
areas of art and is a symptom of profound changes in perception – finds in the cinemas 
its central place. And there, where the collective seeks distraction, the tactile dominant 
element [die taktische Dominante] that rules over the regrouping of apperception is by 
no means lacking. More originally, it is at home in architecture [Ursprünglicher ist sie 
in der Architektur zuhause]. Yet nothing more clearly betrays the violent [gewaltigen] 
tensions of our time than the fact that this tactile dominant element asserts itself in the 
very form of optics. And precisely this occurs in film through the shock effect of its 
image sequences. In this respect, too, film proves to be the most important subject 
matter, at present, for the theory of perception that the Greeks called aesthetics.  
        (GS I:466, AW 34, translation modified)  
 
“The violent tensions of our time”, namely the infamous “aestheticizing of politics” (but also 
“politicizing art” [GS I:467, AW 36]) is the politicisation of what is ‘perceptible by feeling’ as 
etymologically originated from the Greek word aisthetikos. In the age of image reproducibility, 




in film is also primarily tactile. It is based on successive changes of scenes [Schauplätze] and 
settings [Einstellungen] that by jerks [stoßweise] penetrate the spectator” (GS I:464, AW 32, 
translation modified).  
In another key passage, Benjamin regards film’s disruption of the order of visual 
perception, worked through an imagined liquidation of modern environment. Here, a mode of 
collective perception is set in an opposition to the scene of the collected travellers. Now it is 
film’s activation of collective bodily innervations that engenders an image-space of 
architectural confinements struck by explosive destruction – Zerstörung. As Benjamin writes: 
“Our bars and city streets, our offices and furnished rooms, our railroad stations and our 
factories seemed to close relentlessly around us. Then came film and exploded this prison-
world with the dynamite of the split second.” Cinema’s medial transformations – those of 
“close-up” and “slow motion” are effected through an explosive destruction of these 
architectural confinements. And it is for that very reason that film “manages to assure us of a 
vast and unsuspected [ungeheur[en] und ungeahnt[en] field of play [Spielraum]” (GS I:461, 
AW 30).  
The spatial distance as the condition of the image,21 conditional indeed in the case of 
viewing architectural objects, is displaced in film into temporal nearness. The 
indistinguishability of past and present is captured in the scattered materiality that defines – 
and so circumscribes – the whole of the image-space that Benjamin portrays. In it, the dispersal 
of spaces coincides as it were with the distracted beholders. The Zeitraum of human 
environment, of forms of dwelling and habituation – is now strewn with its own residues of 
destruction, and so, spatiality gains ascendancy over temporality, over the nature of film as 
time-based medium. The transformation made manifest, we might say, is that time, constitutive 
of the objective thinking of the (transcendental) subject, is visually apprehended. 
Transitoriness, which abides enduringly within the image reproduced in a medium grounded 
on the passing of time as such, is shared between subject and object as the time of being, the 
ephemerality of both body and world.22 Although cinema’s medial form is that of temporal 
succession, it is a medium in which form radically breaks with its content and dialectically 
destroys time. This thinking image thus coincides with the field of vision associated with the 
“angel of history” in the Ninth Thesis on history, the catastrophe which stands in contrast to 
 
21 On the category of distance in the act of viewing, see the thinking-image entitled “Die Ferne und die Bilder” 
(GS IV:427). 
22 See in this regard Merleau-Ponty’s reflections on the “flesh of the world” in The Visible and the Invisible, 




any “chain of events” (GS I:697-698, SW 4:392) a contrast establishing the idea regarding the 
loss of historical progress.    
Spatial order, however, is likewise subject to displacement: Film inverts this 
claustrophobic characterisation of social space into what Benjamin calls “a play-form of second 
nature”. The current historical demand, as Benjamin asserts, is for the conversion of human 
sensibility into another, collective tactile disposition: “To make the enormous technological 
apparatus [die ungeheure technische Apparatur] of our time an object of human innervation – 
that is the historical task [die geschichtliche Aufgabe] in whose service film finds its true 
meaning” (GS I:445, AW 19). According to Benjamin’s scattered remarks on first/second 
nature, and also on first/second technology (“Technik”), made in the different versions of the 
“Kusntwerk” essay and also in fragments related to them, “first nature” is primarily connected 
with organic nature, “the bodily organism of the individual human being”. And yet, “the 
revolutionary demands of first, organic nature” are still far from being fulfilled in the 
collective’s appropriation of “second nature as its first in technology [Technik]” (GS VII:666, 
SW 3:135). “Technology”, Benjamin writes in Einbahnstraße (written in 1925, published in 
1928), means the “mastery not of nature but of the relation between nature and man” (SW 
1:487). In the “Kunstwerk” essay he contends that “humans of course invented, but no longer 
by any means master this second nature which they now confront” (GS I:444, AW 18). Second 
nature is, in effect, first.23 The cinematic technique, coupled to the “play-form of second 
nature” (or second technology), yields a “play-space” (“Spielraum”) (GS I:461, AW 30, 
translation modified) capable of displacing the primal relation to mythical nature. It is ‘first 
nature’, glossed here as mythic and as that which lies beyond or before the human, that is 
uncannily glimpsed through the ruin-scape of second nature as exposed by film.  
With the cinematic ruin-scape of second nature, an image that seems to be extracted by 
Benjamin out of a real image of reproduction, forms of human habitations appear to 
disintegrate and to be no longer used in the form of possession or of sheltering. Human, 
symbolic “second nature”, succumbing to real, natural death, is fashioned – and this is still to 
be elaborated – as a conjuration of expressionlessness and of the sublime (as hinted by 
Benjamin’s semantics of Ungeheuerlichkeit). Furthermore, in as much as the cinematic is 
inextricably bound up with a procedure of destruction, only this state of ruin, one of a lost 
modern space, no longer a space qua dwelling space for bodies, is that of itinerant happiness 
and fortune: “now we can set off calmly on journeys of adventure among its far-flung debris 
 




[weitverstreuten Trümmern]” (GS I:461, AW 30). What is surfacing in this passage is the idea 
of “Glück”  and its ties to “messianic nature” and to redemption, as prescribed by the 
“Theologisch-Politisches Fragment”: “For Nature is messianic by reason of its eternal total and 
passing away” (GS II:204, SW 3:306).  
 
2) Tactile Embodiment  
 
Architecture and the effect of the teaching associated with it exhibit an artistic domain that 
borders on the two forms of human corporeality. On the one hand, the historical experienced 
body, the “Leib” bound to the perceptual faculties, and, on the other, this body’s corporeal 
essence. According to Benjamin’s early anthropological or psychophysical reflections, the 
physical, habitual body, the body which is given, in its having, is – from the standpoint of the 
body designated as “Leib” – unimaginable, devoid of semblance. In a fragment probably 
written in 1918 entitled “Wahrnehmung und Leib”, Benjamin binds the empirical sensual 
semblances engendered by the human body to language in its highest or purest form. As he 
writes: “We are ultimately placed into the world of perception, into one of the highest realms 
of language, by our bodiliness [Leiblichkeit], our own body.” In this scenography of body and 
language, the natural body (“Naturleib”) is laid bare – being there, it extends up (“ragen”); and 
this occurs in the “most immediate [am unmittelbarsten] fashion”, which has nothing to do 
with visual registering, but rather is negatively guided by a distinction between “Schein” and 
“Sein”, a distinction made according to “the measure of the messianic form [messianisch[en] 
Gestalt]”. What is significant, says Benjamin, is that our body is inaccessible to us in so many 
ways: “We cannot see our face nor our back, projected into the world with our feet, not our 
head.” Hence the inevitability, so Benjamin concludes, that marks “the present moment of pure 
perception [im Augenblick der reinen Wahrnehmung]” in which “our body is transformed unto 
us [sich uns verwandle]”; thence the “sublime suffering of the eccentric in relation to his body” 
(GS VI:67, my translation).  
Body and language, at their projected origins, share a lack of mediation; the nakedness 
of being, the (un)embodied Körper, is analogous to the highest realm of language designated 
by Benjamin as pure communicability. It is the affective flesh that functions here as a medium 
between spirit and corporeality, as if turning the inside (consciousness, mind) to an outside 
tactile cover, the layer of experience, according to this Denkbild, in which the appearance of 
one’s body dissolves. Thereby, with the rendition of the resulting alienated sublimity or 




that which is finite and non-human – the irredeemable transience unfolds. It exceeds the bodily 
mode called Leib, accompanied by physical suffering (and also pleasure, which Benjamin 
distinguishes from happiness, from “Glück” [GS VI:81, SW 1:395]). This scenography of the 
body brings to mind an image of bodily stature glossed in the Wahlverwandtschaften essay. 
There, the body, inconspicuous to itself, comes into play in the idea that the upright standing 
of the human is a corporeal posture that lays itself bare before God.24 In the context of the 
Wahlverwandtschaften essay, this statement appears in relation to the concept of love:  
 
The human being appears to us as a corpse and his life as love, when they are in the 
presence of God. Thus, death has the power to lay bare like love. Only nature cannot 
be unveiled, for it preserves a mystery so long as God lets it exist. Truth is discovered 
in the essence of language. The human body lays itself bare, a sign [ein Zeichen] that 
the human being itself stands before God. 
                   (GS I:197, SW 1:351) 
 
 The idea regarding the sensuous body’s transformation into the body one already has, 
releasing an experience otherwise associated with that of the bodily mode of Körper, is further 
developed and problematised in the aforementioned “Schemata zum psychophysischen 
Problem”, with the exposure of the crossing of meanings between “Leib” and “Körper”, but 
also between “Geist” and “Sexualität”, “Natur” and “Körper”. According to these crossings of 
meaning, the natural progression of  the corporeal individual body through time, its 
“körperliche Natur”, flips over from its trajectory towards passing away into an oppositional 
(messianic) sphere of “resurrection” (“Auferstehung”).25 Corresponding to this movement, in 
which all things earthly and transient are bound to the divine by dint of their decline, is a 
counter-nature, that of the lived, “leibliche” body – through which, according to Benjamin, 
 
24 In reading this scenography as a reference to the Jewish day of atonement, mediated through Benjamin’s 
drawing on the work of Hermann Cohen, Rochelle Tobias comments that it is by this invocation of “der 
Versöhnungstag” that Benjamin marks the distinction between art and ethics in the course of his uncovering of 
the sacrificial logic of Goethe’s novel. See Tobias, “Irreconcilable: Ethics and Aesthetics for Hermann Cohen 
and Walter Benjamin”, MLN 127.3 (2012), 665-680 (p. 666).  
25 Benjamin’s category of the messianic resolves around the split between nature and history. As stated in 
“Theologisch-Politisches Fragment”, “Only the Messiah himself completes all history, in the sense that he alone 
redeems, completes, creates its relation to the messianic. For this reason, nothing historical can relate itself, 
from its own ground, to anything messianic.” And yet, the historical is imbued with the messianic through its 
enmeshment with the natural, thus “nature is messianic by reason of its eternal and total passing away.” (GS 




man partakes in the collective process of history – that advances towards its dissolution.26 
These two opposed progressions of the body, dissolution and resurrection, coincide, as 
Benjamin notes, in “natural history” – “in der Naturgeschichte” (GS VI:81, SW 1:395). What 
is given in Benjamin’s perplexing account of the psychophysical problem is his view of the 
moral, political world as obtaining its significance from the idea regarding a tactile body, 
invisible to the senses, hence the aforementioned proximity between “Leibraum” and 
“Bildraum”. In the Surrealism and the “Kunstwerk” essays, this duality of the body is now cast 
into the idea of a collective corpus that is capable of surpassing the realm of Schein.  
Benjamin’s discussion of architecture in the “Kunstwerk” essay bespeaks this artistic 
medium as the form of historical co-existence, the political being-with of bodies, in which the 
psychophysical problem and the peculiar discrepancies of bodily modes unfold. Architectural 
forms are not only objects of use, but also experienced, to recall – in “perception: or better: the 
tactile and the optical”. This means, according to the “Schemata”, different degrees of bodily 
perception, between the limited yet formless “Person” and its “maximum extension” associated 
with the “people [das Volk]” (GS I:80, SW 1:394-5). In the essay on Surrealism, Benjamin talks 
about a “residue” (“Rest”), claiming that the “collective is a body [in the sense of Leib] too” 
(“Auch das Kollektivum ist leibhaft”) (GS II:310, SW 2:217). It seems that what underlines 
Benjamin’s intentions in these remarks is the attempt to lay bare consciousness and mentality 
as something corporeal; a physiological being that, in lacking contours, is thus gesturing back 
towards that which is intangible and so illegible.  
In the section of the “Schemata” entitled “Geist und Sexualität / Natur und Körper”, it 
is noted that spirit is, at the origin (“im Ursprung”), “something natural”, just as sexuality is. 
Here, natural life – “natürliches Leben” – of which sexuality and spirit comprise the “two vital 
poles”, is described through a metaphor of the currents of the sea: the confluence of spirit and 
sexuality flows (“mündet”) into the physical body and in it they are “differentiated”; these 
aspects of human nature are regarded as the human body’s “fluctuating boundaries with nature” 
(GS VI:81, SW 1:396). And perception (“Wahrnehmung”) is one of the “most important organs 
of this differentiation of the body [Körper]” into spirit and sexuality. The comment continues 
as follows: “The zone of perceptions also shows clearly the variability to which it is subject as 
a function of nature. If nature changes, bodily perceptions change too” (GS VI:82, SW 1:396, 
 
26 On the link between the “Theologisch-Politisches Fragment” and the “Schemata zum psychophysischen 
Problem” and their underlying notion of politics in Benjamin see Uwe Steiner, “The True Politician: Walter 




translation modified). In a phrasing that resonates, in its intimation of “the anguish of nature”, 
with the later “Kunstwerk” essay, as we shall see, Benjamin says:  
 
In the utter decline [Verfall] of corporeality such as we experience in the West at the 
present time, the last instrument of its renewal is the anguish of nature [die Pein der 
Natur] which is no longer grasped in life and therefore roars in wild torrents over the 
body [Körper]. 
     (GS I:81, SW 1:396, translation modified) 
In the second part of the aforementioned fragment “Wahrnehmung und Leib”, 
Benjamin refers to “the history of perception which is in the end the history of myth”. He 
describes primordial modes of perception which are more tactile than optical in nature: 
“already man’s upright walk, achieved only gradually, allows for earlier different modes of 
perception.” The history of perception “comes into being from the factors of change in nature 
[Naturveränderung] and change of the body [Veränderung des Leibes];” yet these changes 
received their “spiritual meaning and their crowning (their mastery, synthesis [Bewältigung, 
Synthese]) in myth.” The mythic essence of perception, the manner in which “body and nature 
stand in relation to one another” – is rendered by its culmination in a “crowning” in the form 
of a spatial net: “right, left – above, below – in front, behind” (GS VI:67, my translation). 
“Krönung” here seems to evoke coronation, and the body, when it is subordinated to myth and 
to the category of sovereignty, is at the same time the mark of the inaccessibility of one’s own 
body to visual perception. When this unavailability of the realm of Schein and of embodiment 
is expressed within myth, it is the latter that is thereby revealed to be bound up with non-
communicability, with “the highest realm of language”.   
In the section in the “Schemata” entitled “Nearness and Distance” (“Nähe und Ferne”), 
these oppositions are considered as part of the aforementioned spatial order in which the body 
is placed. As is also noted there (with a reference to Klages), “[nearness and distance] are 
particularly prominent in the life of Eros and sexuality. The life of Eros is ignited [entzündet 
sich] by distance. On the other hand, and instead, there is a kinship between closeness and 
sexuality” (GS VI:83, SW 1:397, translation modified). The exchange between closeness and 
distance in these notes is associated with death. This idea is brought to the extreme in dreams: 
“in itself we see the greatest nearness in dreams; and also – perhaps – the furthest distance?” 
Thus, the life-likeness of dreams enacts a desire for the inanimate: “however marvellously they 




Tote aus dem Schoße dieser Tiefen]” (GS VI:85, SW 1:399).  There is another death in question 
here, that which is famously formulated in the Foreword to the Trauerspiel book as the “death 
of intention” (a trope to be detailed later on). Following from the problem of the reality of 
dreams and their relation to truth and actuality, Benjamin remarks that “in the world of truth, 
the world of perception has lost its reality. The world of truth may well not be the world of any 
consciousness.” The problem of the relation of dreaming and waking (a problem indispensable 
to the theory of “recognizability” developed in the Passagen-Werk), is a problem not of the 
“theory of knowledge” but of the “theory of perception” (GS VI:85, SW 1:399).   
 
II. The Image-like, the Imageless, the Name 
 
1) The Hülle as the Organiser of the Symbolic  
 
The “Kunstwerk” essay’s intimations of the faculty of touch are directed at the assumption 
(already set forth in the Wahlverwandtschaften essay) regarding the decay of “beautiful 
semblance”. Touch is the basis for the “peeling of the object out of its cover/veil” – “Die 
Entschälung des Gegenstandes aus seiner Hülle” – an image, or better a scene, that is said to 
accord with “the decimation [Zertrümmerung] of the aura” (GS I:440, AW 16, Benjamin’s 
italics, translation modified). The allusion here is to the theory of the un-unveilability 
(“Unenthüllbarkeit”) of “truth” developed in the Wahlverwandtschaften essay and in the  
 Foreword to the Trauerspiel book. In the Wahlverwandtschaften essay, Benjamin interprets 
Goethe’s work as a manifestation of the idea that the veil or cover – of appearances and beauty, 
of “beautiful semblance”, and the veiled/covered object (“truth”) cannot be separated from 
each other: they form a configuration of image, distance and touch (GS I:195, SW 1:351). A 
veiled object, that of a female body, also appears in the “Erkenntniskritische Vorrede”, in the 
evocation of the figure of the goddess Isis standing at the temple of Saïs, accounting for the 
futile striving for truth (“Only nature”, and therefore, the body, “cannot be unveiled”, to recall 
the just cited statement from the Foreword to the Trauerspiel book). As Benjamin comments 
on this programmatic image: “Truth is the death of intention. Precisely this can be gathered 
from the fable of a veiled image at Saïs, the uncovering [Enthüllung] of which is fatal to anyone 
who seeks to ascertain the truth by questioning” (GS I:216, O 12). The ‘tactile’ impulse of 
unveiling is issued here from this manifested series of extirpations of distance as the condition 




significance to this constellation. The veiled body is a statue standing probably outside or 
before the Egyptian temple. It is the relation of architecture to sculpture, we might say, that 
shifts and displaces the image of veiled Isis into another plane of representation and of the 
question of truth. Isis, whose body is devised to remain inaccessible to the human eye, is in 
effect susceptible to an image that is unconcealed; it has stepped out of the temple, and with 
this covered body-image, an image-space emerges as the power of the veil diminishes.  
With the question of the truth as idea, disconnected from “appearances” 
(“Erscheinungen”), the idea reaches its self-consciousness, and that is in contrast to the 
dialectic of truth and beauty, as Benjamin draws on Plato’s Symposium, according to which 
truth “is beautiful not so much in itself as for the one who seeks it”; for the beautiful is 
determined by “the stages of erotic desire”. And the same relation between truth and beauty, 
beauty which is always expropriated by the sensuous body, thus  
 
obtains when it comes to human love: the human being is beautiful for the one who 
loves, though in himself he is not – and precisely because his body presents itself in a 
higher order than that of the beautiful [sein Leib in einer höheren Ordnung als der des 
Schönen sich darstellt]. 
        (GS I:211, O 6) 
 
A few passages later, Benjamin calls upon a reactivation, not of originary language 
(“Ursprache”), but rather, of originary apperception, or better – hearing – “Urvernehmen” – 
which underlies the task of the philosopher. The latter’s concern is, “through presentation 
[durch Darstellung], to reestablish in its primacy the symbolic character of the word” (GS 
I:216-217, O 13). This symbolic character could be traced in the union of the veil of 
beauty/appearance and the body as its covered object, a body which is in itself a tactile cover, 
a union involved in a violent conjuncture between corporeality and knowledge. This demise is 
grounded on a radical representation of closeness, that of the subject to its object, which, at the 
same time, is also an irrevocable separation of truth from its “presentational moment”. For “this 
presentational moment [darstellende Moment] in truth is the refuge of beauty in general” (GS 
I:211, O 6). What is untouchable in truth, requiring in itself to be posited as and in philosophical 
presentation, is a sheltered province where beauty resides; whilst truth enacts a desire for 




the word “grasping” – “Fassen”27), it is beauty that maintains this desire through and as 
distance. 
“The beautiful is neither the veil nor the veiled object but rather the object in its veil” 
(GS I:195, SW 1:351). With the covered nature of the artwork or the object (“der Gegenstand 
in seiner Hülle”), the Hülle as a veil is inescapably subject to a “presentational moment” 
featured by touch. This figure is ‘tactile’ in the dual sense of the bodily proximity it brings to 
the ‘object’ through the substance covered by it and the touching that is obstructed in the 
banned act of unveiling. The moment of disclosure or of truth lies neither in the uncovering of 
an afterimage in the form of the veil or cover, nor in conceptualising any original moment that 
has preceded it in the form of the “veiled object” before the act of its veiling. More than 
anything else, this image seems to disclose a refusal in the sense referred to by the 
Jewish prohibition of the image (of graven images, likenesses, or the image-like).28 Likewise, 
the moral obligation to be faithful to the one and indivisible God is also fused with the non-
semblance that is inherent to any imagistic portrayal of the body. Architecture is an object that 
shelters the body, delimits its optical extension and enables awareness of the tactile dimension 
within the visual by its interior and exterior formations. Yet the body, as content, is never 
architecture’s form (and this is dialectically enacted by the sheltered corpse, according to 
architecture’s Egyptian origins). It is from this stance of the Jewish motif of the Bilderverbot 
that architecture did not fall into the worship of visual images.29 With this idea of iconoclasm 
in mind, we might say that it is precisely the sensory dimension of the tactile that evinces a 
certain attentiveness to the decimation of the aura, to the abolishment of ‘the Eros of distance’.   
The alliance between the rhetoric of touch and the non-communicability of the 
linguistic sign can be read against the backdrop of Winfried Menninghaus’s interpretation of 
Benjamin’s conceptualisations of death and of the “production of the corpse” in the Trauerspiel 
book, as a theory of the sublime and the critique of the beautiful.30 This procedure, according 
to Benjamin, is nevertheless still animated by an impulse or “Moment” of presentation, 
underscored by the name, a mode of representation that has no connection to the realm of 
appearance: “The being – distant from all phenomenality – in  which alone this power inheres 
 
27 See Hegel’s comment in the Aesthetics: “When we take ‘grasping’ something in the spiritual sense, for 
example, it never occurs to us in any connection to think about the act of sensuous clasping with the hand”; 
cited in Werner Hamacher, Pleroma: Reading in Hegel: The Genesis and Structure of a Dialectical 
Hermeneutics in Hegel, trans. Nicholas Walker and Simon Jarvis (London: Athlone, 1998), p. 233.  
28 On the ban on graven images as the foundation of political aesthetics see Gertrud Koch, “Image Politics: The 
Monotheistic Prohibition of Images”, Critical Horizons 14.3 (2013), 341-354. 
29 See Hermann Cohen, Religion of Reason, Out of the Sources of Judaism, trans. Simon Kaplan (Frederick 
Ungar: New York, 1972, published in German in 1919), p. 57.   




is that of the name” (GS I:216, O 13). And this is also the case with the crucial category of 
expressionlessness – “das Ausdruckslose” – dialectically threaded into Benjamin’s 
materialistic media theory, as will be discussed below. The expressionless is that which lies 
beyond language, communicability and the symbol. Pertaining to the mediality of language-
ness, of “language as such”, whereby language does not partake in processes of 
communication, the expressionless adheres to a particular destructibility which has the power 
to liquefy the appearances of the beautiful.  
In Goethes Wahlverwandtschaften it is noted that “only the expressionless completes 
[vollendet] the work, by shattering it into a thing of shards, into a fragment of the true world, 
into the torso of the symbol” (GS I:181, SW 1:340). The symbol, taking the shape of a torso, in 
itself mutates into that through which sensorial perception is denied, that is, it is an image 
concretising the bodily state of being imageless and unembodied, devoid of sensuous 
perception.31 However, and in light of Benjamin’s theory of language, it is also possible to map 
into this thinking image – namely, the violent completion of the work by dint of the 
“expressionless” and the torso of the symbol that is left in ruins – the primal scene of the tower 
of Babel. In the story of Babel, God’s interruption into the linguistic order gave way to 
language becoming not only expressionless, but also non-auditory: “come on, let us go down 
and baffle their language there so they cannot understand each other.”32 It should be noted that 
the Hebrew phrasing stresses sensual reception: “they would not hear each other”, and this 
bears on a resonance with the philosopher’s primal concern, the task of reinstating a “primal 
hearing” (“Urvernehmen”).   
   
2) On the Definition of the Aura 
 
As already indicated, it is the bodily envelope out of which a sensation of limitlessness 
dialectically flows, disclosing the crossed meanings between natural and historical life. This 
informs, albeit in a reversed manner, the Hegelian account of the Egyptian pyramids as the 
prototype for “the symbolical art-form [symbolischen Kunstgestalt]” (VÄ I:459, LA I:356). 
According to Hegel, “the inorganic nature of spirit is given [in] its appropriate artistic form by 
architecture” and it is only in (Greek) sculpture, the proper aesthetic “classical form”, that “the 
 
31 This calls upon the idea, to cite Weigel’s note regarding “Benjamin’s epistemology of images”, that “thought 
learns from the images’ own mode of perception”. See Weigel, Walter Benjamin: Images, the Creaturely, and 
the Holy, p. xxiv. 




spiritual itself now enters so that the work of art acquires and displays spirituality as content” 
(VÄ II:351, LA II:701). Yet still, it is in architecture that the infinite is held within finite form 
in a condition of difference. What is sensuously present to the embodied body is transmitted 
into the knowledge of the soul’s absence; however, it is an absence in aesthetic terms, that of 
Schein, that in turn is a sign of spirit’s immortality. Symbolic architecture serves as the 
foundation for the whole edifice of Hegelian aesthetics, in which spirit is alienated in the face 
of transitoriness and outer nature, whence sensuous forms issue nothing but arbitrary images 
and meanings.  
We could point here to Benjamin’s famous dictum regarding his theory of dialectical 
images: “ambiguity [Zweideutigkeit] is the appearance of dialectics in images [die bildliche 
Erscheinung der Dialektik], the law of dialectics at a standstill” (GS V:55, AP 10). With the 
pyramids, body and architecture form a constellation of what Benjamin terms elsewhere 
“distorted similarity”33: substance body (“Körper”), (un)inhabited by spirit, sets the dialectical 
grounds for the experiencing, historically conditioned body (“Leib”) whose corporeal envelope 
is an unbounded and limitless tactile flesh. Therefore, what is foreshadowed by Hegel and seen 
to be grasped dialectically by Benjamin, is that bodily visions of the image-like, that is, what 
is imagined, represented as of the body – “die sinnliche Vorstellung” in Hegel’s terms – thwart 
the imageless. To be taken as true content of absolute knowledge, the image-like has to be 
absolved in passing away.  
In the age of reproducibility, under the rubric of semblance, art is the realm through 
which dissolution and natural decay are experienced, as is accounted for in the natural 
semantics, organised around the body, that Benjamin uses in order to define the aura’s 
effacement. The aura, to recall the often-cited key passage, is “a strange tissue [Gespinst] of 
space and time: the unique appearance of a distance, however near it may be”. The spectral 
character of the aura is hinted at by the word Gespinst, which – as a simultaneity of materiality 
and immateriality – can be said to be haunted by the word Gespenst.34 The aura, as Benjamin 
 
33 The idea of distortion within the visible, the “entstellte Ähnlichkeit” as the underlying principle of memory 
and writing is pivotal to the Proust essay and to the autobiographical texts on Berlin childhood. See Weigel, 
Body- and Image- Space, esp. pp. 125-127.  
34 This spectral quality of the word Gespinst was pointed out by Gerhard Richter. In his reading of Adorno’s 
employment of Benjamin’s concept of the aura in his Aesthetic Theory, Richter signals this dialectical tension of 
the spectre as a signifier for “the usefulness of the aura as politically charged category of aesthetic experience”, 
according to Adorno’s conviction. See Richter, “Adorno and the Excessive Politics of the Aura”, in Benjamin’s 
Blind Spot: Walter Benjamin and the Premature Death of Aura, ed. Lise Patt (Los Angeles, Calif.: Institute of 
Cultural Inquiry, 2001), pp. 25-36 (p. 33). The spectrality of the aura and the uncanny feeling it evokes is 
captured in another definition from “On some Motifs in Baudelaire” when it is also regarded as a form of 
perception in which the awakening of nature comes about: “To experience the aura of an object we look at 




remarks, makes itself felt within the field of vision of a natural setting. “To track while resting 
on a summer afternoon a mountain range on the horizon or a branch that casts its shadow on 
the beholder is to breathe the aura of those mountains, of that branch” (GS I:440, AW 15). The 
aesthetic relation to nature and the auratic consummation (‘aura’ – from the Greek means 
‘breath of air’) of natural beauty serve as the grounds for the phenomenon of the withering 
aura. Thus, the scene of the aura can be viewed as a reminiscent of the expulsion of nature 
from the realm of the beautiful which sets into motion Hegel’s aesthetic theory. “The first 
existence of the Idea is nature, and beauty begins as the beauty of nature [die erste Schönheit 
ist die Naturschönheit]” (VÄ I:157, LA I:116). It is the sublation of natural beauty by way of 
“breathing”, by the breath of a living thing, that is recorded in the scene of the aura.35  
Moreover, breathing/consuming the aura coincides, according to this scenography, 
with two modes of taking shape, of Gestalt. The one is a projected delimiting line of a natural 
mass as figured by the human eye, the other is a projected shadow. Significantly, the decisive 
moment of perceiving the aura of natural entities, the material mass of mountains or branch, is 
mediated by a specific gaze. This gaze seems to be incorporated into the more acoustical 
dimension of breath, imagined in this Denkbild to be an attribute of the mute, in the sense of 
inarticulate, natural world. Thus, it also draws into this scene Benjamin’s early theories of 
language, lament and pure mediality. Notably, the breathability of the aura occurs in 
conjunction with another kind of bodily deformation: the shadow that is cast. The cast shadow 
transforms the point of view of the whole scenography, exposing the beholder’s bodily 
appearance, his or her “Erscheinung”. As such, the whole scenography is rendered as a body-
space marked by “die bildliche Erscheinung der Dialektik” (GS V:55). For, it is the fact that 
the aura is not seen that incites the dialectical tension of Schein and Sein that it prompts.  
This imagistic being becomes tangible by the fact that the entire scene of the enactment 
of the aura’s consummation is underscored by different degrees of perceptibility and carried 
out by painterly characteristics; that is, the horizon and the fixed topographical lines of natural 
entities and the natural phenomenon of light and shadow. Yet at this point, another, ‘tactile’-
like deformation makes itself felt in a temporal moment: the dissolution of the beholder’s 
bodily contours by way of the shadow that is cast. Just as ruins befall architecture, the body, 
losing its delimited form in the landscape, reverts to its meaning as Körper – the body as thing 
in its bare natural materiality. The natural body, yet to embody free spirit – “the principle of 
 
35 For Hegel, the concept of beauty in the realm of the “philosophy of fine art” is expressed only by its 




freedom”, is what is to be excluded at the beginning of art according to Hegel.36 As we will 
see, the repression of natural beauty as propounded by Hegel underscores Benjamin’s 
attentiveness to architecture and to architectural scenographies.  
The shadow, however, might be regarded as the ‘tactile’ correlative to the aura: it is 
precisely a projection which is an “appearance of a distance, however close the thing that calls 
it forth” (to use here the definition of the aura that appears in the Passagen-Werk [GS V:560, 
AP 447]). Shadows keep cowering to their objects, as the title of Benjamin’s two collection of 
Denkbilder – “Kurze Schatten (I, II)” discloses. In one of them (entitled “Short Shadow”), the 
shadow is envisaged to be distorted into an architectural element, into a burrow or 
(underground) building: “Toward noon, shadows are no more than the sharp, black edges at 
the feet of things, preparing to retreat silently [lautlos], unnoticed [unversehens], into their 
burrow [in ihren Bau], their secret being [Geheimnis]” (GS IV:373, SW 2:272).37 The allusion 
to Kafka’s world through the figuration of the Bau is intensified once this reflection is read 
together with one of Benjamin’s remarks on Kafka’s “Vor Dem Gesetz” (first published in 
1915). “The reader of this parable “may have been struck”, says Benjamin, by “the cloudy spot 
at its interior [die wolkige Stelle in ihrem Innern]” (GS II:420 SW 2:802), indicating, that is, 
the ambiguous, parabolic functioning of the law in Kafka’s story. For the law, it could be 
interpreted, is taking place not only in the prohibition of its representation but also, in the 
presentation of its inaccessibility.38   
 In as much as the breathing body, in the scene of the aura, is clouded, it silently and 
suddenly retreats into its ‘burrow’; and as semblance withers away from it, bodily perception 
is released from semblance. Thus, it is also possible to read the scenography of body and aura 
against the backdrop of the Judaic ban on the image.39 It is the faint intimation of the imageless 
image of the body, evolving out of the idea of a breathing body, and therefore by intimation – 
out of the suppression of natural beauty – that is also incorporated into the shadow that is cast. 
 
36 See Adorno’s remark in his Aesthetic Theory: “Hegel sacrifices natural beauty to subjective spirit, but 
subordinates that spirit to a classicism that is external to and incompatible with it, perhaps out of fear of a 
dialectic that even in the face of the idea of beauty would not come to a halt.” Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, trans. 
Robert Hullot-Kentor (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997), p. 76.  
37 The rest of the short piece continues as follow: “Then, in its compressed, cowering fullness, comes the hour of 
Zarathustra – the thinker in ‘the noon of life’, in ‘the summer garden’. For it is knowledge that gives objects 
their sharpest outline, like the sun at its zenith.”  
38 On the negative topos of the law see Derrida’s analysis of the parable, “Before the Law”, trans. Avital Ronell 
and Christine Roulston, in Acts of Literature, ed. Derek Attridge (London: Routledge, 1992), pp. 181-220 (p. 
196). The theme of architecture and the law will be taken up again in the conclusion.  
39 For an account of the origination of Benjamin’s concept of the aura in Jewish mysticism and theology see 
Miriam Bratu Hansen, “Benjamin’s Aura”, Critical Inquiry 34 (Winter 2008), 336-375. In this article Bratu 
Hansen draws on Gershom Scholem’s interpretation of the Kabbalistic notion of the tzelem (“image”) as a 




Mediated by the idea of the image ban, the juncture of the consummated natural beauty and 
the shadow exposing the substantial body could be seen to be informed by the proximity in 
Hebrew of the word shadow ,tzel, to tzelem, literally “image”, “Bild”.40 And with this affinity, 
the aspect of nature as bound to mythic violence, can be discerned as well. As already alluded 
here with these comments on the concept of the aura, the built environment is implicated in 
Benjamin’s critique of the disintegrated auratic “beautiful semblance”. This alliance is in play 
in Benjamin’s attention to the architectural scenographies in the Wahlverwandtschaften essay.    
 
3) The Mythic Archetype of the House in the Wahlverwandtschaften Essay  
 
In several passages in Goethes Wahlverwandtschaften, Benjamin reflects on the activities of 
building in Goethe’s novel, stressing their connections to (a rejected) sacrifice and so to mythic 
violence. Evoking the novel’s “episode of the crystal glass”, Benjamin notes that the crystal 
glass, “destined to shatter, is caught in mid-flight and preserved. It is a sacrifice to the building 
[Bauopfer] – a sacrifice that is rejected at the consecration of the house in which Ottilie will 
die”. And in the following remark Benjamin uncovers an ominous “reminder of a grave 
[Gräbermahnung]” in what is being said with a “masonic undertone” at the occasion of the 
laying of the house’s foundation stone: the intimations of “the depths of the earth” and a 
“hollowed out space” (GS I:136, SW 1:306). These remarks evolve out of the discussion on the 
connection between guilt, fate and natural life, the crux of Benjamin’s response to Goethe’s 
novel.  
In unfolding the ambiguity of “Das verschuldete Leben”, according to which natural 
life is displaced into guilty life, the mythic order of Goethe’s novel is revealed, as natural life 
appears guilty. Thus, “Fate is the nexus of guilt among the living” (GS I:138, SW 1:307). Under 
the sign of guilt, “natural life” is coupled with the category of  bare or “mere life” (“bloßes 
Leben”) (GS I:139, SW 1:308). This category flows out of the depiction of an uncanny 
sensation of Schein in the novel. The strange resemblance of Otto, Charlotte’s dead baby, to 
Ottilie and the Captain – the respective objects of erotic desire of the infant’s biological parents 
– uncannily and demonically materialises, in the most literal sense of semblance, the criss-
crossed erotic elective affinities between the characters. With this portrayal, the devastating 
 
40 “And God created the human in his image, in the image of God He created him, male and female He created 
them”. Genesis 1:27, in Alter, Genesis: Translation and Commentary, p. 5. For the proximity of the word 
‘shadow’ to the word ‘image’ in Jewish mysticism see Gershom Scholem, “The Tzelem”, in The Fundamentals 




powers of Eros in the context of marriage are arrested into an image of foreboding, an inversed 
mirror image of Kant’s definition of marriage (in The Metaphysics of Moral, to which 
Benjamin refers, SW 1:299). In as far as procreation did not cease, notwithstanding the 
dissolution of the moral content of marriage, namely, fidelity, according to Kant, the mythic 
essence of the novel (and of marriage) reveals itself in this demonic merging of mind and 
sexuality.41 It is a dialectical image (marked by ambiguity) according to which marriage, the 
structure of the bourgeois family, when it enters into a constellation with biological life, 
displaces natural life into guilty life. 42   
This configuration of life that “corresponds to the natural condition of the living”43 is 
portrayed by Benjamin as tied to the image of the house. In a subsection of the essay entitled 
“Das Haus” (GS I:836)44 it is noted that human mythical existence in its “natural” state of 
“misfortune” (“Unglück”) and guilt, is the effect of the “fading away of supernatural life in 
man”. As Benjamin’s subsequent note reads: “When once man has sunk to this level, even the 
life of seemingly dead things acquires power.” For, “The incorporation of the totality of 
material things into life is indeed a criterion of the mythic world. Among them, the first has 
always been the house” (GS I:139, SW 1:308).45 The following thinking images, emanating 
from architectural descriptions in Goethe’s novel, are indeed instructive, not only in terms of 
“architecture’s reception”, insinuated here by the trope of nearness (“Nähe”), but also, by 
means of architectural activities, of building and dwelling. In them, an imparting of a mythic 
law, of fate (“Das Fatum”), is architecturally mediated, inscribed into a scenography of the 
completion of the house and its inhabitation by the living. As Benjamin comments: “Thus, to 
the extent that the house approaches completion, fate closes in [wird das Schicksal nah].” And 
destined fate is closing in in both temporal and spatial terms: “The laying of the foundation 
stone, the celebration of the raising of the roof beams, and moving in mark just so many stages 
of decline [Stufen des Unterganges]” (GS I:139, SW 1:308). This architectural scenography 
 
41 Miguel Vatter comments: “Benjamin focuses on the guilt of mere life as symbolized by the fate of a child, 
here, the child born to Charlotte and Eduard and conceived the very night on which they each realized that they 
are in love with someone else. The death of the child caused by a distraction on the part of Ottilie, will make it 
impossible for either of the parents to remain with the partner for which they felt such ‘elective affinity’”. 
Vatter, “Married Life, Gay Life as a Work of Art, and Eternal Life: Toward a Biopolitical Reading of 
Benjamin”, Philosophy & Rhetoric 44. 4 (2011), 309-335 (p. 312).   
42 On Benjamin’s response to Kant’s doctrine of marriage in the Goethe essay see ibid., pp. 314-317.  
43 See Benjamin’s essay “Fate and Character” (SW 1:204).  
44 Benjamin omitted the subheadings from the published version of the essay.  
45 Benjamin rehearses this argument in the Trauerspiel book in the context of his discussion of the “creaturely 




resonates with a note made a little earlier: “Ottilie’s nature profoundly touches the architect” 
(GS I:137, SW 1:306).  
Benjamin likewise comments on the spectrality of the house, pointing out to the 
participation of architectural forms in the novel’s motif of Scheinwelt: “The house lies isolated, 
without a view of other dwellings, and it is occupied almost unfurnished. Charlotte, in a white 
dress, appears on its balcony, while she is away, to her woman friend” (GS I:139, SW 1:308). 
Not only do the process of building and bodily disintegration, which diametrically oppose each 
other, intersect; the subsequent evocation of an architectural archetype, that of “the mill”, 
resonates with the semantic field surrounding the “Kunstwerk” essay’s treatment of 
architecture. That is, architectural construction as a site of gathering, associated with material 
distraction, dissolution and transmission, entailing not only Zerstreuung but also – Zerstörung:  
 
Consider, too, the mill at the shady bottom of the woods, where for the first time the 
friends have gathered together [sich versammelt] in the open air. The mill is an ancient 
symbol of the underworld. It may be that this derives from the pulverizing and 
transformative nature [auflösenden und verwandelnden Natur] of the act of milling. 
In this circle [in diesem Kreis], the powers [die Gewalten] that emerge from 
the disintegration of the marriage must necessarily win out. For they are precisely those 
of fate. 
           (GS I:139, SW 1:308) 
 
What underscores this remark is the mythic enactment of eternal reoccurrence or re-
production: the dispersibility of matter, continuously splitting itself, is carried away from 
existence as material density, thus expressing a spectral relation to being. Not least, this 
spectrality or semblance is to be regarded as related to “the faith in immortality which must 
never be kindled from one’s own existence” (GS I:200, SW 1:355), as Benjamin puts it. Hegel 
too, characterises the realm of death and of the invisible in the pyramids as structures that are 
initially a symbol of the underworld. What is exposed with the pyramids, says Hegel, is  
 
the true content of art [warhaft[en] Kunstgehalt], namely that of being removed from 
immediate existence; and so this realm is primarily only Hades, not yet a life [zunächst 
nur der Hades, noch nicht eine Lebendigkeit – literally, a liveliness] which, even if 
liberated from the sensuous as such, is still nevertheless at the same time self-existent 




meaning still remains just an external form and veil [Form und Umhüllung] for the 
definite content of that meaning. 
             (VÄ I:460, LA I:356)  
 
Benjamin’s focal thinking image in the Wahlverwandtschaften essay, that of the “object in its 
veil” captures precisely the power of the imagination to make the absent present, an 
indissoluble bond that is at once intensified and shattered in Goethe’s novel according to his 
reading.  
Claudia Brodsky Lacour, in her foregrounding of the architectonic impulse in Goethe’s 
novel, notes that “the novel cancels the historical experience and significance of the aesthetic 
by making death and life each other’s reflection.” In her reading, she takes Ottilie’s body that 
was made available to viewing at all times by dint of a “glass lid” to bear a resonance with 
Benjamin’s “critical illumination of an oddly similar nineteenth-century structure”: “Eduard’s 
design makes the ‘heavenly’ ‘arch’ housing Ottilie a prototype or precursor of the profane 
consumer arcade.”46 The foundational motif of Die Wahlverwandtschaften is that of the 
preservation of beautiful semblance which means “effacing the limits of transient, individual 
corporality by fixing it as image below and amid painted heavens in an arcade whose sole 
commodity is a glimpse of that ‘pious body’”.47 As she comments further, citing from Goethe’s 
novel,  
Eduard allows Ottilie to be “laid to rest” [beigesetzt] in a specific, concrete sense. For, 
rather than interred beneath the ground, Ottilie will instead be set aside – the use of 
beisetzen here recalling beiseitesetzen – so as to “remain among the living.” 
Yet Eduard’s assent to installing Ottilie in the “side-chapel” “arch” is premised on the 
further “condition” that her body be made available to viewing at all times, “covered,” 
as noted previously, “only by a glass lid” and artificially illuminated by an “eternally 
burning lamp.”48 
 
With regard to this uncanny image of the ‘object in its veil’, Benjamin comments that 
Ottilie’s death as mournful (“trauervoll”) and not tragic could be considered. It is her wish to 
become ‘Körper’, substantial nature, which is bereft of spirit, is a mute and expressionless 
(death-) “drive”. Her “Plant-like muteness” (GS I:175, SW 1:336) draws away from the silence 
 
46 Claudia Brodsky Lacour, In the Place of Language: Literature and the Architecture of the Referent (New 
York: Fordham University Press, 2009), p. 74.  
47 Ibid., p. 88.  




of the tragic hero, disclosing, as Benjamin stresses, the dialectical opposition to “Schein”: “das 
Ausdruckslose” (GS I:194, SW 1:350). In Benjamin’s reading, both Ottilie’s life and death are 
reduced to semblance; she neither lives nor dies but carries on indefinitely as an auratic image, 
an appearance of a distant object, however close it may be: “This beauty, as long as the novel’s 
world endures, may not disappear: the coffin in which the girl rests is not closed” (GS I:179, 
SW 1:338). 
Weigel emphasises here Benjamin’s encounter with Freud’s Jenseits des Lustprinzips 
(1920). “For Ottilie this process was initiated in the very moment when Eros vanished, that is, 
when her life drive gave up counteracting her death drive or the ongoing mortality of organic 
life.”49 To the extent that, preserved under a glass cover, Ottilie’s inanimate body becomes the 
site of what Benjamin would call a Schauplatz, this place of showing and looking is a 
dialectical image of the Freudian opposition of the death drive to Eros: the repression of the 
corporeal substance’s death drive is sublated by Eros, taking shape in the ego as the 
phantasmagorical preserver of life.50 What Weigel terms “vanishing Eros” is the force which 
strives for tactile closeness and for presence within opticality and Schein. Tactility, it follows 
from this observation, as circumscribed within allegorical Eros whose “real work” is 
“Thanatos”, as Benjamin writes, informs the messianic structure of Benjamin’s Kritik of Die 
Wahlverwandtschaften to which Weigel points.51  
 
4) “Too Close” 
 
The focal architectural activity in Die Wahlverwandtschaften – namely, the projected 
mausoleum, the presence of the architect and the plans for the project, the constant references 
to gravestone and cornerstone, and with this, the idea that the physical vulnerability of life is 
bound up with the act of building – is seen to be reflected in the “Kunstwerk” essay. The most 
extreme expression of the ephemerality of human life and forms of dwelling, however, is 
manifested, according to Benjamin, in the interior space. In other places in his writing, 
architecture also bears on the meaning of furnishing. Bourgeois interior spaces are cast as 
dwellings in the form of the “case-human” (“Etui-Mensch”). Abounding with tactile covers 
 
49 Weigel, “Fidelity, Love, Eros: Benjamin’s Bireferential Concept of Life as Developed in ‘Goethe’s Elective 
Affinities’”, trans. Chadwick Smith, in Walter Benjamin and Theology, eds. Colby Dickinson and Stéphane 
Symons (Fordham University Press, 2016), pp. 75-92 (p. 82).  
50 Sigmund Freud, “Beyond the Pleasure Principle” in The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological 
Works of Sigmund Freud, vol. 18 (1920-1922), ed. James Strachey et. al., (London: Vintage, 2001), pp. 7-64 (p. 
54).   




and containers, these spaces, as they are described in the exposé for the Passagen-Werk, are 
soft architecture in which all imprints of bodily contact are preserved: “The traces of its 
inhabitant are molded into the interior”, for “To live means to leave traces. In the interior, these 
are accentuated” (GS V:53, AP 20). In the interior, to put it differently, life is always already 
naked or unveiled, and the substance body leaves the traces of its tactile being with and within 
the internal covers, the convolution of this living space. “Das Interieur, die Spur” is the title of 
one of the Passagen-Werk’s convolutes.  
In another convolute, Benjamin formulates the relation between trace and aura:   
 
Trace and aura. The trace is appearance of a nearness, however far removed the thing 
that left it behind may be. The aura is appearance of a distance, however close the thing 
that calls it forth [sie hervorruft]. In the trace, we get hold [are habhaft] of the thing; in 
the aura it takes possession of us.    
     (GS V:560, AP 447, translation modified)  
 
The imprinted trace inside concealments created for the human body, although tantamount to 
a manifested image – “Erscheinung” (appearance, apparition, phenomenon) – of nearness qua 
touch, indeed, ‘there’ by dint of a physical contact, testifies to immediate existence. Yet, this 
is existence in its absolute reality as no more present. Whereas the trace amounts to the 
dimension of time, the aura, by dint of the acoustical registration of “calling forth” and of the 
dimension of vocation associated with it seems to bear not only on spatiality but also on 
transitoriness. To grasp the “thing” (“Sache”) in the form of a trace means to succumb to that 
which is irrevocably inaccessible to the perceptual body. The trace is allegorical in nature. It 
embodies the demonic trait of allegory, the inevitability by which allegory “signifies 
something other than what it is”: “it signifies precisely the nonbeing of that which it represents” 
(GS I:406, O 255). As a form of knowledge, the aura conveys a structure of desire since it is 
constituted through a relation to alterity. By contrast, what is enacted “in the trace” is the 
desiring of “Otherness” as such, for, the trace might be considered a no longer ambiguous sign, 
in as much as the material testimony for ‘what has been’ also stands for a removal of 
nonbeing.52 It is in this sense that Adorno, in “Der Idee der Naturgeschichte” (the text out of 
 
52 The trope of the trace is fundamental to Derrida’s thinking, figuring the condition, the image, of the non-
presence in the present. For Derrida’s discussion of the trace in the context of Heidegger’s metaphysics see  
“Ousia and Gramme: Note on a Note from Being and Time”, in Margins of Philosophy, trans. Alan Bass, 




which the arguments of Part Two unfold), comments that “what is expressed in the allegorical 
sphere is nothing but an historical relationship” (NG 358, NH 119).  
 The trace, the image/sign that is a result of extreme closeness and exposes that 
subjective perceptibility’s alliance with the eye or the optical field, is displaced into, and so 
consummated by, the sphere of tactility – the con-tact through which it arises, and which it – 
mimetically – prompts. The closeness marked by the trace is always on the edge of being too 
close. And this applies also to relations between the perceiving body and the architectural 
exterior. In the Denkbild entitled “Zu Nahe” (1929), a title that in itself betrays one of the 
characterisations of the tactile, namely, physical and always inherent proximity to the object 
of perception in a way that elides optical perspective, what is “imageless” (“bildlos”) is referred 
to as “the refuge of all images”: “Zuflucht aller Bilder” (GS IV:370, SW 2:269). In this 
Denkbild, a Zeitraum is deformed within a dream recounted by Benjamin. Portrayed by the 
more optical dimension of the fern-sichtig (as specified by Riegl), a visual experience is 
transformed into a scenography of getting “too close” to a famous building – Notre Dame 
cathedral (a name in which the feminine/maternal and the architectural are fused). The 
objective position of a contemplative distance is disfigured as, and through, the Entstellung of 
psychic meanings – following the logic of the dream indicated by Freud as the principle of 
displacement and disfigurement.53 The object distorted by proximity entails, as Benjamin says, 
“yearning”. It is not so much the anxiety recognised by Freud as das Unheimliche that is the 
feeling evoked by the ambiguous image of the city, but an experience cognate to that of the 
sort of déjà vu that occurs in dreams: a yearning to be where you ostensibly already are, caught 
in an image oscillating between the familiar and the unfamiliar, past and present: “and what 
overwhelmed me was yearning – yearning for the very same Paris in which I found myself in 
my dream”, says Benjamin (GS IV:370, SW 2:269).   
In the early fragment “Das Skelett des Wortes”, explicating what he terms the 
“Wortskelett” (“word skeleton”), Benjamin notes that, crucially, there must be certain contents, 
objects (“Gegenstände”), that are pure meanings and yet cannot be designated – “bezeichnet” 
–  such as “God, life, yearning”. These objects or concepts are borne by their “Bedeutbarkeit”, 
 
53 As Samuel Weber observes, the dream, in the Freudian account of the narration of dreams, “is already 
present-to-itself; the dream only comes to be in and through a process of narration that Freud significantly labels 
not Darstellung (presentation), but Entstellung: distortion, dislocation, disfigurement. If such distorted 
articulation can be ‘true’ to the dream, it is only because the latter is already a process of distortion, 
Entstellung.” This is considered in spatial terms, for “the distance that separates narration from narrated, like 
that which separates spectator from spectacle, is not an empty interval, not the space of Darstellung but of 
Entstellung. It is in short, a space on the move”. Weber, Freud-Legende, Expanded Edition (Stanford Calif.: 




which is prior to any act of communication and the ascription of meaning; and hence they are 
informed by sheer “communicability” – “Mitteilbarkeit” (GS VI:16). In the dream recounted 
by Benjamin, the object, the city, the famous building – all set the scene for another 
disfigurement of getting “too close”. For, it is the content of the dream, the yearning, that, 
according to Benjamin’s assertion, is in effect what is subject to the optical displacement of 
getting “too close”, and therefore, to “Entstellung”. In getting “too close”– the annihilation of 
distance as the condition of the image – what withdraws is the “yearning that flies to the image 
from afar.” Consequently, what is gained from losing the image is the more “blissful” 
(“selig[e]”) yearning, the one that “has already crossed the threshold of the image and 
possession.” This “too close” yearning thus “knows only the power of names”, the power from 
which “the loved one lives, is transformed, ages, rejuvenates, and imageless is the refuge of all 
images” (GS IV:370, SW 2:269). The veil-less Isis might be recalled here,54 a figure that could 
be seen to dovetail with that of ‘imageless’ Ottilie. Otillie, indeed the refuge of all (feminine) 
images, is constituted as an image in which the erotic relentlessly collapses into the nexus of 
mere life and eternal life sealed by sexual difference.  
This dialectical tension inscribed in the concept of Eros, that is preservation by dint of a 
flight towards the object of desire, underwrites Ottilie’s characterisation and actions, according 
to Benjamin. Moral choice, he emphasises, has no existence outside the order of human 
language; it is always an object of enunciation and transmission. Calling into question the 
morality of Ottilie’s wish for permanence, Benjamin comments on the latter to be “not a 
decision” but a [speechless] “drive” (GS I:176, SW 1:336-337). And as Weigel points out, 
“Benjamin alludes to Freud’s remarks on the ‘inertia inherent in organic life’, when he writes 
of Ottilie that ‘In her death drive, there speaks a longing for rest’”.55 Eros, according to this, 
bears on the unnatural, and therefore on a ‘second nature’ dimension, of those ‘expressionless’ 
objects – “God, life, yearning” – that resist, according to the aforementioned comment, entering 







54 For Goethe’s interpretation of Isis as having no veil see Pierre Hadot, The Veil of Isis: An Essay on the 
History of the Idea of Nature, trans. Michael Chase (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press, 2002), pp. 253-255.   




III. Namelessness and Speechlessness in/of Nature  
 
1) Semblance and Play  
 
The “Kunstwerk” essay’s references to the faculty of touch bind tactility to destruction and 
transitoriness – with respect to images, but also, to the bodies involved in the act of looking. 
The radical destruction bound up with aesthetic construction and attributed by Benjamin to 
film, entailing a sort of “distorted similarity”, is precisely what is worked through in the 
“representation of [man’s] environment by means of this recording apparatus 
[Aufnahmeapparatur]” (GS I:461, AW 30). Embodying the collision between image and bodies, 
film discloses an image-space that is inexorably a body-space, prefiguring what Benjamin calls 
the “Spielform der zweiten Natur” (GS I:1045). This extreme (cinematic) semblance or image-
likeness, taking effect as the expulsion of what is imagined, the extinction of Schein which is 
materialised within the sphere of the image as ruin, to recall Benjamin’s scenography of film, 
is specified as “playing” – “Spielen”.  
The double logic of “Spiel” – meaning “play” and “game”– pervades Benjamin’s 
writings. “Spielen” is predominantly related to the sense of touch and to the hand, in particular 
to child’s play and the play of imagination more broadly, and so – to the phenomenon of 
compulsive repetition. The automaton – inside it a little hunchback is hidden, guiding the 
artificial hand – eternally wins the game, as the First Thesis on history establishes (GS I:693, 
SW 4:389). In a text entitled “Spielzeug und Spielen” (published in 1928) Benjamin, drawing 
on Freud’s Jenseits des Lustprinzips, considers the law of repetition that governs the entire 
world of play to eschew both aesthetic mimesis and mimetic enactments of the body. “The 
essence of play”, Benjamin asserts, is “the transformation of shattering experience 
[erschütterndsten Erfahrung] into habit [Gewohnheit].” Evading the realm of Schein and of 
beautiful semblance, “play and nothing else is the midwife [Wehmutter – literally, labour-pain-
mother] of all habits” (GS II:131, SW 2:120, translation modified). And it is not only that the 
lived body is structured as an image. As is argued in “Lehre vom Ähnlichen”, the essay of 1933 
in which the idea of language as “the highest application of the mimetic faculty” is pronounced, 
the “gift [Gabe] of seeing similarity” (“Ähnlichkeit zu sehen”), and also to “long for” it, is 
coupled with a “flashing up” (“Aufblitzen”). This “Zeitmoment”, although of a spatial kind, 
cannot be held fast (“festgehalten”) (GS II:210, SW 2:689). What is occasioned is a figure, an 




II:206, SW 2:695-696); a singular fleeting moment which is unrepeatable, and as such excludes 
the meaning of mimesis and similarity as repetition. 
According to the rhythmic exchange between presence and absence, famously recorded 
by Freud in the course of his analysis of the child’s “fort/da” game in Jenseits des Lustprinzips, 
the visually disappearing object (“gone” – “fort”) is, by the constant crossing between time and 
being, language and desire, an inscription of the vanishing of Eros.56 The shattering experience 
of the separation from the mother, governed by the death drive, is repressed by the act of 
bringing back into view – “da” – as mediated by touch – the child’s hand pulling back the 
cotton reel. For Freud, the act of mastering the primal scene of traumatic partition from the 
mother, her displacement into an invisible Other which the infant subject yearns to have present 
and visible again, is constructed as a displacement of the optical into the tactile, but also – into 
the acoustical. It is the speech of the child accompanying the game that veils over the loss of 
the original object, naming it, with sounds that imitate “fort” and “da”. Eros, the enactment of 
preservation and bringing closer, is displaced, via speaking, into symbolic manifestation in 
language. Moreover, what is ‘there’ is only to be sensed by means of an absence and through 
habit, the compulsive repetition which Freud, in locating it beyond the pleasure principle, has 
also associated with the sensation of the uncanny. Eros, on the one hand, is a tendency that 
enacts a preservation of distances: from death, from touch and from natural, bare life, but it is 
also the force that, on the other hand, secretly eliminates them. Eros impedes completion; 
standing for unfulfillment, it is the direct opposite to completion found in the notion of love, 
as Benjamin argues in the essay on Goethe. 
 In the essay Das Unheimliche (1919), Freud refers to his Jenseits des Lustprinzips, 
writing of “the discovery that whatever reminds us of this inner repetition-compulsion is 
perceived as uncanny.”57 For Benjamin, as already discussed, what goes beyond images and 
semblances is the presentational impulse he calls the name. In the essay “Zum Bilde Prousts”, 
Proust, it is said, lay on his bed “racked [zerfetzt – torn to pieces] with homesickness, homesick 
for the world distorted in the state of similarity” (“Heimweh nach der im Stand der Ähnlichkeit 
entstellten Welt”). Children, Benjamin comments, know an emblem of this world,  
 
the stocking which has the structure of this dream world when, rolled up in the laundry 
hamper, it is a “bag” and a “present” at the same time. And just as children do not tire 
 
56 On Freud’s case of the fort/da game see for example Andrew J. Webber, The Doppelgänger: Double Visions 
in German Literature (Oxford: Clarendon, 1996), pp. 123-126.  




of quickly changing the bag and its contents into a third thing – namely, the stocking – 
Proust could not get his fill of emptying the dummy [Attrappe], his self, at one stroke 
in order to keep garnering [einbringen] that third thing, the image, which satisfied his 
curiosity – indeed, assuaged his homesickness. 
                (GS II:314, SW 2:240) 
 
Bringing forth the image (moving forever towards the image of Proust – “Zum Bilde Prousts” 
– or the “present”, the “stocking”) results in an original tactile and formless surface, fashioned 
for and in relation to the body, but also apart from it. In as far there was no substance that was 
to be covered in the first place, interiority is consummated yet without its sublimation in the 
Hegelian sense, as the refusal of the interior of the rolled-up sock to be seen seems to intimate.    
This scenography of childhood play also surfaces in the Denkbild of “Der Strumpf” in 
Berliner Kindheit. Here the constitution of the image upon a dialectical arrest between play 
and semblance emanates from the movement through a series of domestic enclosures: the 
bedroom, the wardrobe, the sock and, importantly, the “present” (or that which you bring with 
you) – “Das Mitgebrachte” – that it encases. The revelatory moment, Benjamin emphasises, 
transpires in “the second part of the play/game”, as the object is teased out of itself: 
 
For now I proceeded to unwrap “the present”, to tease it out of its woollen case 
[Tasche]. I drew it ever nearer to me, until something that shocked me [das 
Bestürzende] would happen: I had brought out “the present”, but “the case” in which 
it had lain was no longer there [“Die Tasche”, in der es gelegen hatte, war nicht mehr 
da]. I could not repeat the experiment on this phenomenon often enough. It taught me 
that form and content, the veil and what is veiled are the same [Das Form und Inhalt, 
Hülle und Verhülltes dasselbe sind]. It led me to draw truth [Wahrheit] from literature 
[Dichtung] as carefully as the child’s hand retrieves the sock from “the case”. 
       (GS IV:977-978, SW 3:374, translation modified)   
 
The retrieval of a rolled-up sock from its case or pocket by the child’s hand that penetrates this 
space releases an object devoid of intention: there was not any empty space at all. What 
transpires with the second part, the act of unveiling – “Enthüllung” – is that the ‘object’ is 
completed only by means of a process of its own annihilation, revealing, that is, the impossible 
state of its being subject to unveiling – what we saw Benjamin call “Unenthüllbarkeit”. This is 
a process also embedded in mechanical repetition, like the quotidian domestic habit of the 




attentiveness. Habitual passage out of and into architectural interiors and their cognates 
exposes here the vanishing point at which the abyss between Schein and truth is seen to be 
mediated by corporeality – the persistent presence of the hand. In going beyond the image by 
dint of tactility, what cannot be imparted in the field of art and therefore remains intact in 
aesthetic procedures of Schein – comes forth, as and in con-tact.  
In a long footnote that appears in the second version of the “Kunstwerk” essay (1936) 
and was removed from the finalised version, the “significance of beautiful semblance” is 
reflected. Here Benjamin credits Hegel for his breaking out of the aesthetic tradition that is 
based on “auratic perception”, and – by implication – on the ritual or cult value of the artwork. 
He locates this deviation in the Hegelian formulation set out in his Vorlesungen über die 
Ästhetik: “Art takes away [yet also carries along or away: nimmt …fort] the semblance [Schein] 
and deception of this bad, transient [schlechten, vergänglichen] world” (Hegel, cited by 
Benjamin, GS VII:368, SW 3:127). What is sublated is to be retained, annulled yet preserved 
in the Hegelian conception, dialectically constituted through the negativity of art, meaning or 
being itself. With art, what is merely external, sensuous and transient – “the true content of the 
phenomena [wahrhaften Gehalt der Erscheinungen]” – is given in the form of “highest 
actuality”, “born out of spirit”, as Hegel further states (VÄ I:22, LA I:9). For Hegel, art is the 
representation of the Absolute in sensuous forms, an idea that centres the experience of art on 
the corporeal sensorium, namely on aesthetics, with its origins – as we recall – in Aisthētikos, 
the ancient Greek word for that which is “perceived by feeling” (VÄ I:13, LA I:1). The sensory 
enactments of art, transient in themselves,58 dialectically expunge the sensuous body from 
transient nature,59 that is, Leib from its inevitably transient material dimension – Körper. “Art”, 
as Hegel writes, at its “highest stage”, “transcends itself, in that it forsakes the element of 
reconciled embodiment [Versinnlichung] of the spirit in sensuous form and passes over from 
the poetry of the imagination [Vorstellung] to the prose of thought [Denken]” (VÄ I:123, LA 
I:89). As Rebecca Comay has commented, “the whole ‘hermeneutic’ turn described by Hegel 
in the Aesthetics is the eclipse of art by criticism-of-art.”60  
The view regarding the decay (“Verfall”) of beautiful semblance as already expounded 
in the essay on Goethe,61 and of the aura, makes it doubly urgent, says Benjamin in the 
 
58 And so, art itself: “Art, considered in its highest vocation, is and remains for us a thing of the past.” (LA I:11).  
59 And therefore, in a dialectical fashion, “Spirit apprehends finitude itself as its own negative and thereby wins 
its infinity. This truth of finite spirit is the absolute spirit” (LA I:93).   
60 Comay, “Defaced Statues: Idealism and Iconoclasm in Hegel’s Aesthetics”, p. 141. The Romantic concept of 
criticism was Benjamin’s subject for his dissertation, written in 1919 and published as a monograph in 1920 
entitled Der Begriff der Kunstkritik in der deutschen Romantik.   




aforementioned footnote from the “Kusntwerk” essay, “to look at its origin”. It is this origin 
that became scattered, arrested in a dialectical ambiguity in the current historical moment of 
reproduction. The origins of the aesthetics, that of mimesis, and with it the two “interfolded” 
aspects of art, namely, “semblance and play”, return in a constellation of mimesis and 
mechanical reproduction, which in turn yields a crucial loss of disparity between semblance 
(“Schein”) and play (“Spiel”):  
 
What is lost in the withering of semblance, or decay of the aura, in works of art is 
matched by a huge gain in play-space [Spiel-Raum]. This space for play is widest in 
film. In film, the element of semblance [Scheinmoment] has entirely withdrawn in the 
face of the element of play [Spielmoment[es]].  
            (GS VII:369, SW 3:127, translation modified)  
 
Mimetic enactments of the body lack any subject matter and hence are the disclosure of 
similarity as such (“Der Nachmachende macht, was er macht, nur scheinbar”); it is a sheer act 
of repetition, yet without the reflective, repetitive and mimetic element of “play”, an 
appearance that is, paradoxically, devoid of an object to be transmitted as copy or resemblance. 
Therefore, the suggested chiasmic pairing of play and semblance touches upon the linguistic 
dimension Benjamin theorises as “sheer communicability”, a “spiritual essence/being” (“ein 
geistiges Wesen”), as it is dubbed in the early essay on language (GS I:141), which is therefore 
– pre-semiotic.  
 
2) The Image of Mute Nature  
 
The threshold of the image – the image as a passage from its status as image as such to the 
sphere of the unsayable and the wordless – also transpires in the aforementioned thinking image 
of film as “play-space”, a space now released by way of the withdrawal of semblance. Here, 
the distance that irrevocably arises by dint of an intensified nearness takes the form of an 
inaudible expression – glossed in what Benjamin calls elsewhere the “Lautbild” or phonetic 
 
with beautiful semblance as an auratic reality. Mignon, Ottilie, and Helena partake of that reality. ‘The beautiful 
is neither the veil nor the veiled object but rather the object in its veil [der Gegenstand in seiner Hülle]’; this is 





image (GS VI:15).62 Nature, it is said, speaks differently to the camera than the eye. And this 
otherness of speech is projected out of the visual field:   
 
It can be grasped [So wird handgreiflich] that it is another nature which speaks 
to the camera as compared to the eye. Other above all in the sense that in the 
place of a space that is permeated by human consciousness there is an 
unconsciously permeated space.  
         (GS I:461, AW 30, translation modified) 
 
The sphere of reproduced images begets a space that is manifest there but subject to 
unconscious optical perception. To this sense of manifestation of the photographic 
unconscious, now released from the intentional subject, corresponds nature that in speaking 
otherwise discloses the allegorical structure indispensable to Benjamin’s imagistic thinking (a 
structure that is to be discussed in Part Two). According to this Denkbild, what is proffered to 
acoustical perception, mediated through mechanically reproduced appearances or semblance, 
could only adhere to the destruction of this aesthetic form.  
In the “Schemata zum psychophysischen Problem” it is stated that “nature itself is a 
totality”, that “fate” is the “movement into this abyss [Unergründliche] of total vitality”, and 
that “art” is the countermove, that of “the movement up [hinauf] this abyss”. As is also 
commented there, any other form of expression must lead to “destruction”, beyond the 
“conciliatory effect” (“versöhnliche Wirkung”) of art (GS VI:81, SW 1:396). The thinking 
image of “nature’s speech” alludes to a speech which is inextricably “speechless” by dint of 
nature’s impeded sorrow, according to the formulations made in the essay on language and in 
the Trauerspiel book, and hence it is a form of speech that nonetheless leads to the degradation 
of expression or symbolic meaning.63 In Benjamin’s words, the decline of the Scheinmoment 
in film, recuperating “the anguish of nature”, is an image that dialectically seizes on the 
impartability of language.  
According to the “Kunstwerk” essay’s passing evocation of nature’s speech(lessness), 
the otherness of speech is tantamount to the otherness of space, which, in turn, is disclosed by 
an uncanny thinking image hinged upon that speech(lessness), that of the optical unconscious, 
as revealed by the work of the camera:   
 
 
62 In the aforementioned fragment “Das Skelett des Wortes”.  




This is where the camera comes into play. With its many resources for swooping and 
rising, disrupting and isolating, stretching or compressing a sequence, enlarging or 
reducing an object. It is through the camera that we first discover the optical 
unconscious, just as we discover the instinctual unconscious through psychoanalysis. 
  (GS I:461, AW 30) 
It is in the earlier essay “Kleine Geschichte der Photographie” (1931), however, that the 
references to nature’s speech(lessness) and to the “optical unconscious” first appear. Here, the 
particular communication of nature, its speaking to the inhuman apparatus which looks at it, is 
bound up with the silenced gazes of nameless women, recorded in early photographic portraits:     
   
With photography, however, we encounter something new and strange: in Hill’s 
Newhaven fishwife, her eyes cast down in such indolent, seductive modesty, there 
remains something that goes beyond testimony [Zeugnis] to the photographer’s art, 
something that cannot be silenced [was nicht zum Schweigen zu bringen ist], that fills 
you with an unruly desire to know what her name was, the woman who was alive there, 
who even now is still real and will never consent to be wholly absorbed in “art”. 
 (GS II:370, SW 2:510)   
 
The desire Benjamin alludes to here is enacted by both ‘name’ and ‘knowledge’. Sabine Gölz 
reads Benjamin’s analysis of photography as underscoring the idea of the momentariness of 
legibility, as it is evident in Benjamin’s denotation of the photographic reproduction due to a 
“proper light” (SW 2:508). She shows how Benjamin’s critical commentary on these early 
photographs of feminine anonymity corresponds to the theory of the readability of dialectical 
images developed in the Passagen-Werk. It is the entry of nameless femininity into the space 
of the image that marks the novel and the peculiarity of photography, according to Benjamin. 
At issue, Gölz observes, is a mutation “vom Bild einer Namenlosen zum Bild des Namenlosen.” 
She reads the indirect gaze as an address of a twofold demand: the demand to be named together 
with the demand to remain nameless, an ambiguity inscribed in the word “sie” through which 
“sexual difference is called forth” as a “third opposition” between past and present, between 
desire and consciousness.64  
 
64 Gölz, “Geistesgegenwart als Lichtung im Ähnlichen: Bachmanns ‘Heute’ oder Benjamins ‘Jetztzeit’?”, 
in Re-Acting to Ingeborg Bachmann, eds. Caitriona Leahy and Bernadette Cronin (Würzburg: Königshausen & 
Neumann, 2006), pp. 97-109 (p. 104). Weigel too, attributes to images of the feminine in Benjamin’s textual 




It follows, that it is the category of the name that cannot be incorporated into the optical image, 
nor does it participate in the mimetic function of the camera. “Her gaze” (here Benjamin refers 
to another photographed woman) is “absorbed in an ominous distance [unheilvolle Ferne].” 
Yet this distance is overcome by the viewer: “Immerse yourself in such a picture long enough 
and you will realize to what extent opposites touch, here too: the most precise technology can 
give its products a magical value, such as a painted picture can never again have for us” (GS 
II:371, SW 2:510). The dimension of in-operative opticality which the “Kunstwerk” essay 
terms tactility pertains here to what Benjamin portrays as a scorching that, in emerging out of 
the image-space (as “durchgesengt”), exposes an “inconspicuous spot [unscheinbare Stelle]”. 
This spot or place requires a particular attention, to the degree that “in the immediacy of that 
long-forgotten moment the future nests so eloquently that we, looking back, may rediscover 
it.” With the latter sentence, the speechlessness of nature is (again) expounded: “For it is 
another nature which speaks to the camera rather than to the eye: ‘other’ above all in the sense 
that a space informed by human consciousness gives way to a space informed by the 
unconscious” (GS II:371, SW 2:510). We might say that “play-space”, prevailing over the 
mimetic function or semblance, emerges out of a concealed spot or place – “Stelle”, and 
although pertinent to the ‘historical index’ of the image, this inconspicuous place, or place 
without “Schein” (“unscheinbare Stelle”) within the photographic space resists its own 
incorporation into it, as the shift from the spatial register of “Stelle” to that of “Raum” in 
Benjamin’s formulation conveys. It is the place – the Stelle – of Entstellung as the corporeal-
architectural condition of the unconscious.   
 
IV. Language and the Tactile Unhomelike 
 
In as much as architecture partakes in the polarity of the optical and the tactile, it is also the 
place, the medium, in which this heterogeneity is most indissoluble, closest to the dimension 
of “Nahsicht”, in Riegl’s account, or, “zu nahe” – as in Benjamin’s Denkbild of the imageless 
encounter with Notre Dame. In Benjamin’s contention in the “Kunstwerk” essay, in as much 
as the tactile is that which habitually and familiarly resides within a sensuous form, that of 
architecture, this mode of reception in effect transcends the realm of sensory perception. 
Blocked and non-habitual space is recast as a dwelling space, and so, an unattainable void is 
rendered into an interior. And yet, this sensuous form does not propel semblance into meaning. 
In fact, it is the tactile that is now designated for and consigned to meaning or significance. 




Benjamin’s convoluted definition, this idea of dwelling in, unconsciously and yet “at home”, 
hints at another, psychoanalytic, notion of spatial latency as set out – in a remarkable way – by 
Freud. 
In the accumulation of entries comprising the first part of his essay Das Unheimliche, 
Freud, ceaselessly aiming at arresting the oscillating meanings of heimich/unheimich, 
transcribes in spaced type Schelling’s definition of the uncanny. It is a definition, he admits, 
that is to be adopted. According to Schelling, das Unheimliche “is what we call everything that 
should have remained in secret [Geheimnis], in concealment, but stepped forth [hervorgetreten 
ist]”. As the reading of Hoffmann’s novella, Der Sandmann, which then leads the essay, shows, 
this emergence or stepping forth of what is supposed to remain concealed is in particular a 
function of domestic architecture and its recesses. According to another of Freud’s cited 
sources, uncanniness is also related to theological practice of veiling: “to veil the divine, to 
surround it with a certain Unheimlichkeit”.65 We recall the veiled statue of Isis before the 
temple of Saïs. What this scenography of veiling indicates is that the repression that is lodged 
in the negative prefix “un-” and is concealed as it were in the enactment of the negation of 
negation, is that of the sense of touch and the dialectics of nearness and distance.   
For Freud, what is most home-like, and that includes the human body in its disposition 
for dwelling in the home, is inescapably also the ground for what is most unheimlich. In 
Benjamin’s architectural account, the uncanny feeling arises from the figuration of the 
fragmented body and so from the notion that the sense of touch is cut off from other bodily 
functions, predominantly that of vision. It recalls the dismemberment associated by Freud with 
the castration-complex, worked through with the feeling of the uncanny. The state of being of 
the tactile and fleshly body, possessing a life of its own – uncannily “at-home” – flips over into 
a sensation that arises from the exposure of the unembodied fleshly body, the Leib rendered as 
Körper. In Benjamin’s reading, as we have seen, the latter mutation takes place not in the 
private sphere: it is attributed to the affective dimension of the historical life of the collective.  
Das Unheimliche begins with the contention that the feeling of the uncanny is notably 
absent from aesthetic treatises; not even as the negation of aesthetic themes such as “the 
beautiful, the splendid and attractive (“[das] schöne[n], großartige[n], anziehende[n]”).66 As 
Freud argues, it is not the semblance of life captured in the automaton Olimpia that is the locus 
 
65 Freud, “Das Unheimliche”, in Gesammelte Werke vol. 12 (London: Imago, 1947), pp. 229-268 (p. 235), “The 
Uncanny”, p. 224, translation modified. On this passage by Schelling see also Anthony Vidler, The 
Architectural Uncanny: Essays in the Modern Unhomely (Cambridge, Mass., London: MIT Press, 1992), p. 2. 




of the uncanny in Hoffmann’s tale, i.e., the “intellectual uncertainty” through which Jentsch 
thought to explain uncanny sensations.67 The uncanny, more than anything else, has to do with 
the story’s presentation of the “enucleated eyes”, a violent anti-opticality which is absorbed, 
according to Freud, in a twofold name (“Namen”): that of the novella, and that of its subject-
matter: “das Motiv des Sandmannes”, as Freud puts it.68 Moreover, it is not a matter of relating 
the anxiety about the eyes (“Augenangst”) to the dread of castration that is the key to the 
decipherment of the uncanniness of Hofmann’s novella. The Sandman is not only a proper 
name, it is a placeholder: the novella’s somehow meaningless and arbitrary lines of narrative, 
says Freud, become meaningful only when the figure of a castrating father is posited, emerges 
from domestic hiding, in the place of the Sandman.69  
 This empty space is inscribed in the prefix of the names of the two figures into which 
the identity of the Sandman is projected by the protagonist Nathaniel – Coppelius/Coppola: 
“coppo”, a footnote in Freud’s text indicates, is “eye-socket”.70 According to Freud’s analysis, 
“the conclusion of the story makes it quite clear that Coppola the optician really is the lawyer 
Coppelius and thus also the Sandman.”71 And although Freud ascribes to the sensation of the 
uncanny the phenomenon of the Doppelgänger, uncanniness is not dispelled due to a disclosure 
of an answer to the mystery (“Geheimnis”) of the double, its semblance as it were, as presented 
by the literary piece. Put in terms of Benjamin’s theory of language, the uncanny, the sense of 
being not-at-home – makes its appearance when language obstructs meaning. That is to say, 
when the expressionless – the withering of the communicating and symbolic force – is 
encountered within aesthetic presentation; or, when the latter is transmitted as 
“communicability as such” yet without designation. Suggestively, it is precisely the linguistic 
character of the uncanny that the third part of Freud’s essay addresses, contending that the 
uncanny demarcates the gap between reading (Lesen) and experiencing (Erleben),72 the two 
realms which are at the same time closely related.  
 The uncanny sensation that is attached to repetition is evoked in the beginning of the 
aforementioned fragment on the idea of the “skeleton of the word” (“Wortskelett”). “It is 
peculiar”, Benjamin writes,  
 
67 “Das Unheimliche”, pp. 237-238, “The Uncanny”, pp. 226-227,  
68 “Das Unheimliche”, p. 242, “The Uncanny”, p. 230, translation modified.  
69 “Das Unheimliche”, p. 245, “The Uncanny”, p. 232.  
70 “Das Unheimliche”, p. 241.  
71 “Das Unheimliche”, p. 242, “The Uncanny”, p. 230.  
72 On this point see David Farrell Krell, “Das Unheimliche: Architectural Sections of Heidegger and Freud”, 




that when looking at a word again and again, the intention towards its meaning 
disappears in order to make place [Platz zu machen] for another intention, the intention 
towards what may justifiably be called the word-skeleton [Wortskelett]. (One can 
designate the skeleton of any given word, for instance the word “Tower”, in the 
following way: “–tower–”). 
   (GS VI:15, my translation)   
 
This statement resonates with Benjamin’s pronouncement in “Über einige Motive bei 
Baudelaire” (written in 1939, published in 1940) that “words, too, have their aura. Karl Kraus 
has described it thus: the closer you look at a word, the more distantly it looks back” (SW 
4:354). In referring to this observation, in which the communicability of words, bordering on 
language’s corporeal existence, is weighed up, now in the essay “Karl Kraus” (1931). 
Benjamin notes: “Language has never been more perfectly distinguished from spirit [Geist], 
never more intimately bound to Eros, than by Kraus” (GS II:362, SW 2:453). Intentional acts 
of linguistic signification are linked, according to this remark on Kraus, to the dialectics of 
nearness and distance enacted by Eros, a sensual experience that uncannily brings cognitive 
meaning into non-existence. For precisely when words are aesthetically perceived, the split 
between spirit and corporeality, between names springing out of the divine “Sprachgeist” (GS 
II:153, SW 1:71) and signs which mark its fall, the split constitutive to Benjamin’s theory of 
language – is that which steps forward. In demonstrating “the skeleton of the word” in the 
semiotic form of writing “–Turm –”, the principle of “word-skeleton” (and the uncanniness of 
the expression “das Skelett im Schrank” cannot be overlooked here), is envisioned as the 
stepping out of something that otherwise has to remain concealed, characterised by Benjamin 
as “something originary [etwas Ursprünglich[es]]”. However, in the becoming communicable 
of “originary spiritual being”, the word only partakes in what Benjamin designates as 
“Bedeutbarkeit”. The word “tower”, he writes, “means nothing yet; “bedeutet […] noch nichts” 
(GS VI:16). Put differently, from the outset, every word contains the decay of its own 
intentional dimension towards an object and yet in step with this decay, and for that very 
reason, communicability is communicated.    
Thus, the word “tower” as a “word-skeleton” encapsulates the grounds of Benjamin’s 
language theory, a Schauplatz arresting into an image the Fall of language: 
 
Once men had injured the purity of name, the turning away [Abkehr] from that 




man needed only to be completed in order to deprive men of the common foundation 
of an already shaken spirit of language [erschütterten Sprachgeistes]. Signs [Zeichen] 
must become confused when things [die Dinge] are entangled. In this turning away 
from things, which was enslavement, the plan for the Tower of Babel came into being, 
and linguistic confusion [Sprachverwirrung] with it. 
            (GS II:154, SW 1:72) 
 
The fall of language, according to this comment from the essay on language, has always already 
taken place. The human word is underwritten by the turning away from things which is the 
linguistic subjugation to things. The objects in the world, however, are already entangled, 
subject to both names and signs. The existence of things through language, their linguistic 
essence, thus instigates an unbridgeable distance, a desire that is in play in the scenography of 
the distant looking back of the word. And the word’s “already shaken spirit of language” 
indicates the condition of being of language. It is the semantics of shock, of “Erschütterung”, 
that signals here the almost ‘tactile’ existence of language, ‘tactility’ that is henceforth subject 
to displacement into “Sprachverwirrung”. Linguistic confusion is that which at once informs 
and is the outcome – in the sense of ‘more than origin’– of the architectural scene of Babel, as 
this is indicated by Benjamin. Confusion or distraction also amount to existence and being 
underscored by material dispersal, as manifested by the scene of Babel. And yet, distraction is 
the perceptual condition testifying to an original contemplation – the contemplating act that is 
engaged with “primal hearing” (“Urvernehmen”, as the Foreword to the Trauerspiel has it), a 
receptiveness that invokes the linguistic transmission of names by things. The architectural 
references that bring the “word skeleton” of the word “tower” and the primal perception into 
close proximity might be seen to be reflected also in the “Kunstwerk” essay’s contention 
regarding the more than original lodging of the tactile, the counterpoise to the optical – within 
architecture. 
The co-presence of opticality and tactility, which primarily resides, according to the 
“Kunstwerk” essay, in architecture, was occasioned by the Fall. The division of human 
reception into these poles stems from its relation to the inhuman world: the world of things 
originally possessed a mute language that was nevertheless communicated to man as names. 
This is what Benjamin calls the magical aspect of language, its power of immediate mediality, 
of “Unmittelbarkeit” (GS II:142-143, SW 1:64). The triangulation of opticality, tactility and 





Hamann says, “Everything that man heard in the beginning, saw with his eyes, and felt 
with his hands was the living word; for God was the word. With this word in his mouth 
and in his heart, the origin of language was as natural, as close, and as easy as a child’s 
game [so natürlich, so nahe und leicht, wie ein Kinderspiel]”.   
(GS II:151, SW 1:70) 
 
The subsequent scene to this paradisiacal state which was “close and easy” as child’s play – is 
that of the Fall. The latter is “the hour of birth of the human word in which the name no longer 
lives intact and which has stepped out of name-language, the language of knowledge, from 
what we may call its own immanent magic, in order to become expressly, as it were, externally, 
magic” (GS II:153, SW 1:71). The pre-history of the expressive function of words, their 
tendency of intending to be “ausdrücklich” is inscribed in Hamann’s “Kinderspiel”, which is 
thereby exposed as ‘entstellt’. It follows the same pattern, that is, as the compulsive 
displacements of the fort/da game or the turning inside-out as disfigurement of the stocking.  
 
V. Habit and Attention   
Habit draws something new from repetition – namely, difference.  
               – Gilles Deleuze, Repetition and Difference 
 
Die Gewohnheit ist mit Recht eine zweite Natur genannt worden 
[Habit has, with justification, been called a second nature] 
– Hegel, Die Philosophie des Geistes 
 
According to the “Kunstwerk” essay, the historical phenomenon of the masses is coupled with 
architecture; buildings, to recall, are “umspielt” by their wave, configuring the triadic complex 
of play-, body- and image-space. In as far as play is born out of habit, now “the masses” are 
the “Matrix” (the ‘womb’ in Latin) “from which all customary behavior [alles gewohnte 
Verhalten] toward works of art is today emerging newborn [neu geboren hervorgeht]” (GS 
I:464, AW 18). With the claim that “buildings [Bauten] are received in a twofold manner” (in 
keeping with “use” and “perception”, the “tactile” and the “optical”), Benjamin famously 
states: “Tactile reception comes about not so much by way of attention but also by way of 
habit. The latter largely determines even the optical reception of architecture, which originally 




noticing”. Yet in what fashion, then, does this negative “path of attention” – that of the “laws” 
of architectural reception – translate into the way (or the law) of habit or habitation?73 “Under 
certain circumstances”, Benjamin writes, “[the tactile] form of reception shaped by architecture 
acquires canonical value” (GS I:465-466, AW 34).   
In this framework, it is the Hegelian concept of habit – “Gewohnheit” – that warrants 
consideration. Catherine Malabou, in centring her analysis of Hegel’s concepts of plasticity, 
temporality and the dialectic on the concept of habit, argues that habit, “a process whereby the 
psychic and the somatic are translated into one another, is a genuine plasticity”. This ‘plasticity’ 
is mostly associated with classical Greek: “The ‘exemplary individuality’ which is man 
‘sculpted’ by habit discloses, as if in a Greek statue, the unity of essence and accident.”74 
According to Hegel’s Philosophie des Geistes,75 the transition from nature to spirit is 
dialectically cast into the notion of habit. The soul (“Seele”) is for Hegel spirit in its natural 
state, thus soul and corporeity are fashioned by habit as both first and “second nature”: 
 
Habit is rightly called a second nature; nature, because it is an immediate being of the 
soul; a second nature, because it is an immediacy created by the soul, impressing and 
moulding [Ein- und Durchbildung] the corporeality [Leiblichkeit] which enters into the 
modes of feeling as such and into the representations and volitions so far as they have 
taken corporeal form.76  
 
Habit, as Malabou observes, engenders a moment of difference in which the corporeal body is 
translated into “man as the sensuous medium of spirit”,77 displaced that is, into Leib. Spirit 
sensuously mediates by having a body, as is glossed in the Latin origin of the word habit – 
“habere” (“to have”). As a state of having a body, habit is the crossing point of two forms of 
 
73 For the pyramids too, as Hegel notes, “nothing is captivating” about them, “the whole thing is surveyed and 
grasped in a few minutes” (VÄ III:43, LA II:652). As for the other part of Benjamin’s explication, that of 
Gewohnheit, the twofold meanings inscribed in the term, that of habit and habit(u)ation, are in effect divorced in 
the pyramids. For, they were spaces meant for the perennial habitation of bodies expelled from spirit, however 
not by way of habit. The pyramids, Hegel notes, were to remain closed and not to be used again.  
74 Malabou, The Future of Hegel: Plasticity, Temporality and Dialectic, trans. Lisabeth During (New York: 
Routledge, 2005), p. 26.  
75 That is, the third part of the Encyclopaedia, Die Philosophie des Geistes, which dialectically negates by 
preserving (“aufheben”) the two preceding parts, Logic and The Philosophy of Nature. In The Philosophy of 
Mind it is contended that “the science of the idea comes back to itself out of that otherness”, as Derrida cites 
Hegel in “The Pit and the Pyramid”, p. 73.  
76 Hegel, Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse, Dritter Teil, Die Philosophie des 
Geistes, in Gesammelte Werke vol. 10 (Frankfurt a.M: Schurkamp Verlag, 1970), 184; Hegel, Philosophy of 
Mind: Being Part Three of the Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences (1830), trans. William Wallace 
(Oxford: Clarendon, 1971), p. 141.  




death, spiritual and natural. Habit, in the Hegelian philosophical system, pertains to what we 
already denoted as ‘more than origin’, in the exact sense that it is, as Malabou points out, a 
concept that “plays the role both of result and of origin.” For, as she explains, in habit,   
 
the transition from nature to spirit occurs not as a sublation, but as a reduplication, a 
process through which spirit constitutes itself in and as a second nature. This reflexive 
reduplication is in a certain sense the “mirror stage” of spirit, in which the first form of 
its identity is constituted. Man appears as the inverted lining of the animal and not as 
its opposite.78     
 
The Hegelian idea, that habit serves not only as a force of death but also as the 
preservation of sensory content in the conscious spirit seems to be dialectically treated by 
Benjamin in the short reflection “Gewohnheit und Aufmerksamkeit”, a text that is part of the 
Ibizenkische Folge (1932). Here the double bind of habit and attentiveness is formulated as 
follows:  
All attentiveness has to flow into habit, if it is not to blow us apart, and all habit must 
be disrupted by attentiveness, if it is not to paralyze us. To note something and to 
accustom oneself to it, to take offense and put up with a thing – these are the peaks and 
troughs of the waves on the sea of the soul.  
        (GS IV:408, SW 2:592) 
 
This statement resonates with the “Kunstwerk” essay’s argument that “even the distracted 
person can form habits. What is more, the ability to master certain tasks in a state of distraction 
first proves that their accomplishment has become habitual” (GS I:466, AW 34). Distraction 
and habit form a dialectical image grounded on embodiment, as contemplative absorption 
makes itself manifest by a twofold form of heightening or intensification, set forth by 
Benjamin’s dialectic approach to the phenomenon of distraction. As Vivian Liska notes, “in 
contradiction to the idea that defamiliarization is the stipulation for true attention, Benjamin 
posits the power of habit”. By conflating “both absorption and concentration” she writes, he 
enlists “the apparent antagonists of these two modes of perception” in order to constellate 
“another form of attentiveness.”79  
 
78 Ibid., p. 26.  
79 Vivian Liska, “Walter Benjamin's Dialectics of Attentiveness”, Symposium: A Quarterly Journal in Modern 




In “Gewohnheit und Aufmerksamkeit”, this form of distracted attention flowing out of the 
concept of habit finds its expression in the extreme oppositional phenomena of “dreams” and 
“pain”: “In dreams there is no astonishment and in pain there is no forgetting, because both 
bear their opposites within them, just as in a calm the peaks and troughs of the waves lie merged 
in one another” (GS IV:408, SW 2:592). There is no astonishment in dreams since in them, the 
optical unfolds in a conscious manner, inciting no forgetting, and hence no astonishment. The 
lack of (the tactile) body in dreams is diametrically in play in the phenomenon of pain. There, 
it is the full awareness of the body that enacts “no forgetting”, the forgetting found on the 
“optical side”, that, in opposition to the “tactile side”, is thereby marked by unconsciousness. 
Thus “attention”, according to Benjamin, “struggles to emerge from the womb of habit.” 
Instead of the optical fantasy of compulsive repetition (of the traumatic scene of loss and death 
according to Freud), tactile reception transforms what has become habitual as such, and does 
this gradually, and so historically, beyond the compulsion to repeat, but, significantly, also 
beyond symbolic representation. Therefore, it follows that “the tasks which face the human 
apparatus of perception at historical turning points cannot be accomplished solely by optical 
means – that is, by way of contemplation. They are mastered gradually – guided by tactile 
reception – through habit” (GS I:466, AW 34). Tactile transmission contains a dimension of 
eternal return that cannot be historicised, and this has already been made evident in the 
cohesion of tactility and play. In as much as “play” yields habit, namely, the act of repetition 
without the intentional content associated with similarity, repetition is figured as devoid of the 
consciousness of remembering.  
 
VI. Back to Babel  
For Hegel, to recall, the idea regarding “the true content of art, namely that of being removed 
from immediate existence”, has its origins in the architectural constructions of ancient Egypt 
(VÄ 460, LA I:356). Architecture, in the Hegelian philosophy of the arts, is the first of the fine 
arts (although ambiguously defined as such) to be recognised as an inadequate form for the 
embodiment of the spirit. The Hegelian subsumption of art by philosophy, namely the 
coalescence of the “poetry of the imagination” or of representation into “the prose of thought”, 
and with it, the dissolution of any signifying sensuousness, resonates, yet in a manner that is 
somehow reversed, Benjamin’s celebrated conclusion in the “Kunstwerk” essay. In as much as 




Benjamin, in turn, what ensues out of art’s self-absorption is “Kunstpolitik”. Film (and so, by 
implication, its more originally tactile counterpart, architecture) countervails the 
“consummation [Vollendung] of l’art pour l’art”, and so, makes “the aestheticizing of politics 
[Ästhetisierung der Politik]” perceptible. “Humankind, which once, in Homer, was an object 
of contemplation for the Olympian gods, has now become one for itself. Its self-alienation has 
reached the point where it can experience its own annihilation as a supreme aesthetic pleasure” 
(GS I:469, AW 36).    
According to Hegel’s organisation of the senses, before absolving itself, however, in 
its highest phase, art enacts the sublation of the visible into the audible.80 “Spirit appears in art 
as made sensuous”; yet, excluding the immediate sensual qualities of smell, taste and touch, 
“the sensuous aspect of art is related only to the two theoretical senses of sight and hearing 
[Gesicht und Gehör]”. And these senses, in turn, conform to a dialectical procedure. According 
to the Hegelian theme of consumption,81 sight, in being ‘theoretical’, unlike touch, taste or 
smell, does not consume its objects, the fact of their being there, for sight “lacks desire” – it is 
“begierdelos[e]” (VÄ II:255, LA II:622, translation modified). We can recall here the more 
symbolic trait of the “optical side” conveyed by architecture, to which “there is no counterpart” 
on the “tactile side”. In the Hegelian system of aesthetics, sight’s dialectical counterpart lies in 
the acoustical sphere, whose characterisations are projected as a mirror image, as it were, of 
the “the integrity of sight”. Corresponding to this integrity, which is made known “only in 
shape and color”, is the oscillation of the body (“Schwingen des Körpers”), so that the soul 
(“Seele”), dialectically mediated by the temporal nature of sounds, does not partake in a 
“process of dissolution” – “Auflösungsprozeß” (VÄ II:256, LA II:622, translation modified). 
According to Benjamin, as we have seen, it is an absolute absence “on the tactile side” that 
prescribes the manner in which it is ‘tactility’ that is capable of apprehending the image, and 
therefore – the experiencing, lived body – in its passing away.   
It is with regard to the pyramids, however, that Hegel comments that “it is of importance 
for architecture that here there ensues the separation out, as it were, the spiritual as the inner 
meaning which is portrayed in its own account while the corporeal shell [leibliche Hülle] is 
placed round it as purely architectural enclosure” (VÄ III:42, LA II:651). To Hegel, the 
architectural sign of the pyramid is likewise the body of the sign marked by arbitrariness: “[the 
sign] is the Pyramid [Hegel’s emphasis] into which a foreign soul [eine fremde Seele] has been 
 
80 See also Derrida, “The Pit and the Pyramid”, pp. 92-93.  




conveyed [versetzt] and where it is conserved [aufbewahrt].”82 As a “mere sign” that bears 
upon “an indifference between meaning and its expression” (VÄ I:394, LA I:304), architecture 
dialectically inaugurates the symbol, which is not “purely arbitrary sign” (VÄ I:394, LA I:305), 
an idea that constitutes Benjamin’s entanglement of allegory and symbol in the Trauerspiel 
book (this will be detailed in Part Two). In the essay “The Pit and the Pyramid”, Derrida 
observes in accounting for the relation between sign and symbol in Hegel:  
 
the production of arbitrary signs manifests the freedom of spirit […] there is more 
manifest freedom in the production of the sign than in the production of the symbol. In 
the sign spirit is more independent and closer to itself. In the symbol, conversely, it is 
a bit more exiled into nature.83  
 
Not only the pyramids, we might say, unfold the different degrees of the tactile and the 
optical. The pyramids, in Hegel’s system of aesthetics and also in his theory of semiotics, are 
empty signs, signs that convey no meaning, hence the demonic character that is attached to 
them which is also the trait of the allegorical intuition or beholding (“Anschauung”), according 
to Benjamin. Art, as Hegel has it, is configured out of this gulf between sign and symbol, yet 
it cannot be assigned to the idea that the symbol is a mere sign: “art as such consists precisely 
in the kinship, relation, and concrete interpretation of meaning and shape” (VÄ I:394, LA 
I:304). This ambiguity of sign and symbol, grounded as it is on the distinction between the 
sensuous and the linguistic, thus runs throughout the whole Hegelian system of aesthetics, till 
the point at which it coils back upon itself in Romantic poetry. 84 Therefore, “in the system of 
the arts we can regard poetry as the polar opposite of architecture.” As Hegel further explains: 
“[poetry] reduces the opposite of heavy spatial matter, namely sound, to a meaningless sign 
[bedeutungslos[es] Zeichen] instead of making it, as architecture makes its material, into a 
meaningful symbol” (VÄ III:235, LA II:968). This interfolded relation of matter and spirit has 
its origins in architecture. If, with poetry as the proper art form of art in its Romantic stage, 
signs provide concentration yet are devoid of signification (or serve to point up the conditions 
 
82 Hegel, Encyclopaedia, cited in Derrida, “The Pit and the Pyramid”, p. 83. Derrida unpacks the semantics of 
the two verbs in Hegel’s formulation: versetzt means also “transposed, transplanted, translated: versetzt; 
versetzen is also to place on deposit; im Leihhause versetzten: to place in the pawnshop”; “aufbewahrt: 
consigned, stored, put in storage”. As Derrida also comments, “if the Egyptian pyramid, in the Encyclopaedia, is 
the symbol or sign of the sign, in the Aesthetics it is studied for itself, that is, as a symbol right from the outset”, 
p. 85.  
83 Ibid., p. 86.  
84 On plasticity and the Hegelian writing on art see Margaret Iversen and Stephen Melville, Writing Art History: 




of possibility of representation as such), this idea has already figured with architecture, the 
outlived among aesthetic genres. This evaluation, to repeat, of ‘more original’ architecture, 
could also be gleaned from Hegel’s striking description of the pyramids as “ungeheure 
Kristalle” – “prodigious/monstrous crystals” (VÄ I:459, LA I:356). With this figuration, both 
construction and perception, matter and spirit, recede into the remote tip of the pyramid, an 
optical, ideal, theoretical point, as stone becomes tantamount to crystal, at once plastic form 
(prefiguring sculpture and the plasticity of classical art), and transparent, adequate to the 
transmission of meaning. And yet, this ideality of meaning, according to the constructional 
logic of the pyramids, is architectonically, and also allegorically, fixed to the labyrinths that 
subsist in its foundation, as the labyrinth of language.      
Transmission and communicability were occasioned with the destruction of an 
architectural sensuous form, the Tower of Babel. Babel, not just the tower but the city too, 
surfaces in Hegel’s account for symbolic architecture, and with it yet another sense of 
Benjamin’s architectural topos of Rezeption in der Zerstreuung – is profoundly laid bare. In 
the section “Die selbständige, symbolische Architektur”, what Hegel calls “die eigentliche 
Symbolik”, architecturally expressed, is exemplified by the Tower of Babel. Here the art of 
building is considered symbolic for the reason that it architecturally expresses nations’ religion, 
a “unifying point of their consciousness”, a “place where they assemble” (VÄ II:275, LA 
II:637). The meaning of the tower as symbolic architecture is to be found, however, also on 
the level of its external surface, a surface that has been erected collectively by the builders of 
Babel. This externality subsists in the costumes, the habitual life (“Gewohnheit”) and the “legal 
constitution of the state”, the laws that unite people. All these are symbolically in play “by 
means of the excavated site and ground [Grund und Boden], the assembled blocks of stone, 
and the as it were architectural cultivation [architektonische Bebauung] of the country” (VÄ 
II:276, LA II:638).  
The erection of upright structures, in the Hegelian sense, is strictly second nature. As 
he comments, “to make a nest in the ground, to burrow, is more natural than to dig up the 
ground, look for material and then pile it up together and give shape to it” (VÄ II 289, LA 
II:649). The story of Babel as it unfolds in Genesis, gives an account of what Hegel glosses as 
the “architectural cultivation of the earth.”85 And yet, in the symbolic architecture of Babel, 
first and second nature, or better, nature and history, are inextricable: the Tower is a positive 
 
85 “and the brick served then as stone, and bitumen served them as mortar”, Genesis 11:3, in Alter, Genesis: 




creation bound to the “removal of the negative” (VÄ II 289, LA II:649), the more ‘natural’ way 
of creating excavated dwelling spaces. Hegel also points out that God does not inhabit the 
tower, nor is it allegorically represented by its very absence, signalled by hollow interiority. 
Furthermore, the story as recounted by Hegel is not about idolatry, nor about a wrathful or 
jealous God. God’s locus is indicated by the enterprise to touch the heavens. According to 
Genesis, God indeed descended down to earth, to get closer and see, to watch over the action 
of man, to judge and thence to enact a punishment: the material dispersion of the Tower and 
the confusion of speech. The entrepreneurial act of the people of Babel is susceptible to both 
linguistic and material ruin.  
The idea of construction as never to be touching the ever-receding clouds proclaims the 
unattainability of the sacred and resembles the foundational case of the pyramid. With the 
pyramids, too, the labour of raising (“aufheben”) non-organic matter out of the ground 
corresponds to an oppositional trajectory that advances only by its passing away and so, is 
more tactile in nature – the withdrawal of matter as such.86 To recall here again Benjamin’s 
classification of the distinction between the optical and the tactile, the optical, within the scope 
of architecture, gives way to contemplation and thence to the aesthetic experience of beautiful 
semblance; yet this experience is inescapably tactile. With this foreclosure, what is 
aesthetically constituted shifts into sublimity and uncanniness, an original move, a leap, Ur-
sprung, that was imparted to the realm of the aesthetic by the medium, or the idea, of 
architecture.  
Babel, the tower, is an optical-tactile symbol of the city, the topos and the site for habits 
and laws, shaping ways of life and taking place between families, in the units comprising 
homes and houses. The city, the dwelling place, in housing and sheltering, is more 
commensurable with the tactile habitual side, the “most instructive laws” of architectural 
reception. The idea of the city deforms the visuality of the tower into reception in 
distraction/dispersion, the double meaning inscribed in the word Zerstreuung. We recall that 
the travellers in Benjamin’s scenography from the “Kunstwerk” essay, are concentrated, 
“gathered” – “gesammelt[en]” – in front of a famous building (much as Benjamin was in his 
dream of the too proximate Notre Dame).87 The builders of the tower, as Genesis has it, were 
 
86 This double meaning of lifting up and cancellation, or better, cancellation by way of lifting up, is captured in 
the double meaning of the German verb “aufheben”.   
87 A traveller in front of ruins is also portrayed by Hegel: “The sight of the ruins of some ancient sovereignty 
directly leads us to contemplate this thought of change in its negative aspect. What traveller among the ruins of 
Carthage, of Palmyra, Persepolis, or Rome, has not been stimulated by reflections on the transience of kingdoms 
and men, and to sadness at the thought of a vigorous and rich life now departed – a sadness which does not 




also travellers who toured the land for a dwelling place. According to one commentary, it was 
a “strange power” that was revealed to them with a sight of an empty valley, which triggered 
the act of construction; also according to this tradition, the site they found and founded was 
not in fact empty, it was a place of burial, a trace in the landscape encountered as the removal 
of nonbeing. To use a term with central significance for the way in which this thesis unfolds 
the relations between body and architecture, it is a Schädelstätte: Golgotha, or Calvary.88 
 
It is possible to interpret this montage-like procedure that brings two spatial instantiations – 
the Tower of Babel and the Schädelstätte (the spatial figure that lies at the core of “natural 
history”, as will be discussed in Part Two) – into the time-space of a single image, or 
constellation, according to the model set out by Benjamin in the Ninth Thesis on history. Here 
we encounter the mute creature depicted in Klee’s painting “Angelus Novus”: “There is a 
picture by Klee called Angelus Novus.” And the named angel is arrested amidst the force field 
of an image: “an angel is depicted there”; and the degradation of the power of the name, as the 
movement from the named angel to “an angel” – the angel as word skeleton – intimates, is cast 
into the idea that the angel “seems about [im Begriff] to move away [sich entfernen] from 
something he stares at.” The angel is “im Begriff” here in three senses: in the process, in the 
concept, and in the grip. The figure’s implicitly dysfunctional bodily organs of perception, 
those of sight, speech and touch are described: “His eyes are wide, his mouth is open, his wings 
are spread”. Standing still and speechless and in a state of shock, body space yields an image 
space: 
This is how the angel of history must look. His face is turned toward the past. Where a 
chain of events appears before us, he sees one single catastrophe, which keeps piling 
wreckage upon wreckage and hurls it at his feet. The angel would like to stay, awaken 
the dead, and make whole what has been smashed. But a storm is blowing from 
Paradise and has got caught in his wings; it is so strong that the angel can no longer 
close them. This storm drives him irresistibly into the future, to which his back is 
turned, while the pile of debris before him grows toward the sky [der Trümmerhaufen 
vor ihm zum Himmel wächst]. What we call progress is this storm.  
     (GS I:697-698, SW 4:392) 
 
 
the decay of a splendid and highly cultured national life!”. Hegel, The Philosophy of History, trans. J. Sibree, 
(Buffalo: Prometheus Books, 1991), p. 89 
88 That is, the burial site for the people punished by the flood. See The Zohar, vol. 1 trans. Harry Sperling and 




Although this thesis, with the angel of history as its focus, has been endlessly recounted, it is 
possible to put into practice Benjamin’s own procedure described above as the optical 
unconscious, to spot, that is, an “inconspicuous place”, the place in the image that cannot bear 
on Schein, as the place of its legibility. The Ninth Thesis seems to set forth an image- and body-
space, also with their complement in the triad of spaces, that of play-space. Spielraum is 
intimated by the portrayal of the pile of debris sprawling at the angel’s feet which are then, as 
in a sort of cinematic shot – towering up and fixing his gaze. And it is with the “Turm” that is 
veiled and ‘entstellt’ in the “Trümmerhaufen” that the failed project of Babel wanders  – 
nameless – into the thesis.89  
The encounter between the (angel’s) body and the towering, ruinous remains of 
architecture is an encounter twice described. In the first case, there is an unbridgeable gap 
between being and seeing, between historical time and the pictorial. In close proximity, 
wreckage upon wreckage (“Trümmer auf Trümmer”) piles up, condensing the chain of events 
(that is, historicity, in the standard view) into a “single catastrophe” that lies at the angel’s feet. 
This refuse of history, the matter of natural history, is nevertheless ‘seen’, as bodiliness here is 
“placed into the world of perception, into one of the highest realms of language”, to evoke here 
Benjamin’s fragment on body and perception, discussed above. For the angel is literally, in the 
place of language, the place of origin out of which the Tower rises to the sky or to the heavens. 
This happening is marked by ‘de-formation’ and is ‘in tactility’, to use here two of Benjamin’s 
tropes that are yet to be discussed in the next parts. In the second scenography of perception 
and architectural ruin, it is by dint of the distance that the blowing storm opens up between 
body and ruin, and through which a field of vision thereby unfolds, that “the pile of debris 
before him grows toward the sky”. The more the angel is drawn, facing back, toward the future, 
the more the ruinous, uninhabitable anti-architecture grows. Babel here is susceptible to an 
unredeemed world, an object of desire whose fragments the angel is unable to repair. His wings, 
resembling in fact claws or hands,90 are forestalled from touching by the storm of progress, the 
“storm that is blowing from paradise [the verb here is “wehen”; Wehen, as we recall, are also 
“labour-pains”] and is entangled in the angel’s wings.  
 
89 As Michael Löwy observes, in the Ninth Thesis, the expulsion from paradise is “now represented by the 
dialectical image of ‘a storm blowing from Paradise’ which ‘irresistibly propels’ the angel of history ‘into the 
future’. The new figure of the Tower of Babel reaching to the heavens is ‘the pile of debris growing skyward’ 
produced by the storm – a storm which is nothing other than ‘what we call progress’”. See, Löwy, “Revolution 
Against ‘Progress’: Walter Benjamin’s Romantic Anarchism”, New Left Review 152 (1985), 42-59 (p. 53).  
90See Giorgio Agamben, “Walter Benjamin and the Demonic: Happiness and Historical Redemption”, in 
Potentialities, Collected Essays in Philosophy, trans. Daniel Heller-Roazen (Stanford: Stanford University 




Giorgio Agamben, drawing on Scholem’s analysis of the theory of the Kabbalistic 
image of ‘Tzelem’, reads the angel of history as modelled after the personal angel, the Tselem 
or astral body. This theme, for Agamben, links “the prehistory and pre-existence of man, and 
prophetic and redemptive motifs, which concern the destiny and salvation of man – or, in other 
words, his history and posthistory.”91 That the angel is displaced into an image of the lived 
body marks the differentiation between our gaze and his: the discrepancy between history and 
nature. Crossed between history and nature or being, between the spectacle of the broken tower 
and the drive of the wind, this double scenography around which the Ninth Thesis is organised 
in chiasmic form thus prepares the ground for a consideration of Adorno’s idea of natural 
history, an idea not least suffused with architectural scenographies, as we will see in the next 
part of this thesis. Adorno’s preoccupation with the theme of natural history unfolds out of 
critique of the Heideggerian focus on the project-ion – “Entwurf” – of “Being as historicity 
[Geschichtlichkeit]” (NG 349, NH 113), a critique that Adorno establishes by turning to 
Benjamin’s account of Baroque allegory.  
 
91 Ibid., p. 146. 
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Part Two: 
Sites of Ruins, Ruination of Time: The Stimmungen of Natural History 
 
Klage [ist] der Urlaut der Kreatur  
[Lament [is] the primal sound of creatures]      
– Benjamin, “Hugo von Hofmannsthals ‘Turm’” 
 
Das Denken der Tiere / Ihre Angst 
[The thinking of animals / Their fear] 
– Benjamin (“Notes on Kafka”) 
 
                                           
Drawing on the early phase of phenomenology, Adorno’s 1932 lecture “Die Idee der 
Naturgeschichte” aims at the formulation of a theoretical stance from which the dismantlement 
of the subject-object divide in modern epistemology could be mediated. “Natural history” – 
better glossed as “history of nature” – offers an optics of displacement: nature and history, 
which might be thought to be in binary opposition, are each subsumed back into their opposite 
in a state of continuous flux. This indistinctness, significantly, also characterises the aesthetic 
mode identified by Hegel as “symbolic” (we recall, the aesthetic phase most pertinent to 
architecture): the failed identity of the idea of art with itself. In this state of affairs, “the 
foreignness	 of the Idea [die Fremdheit der Idee] to the phenomena of nature 
[Naturerscheinungen]” is rendered as an extreme abstraction. At this stage, according to Hegel, 
“[abstraction] seeks, through distraction, [versucht, durch Zerstreuung]” – distraction 
occasioned by the preliminary sublimity of the symbolic – to elevate the phenomenon in which 
nature is encountered as self-alienated spirit, into an Idea, into its highest truth (VÄ I:108, LA 
I:76, translation modified). Seen from this perspective, Adorno’s meditations on the idea of 
natural history grapple with Hegel’s logic of phenomena (“Phänomeno” and “logie”), the logic 
according to which contingent appearances are absolved by a totality of “absolute knowing”, 
as stated in the final passage of Phänomenologie des Geistes. This logic, in Adorno’s reading, 
is incorporated into the historical and cultural phenomena of Schein, the all-pervasive 
phantasmagoria of late capitalism.1 According to Adorno, it is “the character of the mythical 
itself”, a character to be understood in terms of an exposure or opening to otherness (cognate, 
 
1 Beatrice Hanssen comments that Adorno wrote his lecture at the time when Benjamin was formulating his 
entries for convolute N of the Passagen-Werk. See Hanssen, Walter Benjamin’s Other History, Of Stones, 
Animals, Human Beings, and Angels (Berkeley, London: University of California Press, 1998), p. 22. 
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that is, to the repression of corporeal-material nature worked through architecture at the origin 
of art, as shown by Hegel) that returns in phenomena of “Schein” (NG 365, NH 124).  
Spirit, however, as unfolded in Hegel’s Vorstellung, is natural historical: in intuiting 
itself outside of itself, encountering its limit, spirit relinquishes itself as “substance”,2 and as 
such – appears spatialised. This arrest which marks spirit’s own limit, necessitates, according 
to Hegel, a “sacrifice” (“Aufopferung”): “Spirit exhibits its coming-to-be spirit in the form of 
a free contingent event, and it intuits outside of itself its pure self as time.”3 In entitling his 
lecture “Die Idee der Naturgeschichte” (my italics), Adorno reasserts the schism of the Idea 
between spirit and world in the Hegelian account. He argues that it is precisely the idealist 
“disintegration [Auseinanderfallen] of the world into being as nature and as spirit, or better, 
nature and history [Natur- und Geistsein oder Natur- und Geschichtesein]”, that must be 
overcome (NG 354, NH 116, translation modified). Adorno demonstrates the idea of the 
manifestation of history as natural history by drawing on Benjamin’s Ursprung des deutschen 
Trauerspiels (completed in 1925, published in 1928). In the dramatic composition of the 
German Baroque Trauerspiele, Benjamin detected an opening to a profane and spatialised time, 
to the extent that these plays’ historical conception of redemption resides “in the depths [in der 
Tiefe] of these vicissitudes [Verhängnisse]” (GS I:260, O 68).  
The idea of history, as presented by the Trauerspiel, is a sphere of significance yielded 
by immediate ‘first nature’, to use Adorno’s term, nature that signifies fate and creaturely life. 
In Hegel, what is dialectically sacrificed, and for that reason – preserved, is spirit’s “persistence 
of being” (“das Bestehen des Daseins”).4 For, “the other aspect of spirit’s coming-to-be, 
history, is that knowing self-mediating coming-to-be – the spirit relinquished into time.”5 Yet 
the presentation (both spatial and temporal) of spirit’s accumulated experiences between nature 
and history, is once more to be aufgehoben, at once annulled and elevated: spirit’s 
contingencies, together with their fixed organisation through the order of conceptual 
experience (“begriffnen Organisation”) – “the science of knowing in the sphere of appearance” 
(“die Wissenschaft des erscheinenden Wissens”) – are “begriffne Geschichte”. “Both”, Hegel 
writes, “form the recollection [Erinnerung, also connoting internalisation] and the Golgotha of 
absolute spirit [die Schädelstätte des absoluten Geistes].”6   
 
2 Hegel, Phänomenologie des Geistes in Gesammelte Werke, vol. 3 (Frankfurt a.M: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1970), p. 
591. Hegel, The Phenomenology of Spirit, trans. Terry Pinkard (Cambridge University Press, 2018), p. 467.  
3 Phänomenologie, p. 590, Phenomenology, p. 466.  
4 Phänomenologie, p. 588, Phenomenology, p. 464.  
5 Phänomenologie, p. 590, Phenomenology, p. 466. 
6 Phänomenologie, p. 591, Phenomenology, p. 467.  
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As a constellation of tensions in the Benjaminian sense (NG 359, NH 120), “the idea of natural 
history” contends that signification cannot be brought to a halt. If nature and history are held 
dialectically within an opposition, the task, for Adorno, involves refraining from this very 
opposition in order to think each of these concepts independently, to the extent that each of 
them is now delivered as a sign of its counterpart:  
 
As transience [Vergänglichkeit] ur-history [Urgeschichte] is absolutely present. It is 
present in the form of “signification” [“Bedeutung”]. “Signification” means that the 
elements [Momente] of nature and history are not fused with each other, rather they 
break apart and interweave at the same time in such a fashion that the natural appears 
[auftritt] as a sign [als Zeichen] for history and history, where it takes its most historical 
form [wo sie sich am geschichtlichsten gibt], appears as a sign for nature.  
         (NG 360, NH 121, translation modified) 
 
With this chiasmic construction, any signification is to be regarded as both natural and 
historical, subsisting in the deformation of these aspects of existence into difference and 
negativity, their own non-identity. To retain the impossibility of thinking nature and history as 
mutually subsumed (‘nature’ as a sign for the lack of spirit; ‘history’ as the sign for its absolute 
presence, as set out by Hegel) would be, according to Adorno, to uncover the allegorical 
structure of Naturgeschichte. Benjamin, in his interpretation of the allegorical mode of 
perception, evokes the topos of the Schädelstätte. The “bleak confusion of Golgotha [die 
trostlose Verworrenheit der Schädelstätte]”, he comments, is to be read as the underlying 
scheme for Baroque allegory. According to Benjamin, it is the scene of the Schädelstätte that 
precisely reveals that “transience” – “Vergänglichkeit” – is not what is being displayed. It “is 
not simply a symbol [Sinnbild] of the wilderness of human existence [Menschenexistenz]”, but 
rather, “transience is not so much signified, allegorically presented, as – itself signifying – 
presented as allegory. As the allegory of resurrection [Auferstehung]” (GS I:405-406, O 254). 
“Confusion”, revealingly, alludes here to the Fall of language, correlative to Babel and to 
translation, and hence to the radical break between language and world, between semblance 
and being. With this intimation, therefore, the theological conception of Golgotha as the 
promise of reconciliation is projected into a fraught language- and image-scape in the 
Benjaminian sense, as we will see.  
The project of presenting the paradoxical resistance to the opposition of nature and 
history, Adorno states, has to begin with the posing of the ontological question (“ontologische 
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Fragestellung”), for the latter pertains to “the natural”. The task that concerns an “ontological 
redirection of the philosophy of history” is that of “retransformation [Rückverwandlung]”: the 
turning back of “concrete history” into “a dialectical nature [dialektische Natur]”. This, Adorno 
contends, is the “idea of natural history” (NG 355, NH 117). “Concrete history” conceivably 
refers either to “grasped history”, according to Hegel, or to the finite temporality in Heidegger’s 
analysis of the mere contingency (“Faktizität”) of human existence – Dasein. Yet, says Adorno, 
this concrete history cannot be modelled on grasping the indispensability of being as 
“possibility” (i.e., the transcendental subject as the condition of possibility of experience as 
formulated in the Kantian critique), it should be modelled on “the determinations 
[Bestimmungen] of real being itself” (NG 354, NH 116, translation modified).7 As just 
indicated, Adorno’s uncovering of the mutual imbrication of nature and history appears to play 
out in a crossing between two figures of thought that he borrows, adapts, and eventually sets 
against each other. In Adorno’s presentation, transitoriness and decay are considered the 
allegorical expression of history, a history exposed by the German Trauerspiele to be founded 
on the trope of mourning as a form of signification. These motifs reverberate in Heidegger’s 
temporalisation of “being-there”, his account of human Dasein as “factical”, “natural” ruin.8  
This part of this thesis’s inquiry starts from an intimation of an architectural figure of a 
wall that surfaces in the final passages of Adorno’s lecture. There he addresses the “promise 
[Versprechen] of reconciliation” that “is most perfectly given where at the same time the world 
is most densely walled up from/by all ‘sense’ [Welt von allem ‘Sinn’ am dichtesten vermauert 
ist]”. As Adorno explains, this walling up is the condition of “the element of reconciliation [das 
Moment der Versöhnung], which is there wherever the world constitutes itself as most 
pertaining to semblance [am scheinhaftesten]” (NG 365, NH 124, translation modified). The 
irreducible ambiguity underpinning Adorno’s figure of a “world densely walled up” unfolds 
the chiasmic exchange between history and nature, wherein one level of meaning is folded up 
and turned back towards its repressed other. The chiasmus turns on the ambiguity of ‘von’ here, 
 
7 This notion regarding the unattainability of totality by reason is also glossed in “Die Idee der 
Naturgeschichte”. In formulating the impasse that phenomenology has arrived at, namely its attempt to 
overcome autonomous reason without, in fact, overcoming it, Adorno’s claim is that “only when the ratio 
perceives the reality that is in opposition to it as something foreign, reified and lost to it, that is, only when 
actual reality is no longer immediately accessible and reality and reason have no common meaning, only then 
can the question of the meaning of Being be posed” (NG 347, NH 112, translation modified). To be there always 
implies the uncanninness of human existence, amidst what Adorno terms elsewhere “damaged life”. 
8 Adorno contends that what Heidegger postulated as “the question of Being” is to be figured only, as he says in 
his 1931 inaugural lecture entitled “Die Aktualität der Philosophie” – “in traces and ruins”: “Only polemically 
does reason present itself to the knower as total reality, while only in traces and ruins is it prepared to hope that 
it will ever come across correct and just reality.” Adorno, “The Actuality of Philosophy”, trans. Bruce Mayo, 
Telos 31 (1977), 120-33 (p. 120).  
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as the senses of ‘from’ and ‘by’ are folded into each other. According to this scenography, 
there is a world that lies ‘there’, except, that it is already lost or displaced, precluded from 
(“von”) all sense-making – “Sinn”. The inaccessibility to any cognitive, abstract or conceptual 
formations resists any resolution or settling of the oppositions in play, elicits a ‘dialectical 
image’ in Benjamin’s terms. The world, “densely walled up”, is sealed off from sense, from 
being meaningful and knowable and as such does not avail itself of becoming the object for 
the subject. And yet, in retaining its thereness as a thing to be sensed, as sensuous presentation, 
the world, according to the same scenography, is thence “densely walled up” by (“von”) sense; 
it is present as a sheer negation of any signification – “‘Sinn’” (hence Adorno’s framing of the 
word Sinn in quotation marks). And precisely in the sense of this level of sensual or imagistic 
perception, the world/wall might be considered in terms of a-perspectival, tactile nearness, as 
the “‘sense’” of the world/wall is rendered as at once conceptual and yet corporeal, spectral 
and yet actual, abstract and yet sensed. 
The condensation of the “world” and its actualisation in the form of a fragment of a 
wall is a testimony to lost meaning and an allegory for memory. What is given in the form of 
an architectural remnant, is, in other words, an intimation of another possibility – and hence, 
of critique, which is ‘there’ yet in a form of deferral: a promised reconciliation, as Adorno puts 
it. Adorno here seems to adopt Benjamin’s procedure as he prescribes it in the Foreword to the 
Trauerspiel book and in Das Passagen-Werk, namely, giving privilege to presentation over 
expression, to showing over saying.9 Moreover, Adorno’s emblematic Denkbild of a world 
“densely walled up” from/by all “‘sense’” precisely captures at one stroke, so it could be 
argued, both the Heideggerian “Seinsfrage” and Benjamin’s grounding of his theory of 
language on the clinch between the expressionless and sheer communicability. As Adorno’s 
lecture uncovers, both thinkers promote a form of knowledge underscored by the inescapability 
of the fusion between nature and history; their thought diverges, however, in relation to the 
question of historical time. Heidegger’s “Seinsfrage” – the question issuing from the oblivion 
of Being (“Seinsvergessenheit”, an articulation that already renders being as spectral and 
abstract), potentialises its completion within history,10 and does so, as will be put into focus 
here, by what is explicated in Sein und Zeit as “the fundamental attunement 
 
9 For this point, see Andrew Benjamin, “Time and Task: Benjamin and Heidegger Showing the Present”, in 
Sparks Will Fly: Benjamin and Heidegger, eds. Andrew Benjamin and Dimitris Vardoulakis (Albany, NY: 
SUNY Press, 2015), pp.145-174 (p. 148).  
10 See for example Derrida’s contention regarding how the Heideggerian ontological difference fails to eliminate 
any opening of ‘différance’ or otherness. Derrida, “Différance”, in Margins of Philosophy, pp. 3-27. 
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[Grundbefindlichkeit] of anxiety [Angst]”.11 In Benjamin’s thought, it is the exposure of empty 
time that opens up the purview of Erfüllung, which is negative in character. As Howard Caygill 
observes, “it is the distinction between fulfilment in historical time and the fulfilment of 
historical time which marks the difference between Heidegger and Benjamin.”12  
The non-actuality of meaning, which is also the suspension of judgment and the 
constant (messianic) deferral of graspable signification are therefore set in a direct opposition 
to any preservation of meaning intimated by the question of Being. From this perspective, 
meaning, and by implication – history, is always already missed, never fulfilled: “Historical 
time is infinite in every direction and unfulfilled at every moment” (GS II:134, SW 1:55), as 
Benjamin notes in the fragment “Trauerspiel und Tragödie” of 1916.13 Here, Benjamin 
postulates “messianic time” (the idea of fulfilled historical time that is prevalent in the bible, 
according to this fragment) against the idea of unfulfilled time. The conception of time 
unfolded in the Trauerspiel is “not fulfilled” and “yet finite” (GS II:136, SW 1:57); a perpetual 
deferment Benjamin famously uncovered through the allegorical mode of signification. Werner 
Hamacher, referring to Benjamin’s Second Thesis on history, comments: “there is historical 
time only in so far as there is an excess of the unactualized, the unfinished, failed, thwarted, 
which leaps beyond its particular Now and demands from another Now its settlement, 
correction and fulfilment.”14 History, it follows from this dialectics of Erfüllung, could be seen 
to be worked through with the linguistic logic of the expressionless and the linguistic entity of 
the name as an epistemological structure of deferred fulfilment.  
 The first move in this part of the thesis aims to further peruse the close connection 
between the linguistic dimension and the communicative function of the sensation of the 
Unzuhause. Suggestively, it is the sensation of strangeness or eeriness that Adorno invokes as 
the exemplary topoi out of which the optics of Naturgeschichte and hence – its Idee – emerges. 
Not only is the Schädelstätte the ur-form out of which allegory steps forth as the turmoil of 
 
11 Heidegger, Sein und Zeit (Tübingen: M. Niemeyer, 1953), p. 184, Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. Joan 
Stambaugh (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1996), p. 178. 
12 Howard Caygill, “Benjamin, Heidegger and the Destruction of Tradition”, in Walter Benjamin’s Philosophy: 
Destruction and Experience, eds. Andrew Benjamin and Peter Osborne (London: Clinamen Press, 2000), pp. 1-
31 (p. 10).  
13 On Benjamin’s critical engagement, in his early texts (“Trauerspiel und Tragödie” and “Die Bedeutung der 
Sprache in Trauerspiel und Tragödie”) with Heidegger’s essay Der Zeitbegriff in der Geschichtswissenschaft 
of 1916 and on “their two different ways of viewing history”, as Benjamin writes to Gershom Scholem in 
November 1916, see Caygill, “Benjamin, Heidegger and the Destruction of Tradition”. As Caygill concludes, 
Benjamin early writings, his “programmatic sketch for the Trauerspiel book, and indeed for his authorship as a 
whole thus emerges from a critique of Heidegger” (p. 4).   
14 Hamacher, “‘Now’: Walter Benjamin and Historical Time”, in Walter Benjamin and History, ed. Andrew 
Benjamin (London, New York: Continuum, 2005), pp. 38-68 (p. 41).  
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meaning(lessness); Adorno also points to subjective experiences that are underlined and 
prevailed over by the historical structure of compulsive repetition. It is the repetitive character 
of “having-been” tied to the persistence of its “thereness” – also the constitution of Dasein 
through “ecstatic temporality” according to Heidegger15 – that innervates the critique of natural 
history and provides the setting for its graspability. This setting, as we will see, emphatically 
takes the shape of an architectural site of a ruin, one that is interlaced with the notion of 
temporality and decay as the main manifestation of the concept of life in a passage by Rainer 
Maria Rilke cited by Heidegger. To further explore this setting of a dialectical relation between 
the space of meaning of natural history and what Benjamin terms “creaturely life” I will 
subsequently turn to Franz Kafka’s short story “Der Bau” (written in 1923/4). The point of 
convergence here is the auditory enigma of Kafka’s fragment of a story: the creaturely 
soundscape of hissing and rustling that monstrously pervades the burrow. The site of the 
underground, as indicated in the previous part, evinces the sense of ambiguity in the Kafkan 
sense, as it has been drawn from Benjamin’s figuration of the shadow (a key emblem, as we 
have seen, for the scenography of the aura). In the argument developed in this part, “Der Bau” 
is congruent with Adorno’s thinking image of meaning and anxiety most figuratively (but also 
literally), setting forth the creature’s experience of “a world walled up from/by all ‘sense’”.  
 Another topos that will be considered here is that of the already mentioned 
Schädelstätte. This site of corporeal refuse, intimately linked to the programmatic Baroque 
architectural ruin, is at once a testimony to or a symbol of contingency and a sign to be critically 
read as the incompletion of history. With this convergence of symbol and sign into the 
“allegorical intuition” in Benjamin’s terms, the final move of this part of the thesis takes its 
lead from the architectural motifs and imaginations that are mapped onto the analysis advanced 
by Benjamin in ending the Trauerspiel book. This analysis, as will be elaborated, traverses the 
paradoxes of fate, melancholia and the theory of sovereignty, among others. The primary focus 
here, however, will be upon the closing formulations of the book in which the political theology 
of creaturely life, drawn from natural history, is disclosed by mute architectural 
representations. To the extent that the dramatic form of the Trauerspiel consists of the manner 
in which body and language are at work within and as a Schauplatz – literally “the place of 
 
15 “The ecstatic unity of temporality – that is, the unity of the ‘outside itself’ in the ruptures [Entrückungen] of 
the future, the having-been, and the present – is the condition of the possibility that there can be a being that 
exists as its ‘there’.” Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, p. 350, Heidegger, Being and Time, p. 334.  
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showing and looking”16 – it is architecture that most properly divulges blocked language, 
prompting “the  ear of lament” (GS II:140, SW 1:61) in Benjamin’s words.  
One of the focal points here in the reading of the architectural projections, 
manifestations and ruinations evoked by Benjamin is Carl Linfert’s study of 1931, “Die 
Grundlagen der Architekturzeichnung”.17 In his study, Linfert refers to Benjamin’s theory of 
allegory, as developed in the Trauerspiel book, in what can be taken to be one of the first 
academic references to Benjamin’s most complete study.18 Benjamin, in turn, reviewed 
Linfert’s work as part of his essay, “Strenge Kunstwissenschaft: Zum ersten Bande der 
Kunstwissenschaftlichen Forschungen” (1933). In a letter to Linfert, Benjamin regards the 
“truly methodical detour” as exemplified “by selecting architectural drawings.” This, has 
brought to light, “at one stroke”, Benjamin writes, “the close proximity between the essence or 
being [Wesen] of architecture [Baukunst] and the ingenuity of the Baroque.”19 Although much 
focus has been invested in the figure of the ruin, as will also be discussed below, there is a 
particular projected, imaginary architectural element which has drawn less attention – a 
balcony – that vividly captures the space of thinking and sensing in the allegorical turn of the 
melancholy Baroque.  
 
I. The Ear Which Is Attuned to Lament  
 
1) Profanation and Secularisation   
 
The short unpublished essay “Die Bedeutung der Sprache in Trauerspiel und Tragödie” of 1916 
adumbrates, in its demonstration of the cohesion of language and history, the significance 
of Benjamin’s linguistic theory for his study of the Baroque. As a linguistic category or order, 
as Benjamin understands it, history is concomitant with “meaning in the language of man 
[Bedeutung in der Menschensprache]” (GS II:139, SW 1:60, translation modified). The drawing 
 
16 On the notion of Benjamin’s conceptualisation of the Schauplatz as a space of alterity and allegorical 
“speaking otherwise” see Andrew J. Webber, Berlin in the Twentieth Century: A Cultural Topography 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), pp. 70-71. 
17 Carl Linfert, “Die Grundlagen der Architekturzeichnung: Mit einem Versuch über granzösische 
Architekturzeichnungen des 18. Jahrhunderts”, Kunstwissenschaftliche Forschungen I, ed. Otto Pächt (Berlin: 
Frankfurter Verlags-Anstalt, 1931), 133-246.  
18 Fredric Schwartz has pointed out that when the Trauerspiel book entered into academic circulation, it was in 
the context of an art-historical dissertation, “one specifically on architectural drawings,” and not in the context 
of literature. See Blind Spots, p. 64.  
19 Benjamin, Gesammelte Briefe vol. IV, eds. Christoph Gödde and Henri Lonitz (Frankfurt a.M: Suhrkamp 
Verlag, 1995), p. 42. All renderings in English from the letters between Benjamin and Linfert and from Linfert’s 
“Die Grundlagen der Architekturzeichnung” are based on a translation made by Polly Dickson.      
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into proximity of history and language issues from the primal scene of the Fall of language, its 
degradation towards “bourgeois language” as it is defined in the essay on language. When 
language falls outside its original, Edenic purposefulness of immediate knowledge via name 
giving, it subsequently lapses into semiotic, instrumental and objective functioning.20 
According to Benjamin, the concept of history has originated as it were in this transformation 
from a non-mediating, non-abstract language of names into the making mediate of language – 
its “Mittelbarmachung” (GS II:154). And yet, bound up with this primal divagation of language 
from the linguistic order that does not mean but only points to sounding and hearing as such, 
‘history’, we might say, resides in a dialectical tension of ‘untransmissibility’. Invariably, this 
material and sensuous dimension of language is associated with a perceptual web characterised 
by Benjamin as melancholic or mournful. This feeling or mood – Stimmung – entailed by 
nature’s “great sadness” – which, as we will see, inaugurates meaning as human history proper 
– is therefore the ‘primal history’ of language, what Benjamin calls the “Urgeschichte des 
Bedeutens” (GS I:342), as also relayed by Adorno (NG 359, NH 119).  
The theory of human cognition developed by Benjamin in the essay on language is 
grounded not on the first but on the second version of the story of Creation in Genesis, in 
which, it is reported, man was made from earth. The creation of man, Benjamin notes, is a 
mediated one, enacted upon a primal matter:  
 
In this second story of the Creation, the making of man did not take place through the 
word: God spoke – and there was. But this man, who is not created from the word, is 
now invested with the gift of language and is elevated above nature.  
             (GS II:147-148, SW 1:67-68) 
 
And it was nature, as Benjamin stresses, that was thus left forsaken in a state of speechlessness, 
and for that reason – mourns: “Weil sie stumm ist, trauert die Natur” (GS II:155, SW 1:73). 
According to this other original scene, man – now, significantly, not created at one stroke with 
woman, via a divine creative word – is set apart from the order of creation, and becomes a name 
giver: a creator devoid of the power of material creation (which might be read as a variation of 
 
20 “The name… is the innermost nature of language as such” (SW 1:65 translation modified). In the Foreword to 
the Trauerspiel book, Benjamin draws on the pre-eminence of Adam, arguing that “in philosophical 
contemplation the idea as word – as the word that claims anew its naming rights – is released from the 
innermost reality. In the end this stance is not Plato’s but Adam’s, the father of humankind regarded as father of 
philosophy” (GS I:217, O 13-14). 
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the rejection of the feminine).21 In a distanciated act of creation, as if nothing in what is human 
is to be touched by the divine sphere, or even pronounced in a divine word, man’s creaturely 
life was elevated from the gravity of earth.22    
At the core of Benjamin’s conception of language lies the triad of nature, the human 
and the divine, and notably, the non-contiguous relationship between them. We can draw 
attention here to an important distinction clarified by Giorgio Agamben between the meanings 
of secularisation and profanation. In sacrifice, profane objects can pass into the sphere of the 
sacred and an object during the rite can also pass over from the sphere of the divine to that of 
the profane, a transition enacted through contact, practices of use and touch.23 Profanation, 
therefore, retains the idea of separation from the sacred; it “neutralizes	what it profanes. Once 
profaned, that which was unavailable and separate loses its aura and is returned to use.” In 
secularisation, this separation is repressed, “Thus the political secularization of theological 
concepts (the transcendence of God as a paradigm of sovereign power) does nothing but 
displace the heavenly monarchy onto an earthly monarchy, leaving its power intact.” 
Secularisation and profanation, Agamben writes, “are political operations: the first guarantees 
the exercise of power by carrying it back to a sacred model; the second deactivates the 
apparatuses of power and returns to common use the spaces that power had seized.”24 
When Benjamin writes in the “Theologisch-Politisches Fragment” that “the order of 
the profane should be erected on the idea of happiness” (GS II:203, SW 3:305, translation 
modified), he not only maintains that the order of the profane is that which has been released 
from the hold of the sacred, whose meaning always lies beyond its material or manifested 
appearances. Rather, it is on the disintegration of perceptual forms that the idea of happiness, 
of “Glück”, also seems to be hinged. To the extent that the profane is to be erected – “hat sich 
aufzurichten” – on the idea of happiness, it is in “happiness” that the lived body finds its 
 
21 This rejection is also recorded in Benjamin’s early meditations collected in “Metaphysik der Jugend” and in 
his reflections on the figure of the genius there. See Weigel, “Eros and Language, Benjamin’s Kraus Essay”, 
trans. Georgina Paul, in Benjamin’s Ghosts: Interventions in Contemporary Literary and Cultural Theory, ed. 
Gerhard Richter (Stanford, Calif..: Stanford University Press, 2002), pp. 278-295 (pp. 280-284).     
22 The cohesion between the two stories of creation lies in the chiasmus of image and speech. The first story is 
based on a relation of likeness: “And God created the human in his image, in the image of God He created him, 
male and female He created them.” Genesis 1:27, Alter, Genesis: Translation and Commentary, p. 5. The 
second story consists not of an image, nor language, but rather formless matter and inarticulate sound: “then the 
LORD God fashioned the human, humus from the soil, and blew into his nostrils the breath of life, and the 
human became a living creature.” Genesis 2:7, p. 8.    
23 Agamben, “In Praise of Profanation”, in Profanations, trans. Jeff Fort (New York: Zone Books, 2007), pp. 
73-92 (p. 74). The meaning of the Messianic is rooted in a ritual of touch, through which the act of elevation of 
what is profane and unholy to the order of the sacred is performed. The word messiah is derived from the 
semiotic root masach, meaning to apply or spread oil: “the high priest, who was anointed with the holy oil”. 
Numbers, 35:25.   
24 Agamben, “In Praise of Profanation”, p. 77.  
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downfall, its “Untergang”, in the sense of ‘going down into’, which is the exact spatial polarity 
to the more ‘upright’ establishment of the profane. And this relation, which, is, in its totality, 
“transient” in both “temporal and spatial” senses, Benjamin denotes as “messianic”. Although 
the messianic, says Benjamin, has nothing to do with historical processes in which – to draw 
here on Agamben’s aforementioned observations – secularisation and profanation are 
inevitably dialectically in play, it is for this reason that “the relation of this order to the 
messianic is one of the essential teachings of the philosophy of history” (GS II:203, SW 2:305).  
The significance of the Baroque for this account of the philosophy of history resides in 
that era’s repressed entanglements of the profane and the sacred. On the turning (“Wendung”) 
of history to nature that underlies the allegorical tendency of the Trauerspiele Benjamin 
comments that “Even the story of the life of Christ lent itself to that turning of history into 
nature that is fundamental to the allegorical” (GS I:358, O 194).25 Benjamin notes how the 
Baroque conception of nature did not truly indicate the flight from the annihilating effect of 
time, as the antithesis of nature and history would suggest. Weigel, reflecting on this “not very 
readily accessible interpretation of the Baroque”, notes that this “unusual reference to ‘the 
secularization of the historical’, which runs counter to conventional notions of secularization 
as a process of transformation which goes from the sacred or the theological to the historical 
and not vice versa, already introduces a complex dialectic into secularization”. She suggests 
that the concept of secularization holds the position of a counter-concept to messianism: if “the 
messianic aims at redemption through the fulfilment of history, secularization here means the 
withdrawal of sacred significance within history, the transformation of existence back into the 
creaturely state or of history back into nature.”26  
To the extent that Benjamin’s analysis retains the theological ideas of guilt and 
redemption,27 conceptualised through their “secularisation in space”, it is with the aid of the 
device of allegory that these ideas are dialectically treated; and this brings us back to 
Benjamin’s approach to language. Not only has the faculty of naming – “the mental being of 
man” (GS II:144, SW 1:65) – emerged out of the caesural act of profanation, in Agamben’s 
terms, i.e., the strict withdrawal of the divine from what is human (a view also held by the 
Kabbalistic metaphysics of Tsimsum). Rather, Adamitic Namesprache, the “gift” (“Gabe”) of 
 
25 Gillian Rose notes that “while the protestant ethic leads to the withering of the interest in salvation without 
loss of the anxiety of salvation, the Baroque ethics evinces a created and creaturely world with the aspiration 
but without the promise of redemption”. “Walter Benjamin – Out of the Sources of the Modern Judaism”, in 
Judaism and Modernity Philosophical Essays (London, New York: Verso Books, 2017), pp. 175-210 (p. 181).   
26 Sigrid Weigel, Walter Benjamin: Images, the Creaturely, and the Holy, p. 12.  
27 A theme already explored in Benjamin’s early essay “Kapitalismus als Religion” (1921) by employing the 
double meaning of the German word Schuld as both (moral) guilt and (financial) debt.    
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language, prior to original sin and to the subsequent expulsion from Paradise, has emerged out 
of God’s inarticulacy.  
As Benjamin emphasises, the creation of the human is inscribed in an acoustical act of 
divine breathing as transfusing/transmitting the power of speech, which is “at once life and 
mind [or spirit: und Geist] and language” (GS II:147, SW 1:67). And once language as creation 
is released from its “divine actuality” it became “cognition” (“Erkenntnis”): “Man is the 
knower [der Erkennende] in the same language in which God is the creator” (GS II:149, SW 
1:68). “Whereas creation wished only to pour forth in purity”, Benjamin comments in “Die 
Bedeutung der Sprache in Trauerspiel und Tragödie”, “it was man who bore its crown. This is 
the significance of the king in the mourning play” (GS II:138-139, SW 1:60); a significance 
that is marked by a repressed profanation of political theology. In the section of the Trauerspiel 
entitled “Souverän als Kreatur”, Benjamin states that the “Schöpfungsstand” is “the plane 
[Ebene]” and the “terrain” – “Boden” (also translated also as “soil”), which seems to resonate 
the formless plasticity of mere created life or being – on which the “Trauerspiel unfolds” (GS 
I:263-264, O 72). The Trauerspiel, in other words, is constituted on the ur-history of the state 
of creation and of language, where spirit and language are still tied to the concept of ‘life’ in 
its pure form.  
 
2) The Presentiment of Mourning 
 
According to Benjamin’s essay on language, it is for the reason of the deficiency of divine 
language that “this man, who is not created from the word, is now invested with the gift of 
language and is elevated above nature”, nature that was left in a state of speechlessness and 
mourning. With this, the dialectics of Naturgeschichte as the interplay between timelessness 
and transitoriness is also set forth. Things, whose “proper name [is] in God” pertain to (mute) 
existence; and yet “to be completely known” by the divine (that which is “Unerkennbar[en]”) 
and, importantly, “To be named – even when the namer is godlike and blissful – perhaps always 
remains an intimation [presentiment, Ahnung] of mourning” (GS II:155, SW 1:73). Derrida, in 
respect to Benjamin’s conception of naming, comments:  
 
Whoever receives a name feels mortal or dying precisely because the name seeks to 
save him, to call him and thus assure his survival. Being called, hearing oneself being 
  
89 
    
named, receiving a name for the first time, involves something like the knowledge of 
being mortal and even the feeling that one is dying.28  
 
Through being named, a radical expression of mourning was released by nature. Nature, after 
the Fall, so Benjamin writes, profoundly changed its appearance (“Ansehen”), an appearance 
which is, nonetheless, acoustically receptive. (We might recall the “Kunstwerk” essay’s 
statement regarding how there is different “nature that speaks” to the camera than to the eye.)  
“Now begins [nature’s] other muteness, which is what we mean by the ‘deep sadness of nature’ 
[‘das große Leid der Natur’]”. Nature’s “other muteness” here adheres to history as “meaning 
in the language of man”, an idea that, figured through the scheme of Naturgeschichte, is a sign 
to be read in and as “nature”. This is expressed in Benjamin’s following observation: “it is a 
metaphysical truth that all nature would begin to lament [zu klagen begänne] if it were endowed 
[verliehen] with language (though ‘to endow with language’ is more than ‘to make able to 
speak’)” (GS II:155, SW 1:72).29 Benjamin attempts to clarify “a double meaning” intrinsic to 
this statement, enacting, to be sure, the very logic of the nexus between meaning and history: 
the passage of language from its ur-history of  “Eindeutigkeit” to that of  “Zweideutigkeit”.30 
Benjamin links the latter to “overnaming” (“Überbenennung”) (GS II:155, SW 1:73) and hence, 
to demonic ambiguity, to allegory, and to melancholy. As Benjamin explains the duality 
inscribed in this lament, firstly, nature would lament about (“über”) language itself: “sie würde 
über die Sprache selbst klagen”. Nature’s lament is infused by language itself. Secondly, 
nature, simply, “would lament”, regardless, that is, any object of loss.31  
 Inconspicuously given to perception (in the same degree as weak messianic power), 
nature’s lament, the ‘weak’ linguistic sensuous sign of history’s “continuum with nature”,32 is 
 
28 Derrida, “The Animal that Therefore I Am (More to Follow)”, trans. David Wills, Critical Inquiry 28.2 
(2002), 369-418 (p. 389).   
29 In a short entry in his diary entitled “Die Trauer der Natur”, Scholem refers this trope to Schelling, who 
writes, in a passage transcribed by Scholem, about the mourning of nature in the light of man’s voluntary 
renunciation of his central status (“Zentralstellung”) in nature enacted through the Fall. Scholem, Tagebücher 
vol. 2 (1917-1923), (Frankfurt a.M: Jüdischer Verlag, 1995), p. 615.  
30 For an explication of the “law of ambiguity” in Benjamin see for example Sigrid Weigel’s “Eros and 
Language: Benjamin’s Kraus Essay”, pp. 282-283.  
31 Language, in Benjamin’s wording, would be lent – “verliehen” – to nature; it is from the beginning not 
nature’s to have, for, conversely, as it is stated in the Foreword to the Trauerspiel, “Knowledge [Erkenntnis] is a 
having” (GS I:209, O 4). In respect to this difficult passage, Rebecca Comay invokes Benjamin’s view that 
“modernity’s curse and privilege is to repeat, to intensify, and (this is Benjamin’s gamble) even to redeem a 
catastrophe that was from the outset always already underway”. Comay, “Paradoxes of Lament: Benjamin and 
Hamlet”, in Lament in Jewish Thought: Philosophical, Theological, and Literary Perspectives, eds. Ilit Ferber, 
Paula Schwebel (Berlin, Boston: De Gruyter, 2014), pp. 257-276 (p. 261). 
32 This phrasing is borrowed from Antonia Birnbaum, “Variations of Fate”, in Towards the Critique of 
Violence: Walter Benjamin and Giorgio Agamben, eds. Brendan Moran and Carlo Salzani (London, New York: 
Bloomsbury, 2015), pp. 91-108 (p. 93).   
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thereby “the least differentiated, powerless expression of language”. Lament is the sign of 
nature that is sensuous and so perceptible by way of almost only containing a “breath” 
(“Hauch”), to the extent that “even where there is only a rustling of plants, lament also resounds 
with it” (GS II:155, SW  1:73). In an argument also reproduced in the Trauerspiel book 
Benjamin writes: “in all mourning there is the deepest inclination to speechlessness, which is 
infinitely more [unendlich viel mehr] than the inability or disinclination to communicate [or 
share oneself – zur Mitteilung]” (GS II:155, SW 1:73). For what language solely shares, is “the 
corresponding mental essence to it [das ihr entsprechende geistige Wesen]” (GS II:142, SW 
1:63) and this is enacted through language’s essence as language and not through its capacity 
of communicating something other than itself. Cognitive capacity is necessarily linguistic, for 
language, in Benjamin’s sense, is to be accounted as a spiritual essence which is nevertheless 
transmitted in language as medium: “in der Sprache…und nicht durch die Sprache” (GS 
II:141). This is why “Sprachlosigkeit” is the essence of language proper, corresponding 
dialectically to the fact of its “Fall” into “the abyss of the mediacy of all communication [den 
Abgrund der Mittelbarkeit aller Mitteilung]” (GS II:154, SW 1:72, translation modified). 
Therefore, it is sorrowfulness, the feeling transmitted in and through lament, that is a sign to 
be read: the transition from nature to history. But this also means that the relation between 
these realms of human significance is transpositional, interchangeable – allegorical. As 
Benjamin states in the Trauerspiel book, the foreshadowing sensation of mourning, in 
corresponding to the degradation of language, was intensified in the allegorical mode: “But 
how much more so to be not named but only read, to be read uncertainly by the allegorist, and 
to have become highly significant only through him.” “On the other hand”, Benjamin adds, 
“the more that nature and antiquity were felt to be guilt-laden [schuldbeladen]” – guilty that is, 
in their endurance in history, an everlastingness he associates with ‘creaturely life’ – “the more 
obligatory became their allegorical interpretation, understood as their only conceivable 
salvation” (GS I:398, O 244-245).  
The aspect of language’s fundamental trait of “Unmittelbarkeit”  – that is, its 
immediacy, in relation to the negative sense of mediation – can be discerned in the constitution 
of finite human existence – Dasein, the condition of being-there in Heidegger’s terms. History, 
cognate to “meaning in human language”, is irrevocably the mark of earthly temporal 
existence. For, whereas the verbal contents of language are marked by finitude, the mode of 
language which does not share external content but rather concerns the transmission of its own 
“spiritual essence”, what Benjamin terms the magic character of language, points to language’s 
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own border (“Grenze”) – its infiniteness (GS II:143, SW 1:64).33 The registration of language 
as the sphere in which being is constituted, and not as a conceptual structure, informs the “idea 
of natural history”, now referred to by Adorno as a “constellation of ideas” – namely, “the idea 
of transience, of significance, and the idea of nature and the idea of history”. As Adorno 
explains: “According to Benjamin, nature, as creation, carries the mark of transience. Nature 
itself is transitory. Thus, it includes the element of history. Whenever an historical element 
appears it refers back to the natural element that passes away with it” (NG 359, NH 120). 
Intelligible sense, in other words, always subsists in laying bare the sensible dimension that 
passes away in its manifestation as meaning or history.   
Benjamin’s interpretation of the specifications of language as informing the aesthetic 
form of the Trauerspiel is also grounded on the distinction between natural and tragic guilt 
(GS I:310-311, O 130-132) and on this distinction’s link to the concept of fate. This distinction 
is borne out in the following definition: “Fate rolls toward death. Death is not punishment but 
expiation, an expression of the subjection of guilty life to the law of natural life” (GS I:310, O 
130). When death enters the symbolic order of punishment and or expiation, it becomes an 
expression – “Ausdruck” – of creaturely life. “Baroque fate”, Antonia Birnbaum observes,  
 
deals with a history deprived of divine meaning that arises from an infinite course.  The 
task of the Baroque work will thus be that of dramatizing this privation, of arranging 
its dynamics and coordinates. Of producing its scene and fulfillment – in a word, of 
presenting a piece of history become nature. The issue is consequently in fact to render 
fate perceptible, to represent it.34   
 
For Benjamin, history becomes nature as the harbinger of the dialectics of fate in a process 
likewise inscribed in the world of things (GS I:311, O 132). In the “Setting” or Schauplatz, the 
place of showing and looking, the paradigmatic object that presented the fading away of life, 
as fate rolls towards death, towards that which is expressionless – was the ruin. We can recall 
here Benjamin’s argument regarding the mythical character of “the house” from the 
Wahlverwandtschaften essay. The deprivation of fate and its transmutation into the realm of 
the creature was mirrored to men and women in the seeming life that flows out of the inanimate 
 
33 On the role of prefix ‘bar’ in Benjamin’s theory of language see Werner Hamacher’s comment that “Here, bar 
is not only the word for truth or revealability, but also for freedom (it constitutes one of the centers of the essay 
on the translator) and for purity – especially that of ‘pure language’, of the mere, of that free from all imparting 
[Mitteilung]”. Hamacher, “Intensive Languages”, trans. Ira Allen with Steven Tester, MLN 127.3 (2012), 485-
541 (p. 527, footnote 32).  
34 Birnbaum, “Variations of Fate”, p. 93.   
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world to which they subjected themselves. For the Baroque, this was the ground on which the 
feeling of mourning and melancholy originated.   
 According to “Die Bedeutung der Sprache in Trauerspiel und Tragödie”, the rejection 
of language as a means of communication underscores the distinction between the linguistic 
aspects of the German Trauerspiel and the ancient Greek genre of Tragödie, and therefore, 
between Trauer and the tragic. Sorrow deviates from the tragic by dint of its being a feeling: 
“[Trauer] ist ein Gefühl”, a feeling invoked by a play of sorrow.35 The divergence between 
sorrow, which is “untragic”, and the tragic, according to the fragment, lies in the association of 
the tragic with a “ruling power”, the “indissoluble and inescapable law” (GS II:137, SW 1:59). 
The tragic is modelled on “demonic fate”, a pagan remnant which has not been overcome but 
rather “breached” (“durchbrochen”) in tragedy (SW I:288, O 104), and thereby settling as it 
were in the post-tragic form of the German Trauerspiel.36 The Trauerspiele enacted a diversion 
that moves from fated history – a history that is fulfilled in the tragic hero’s death as the 
expression of her or his guilt37 – to “the historical idea of repetition”. It is an idea that the 
Trauerspiel “artistically exhausts [erschöpft]”, as Benjamin notes in “Trauerspiel und 
Tragödie” (GS II:136, SW 1:57). And aesthetic forms, according to Benjamin, prevail over 
moral or religious contents: “It was not in law but in tragedy that the head of genius lifted itself 
for the first time from the mist of guilt” (GS I:288, O 104). Yet this elevation did not result in 
the reconciliation of man or woman with their gods but rather entailed a cognition deprived of 
language, leaving the tragic hero “dumb” and arrested in silence, which is the properly tragic 
dimension.38 Benjamin associates this state of affairs with the sublime: “The paradox of the 
birth of genius in moral speechlessness [Sprachlosigkeit], moral infantility, is the sublimity of 
tragedy.” The moral man is the one who is “still speechless”, “noch unmündig”, in the 
 
35 To recall, play indicates a relation between form and content which is not mimetic but rather repetitive. By 
this diversion, the idea of art is deformed on the level of the relation of the artwork to finitude: the artwork’s 
link to infinity takes the form of eternal return.  
36 For an account of the Trauerspiel as a post-tragic form, see Julia Reinhard Lupton, “Creature Caliban 
Revisited: Shakespeare, Benjamin, and Post-Tragic Form”, a talk given in the conference Walter Benjamin and 
Shakespeare, London, November 2018.    
37 This death is diametrically posited in relation to messianic time, for “in tragedy the hero dies because no one 
can live in fulfilled time” (SW 1:56), as Benjamin notes in “Trauerspiel und Tragödie”.   
38 See Giorgio Agamben, Language and Death, The Place of Negativity, trans. Karen E. Pinkus with Michael 
Hardt (Minneapolis: Minnesota University Press, 1999), pp. 88-89. Along these lines, Adorno formulates the 
dialectics of myth: “the mythology that underlies tragedy is in every instance dialectical because it includes the 
subjugation of the guilty man to connection with nature [Verfallensein des schuldigen Menschen an den 
Naturzusammenhang] at the same time that it develops out of itself the reconciliation of this fate: man raises 
himself up out of his fate as man [der Mensch aus dem Schicksal als Mensch sich erhebt]. The dialectical 
element here is that the tragic myths contain at one and the same time subjection [Verfallenheit] to guilt and 
nature and the element of reconciliation that transcends the connective realm of nature [Naturzusammenhang]” 
(NG 363, NH 123, translation modified).   
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condition of a minor – a mode of consciousness (“Erkenntnis”) that “without declaring itself 
[Ohne sich zu bekennen]”, still secretly – “heimlich” – “seeks to gather its forces [ihre Gewalt 
zu sammeln]” (GS I:288-289, O 104).  
The Trauerspiel reflects back upon the paradox of moral silence by acoustically 
intensifying the very exposure left in abeyance in tragedy. In the Trauerspiel, “guilt and 
greatness” make a claim (“beanspruchen”) not for “overdeterminedness” but for a “greater 
expansion” (GS II:136, SW 1:57). They enact, that is, a demand for space, a space for 
(mourning-)play in which the link between fate, guilt and history is recalled as incomplete, “as 
to repeat the same game, albeit on a grander scale, in another world. It is this repetition on 
which the law of the mourning play is founded. Its events are allegorical schemata, symbolic 
mirror-images [sinnbildliche Spiegelbilder] of a different game”. And this was expressed 
acoustically. The “interplay between sound and meaning” remains for the Trauerspiel a 
“terrifying phantom [Geisterhaftes, Fürchterliches]” (GS II:139, SW 1:60). In the section of the 
book entitled “Sprachzerstüdtelung” (“Dismemberment of Language”), Benjamin observes 
that “For the Baroque, sounding [Lautlich[es]] is and remained something purely sensuous; 
meaning is at home in the script(ure) [die Bedeutung ist in der Schrift zu Hause]” (GS I:383, 
O 226, translation modified). And yet, as it is stated elsewhere (in the section “Die Ruine”), 
“When, with the Trauerspiel, history enters the scene, it does so as script. ‘History’ stands 
written on nature’s countenance in the sign-script of transience” (GS I:353, O 188).  
             The antithesis of sound and meaning, of sensuousness and meaning that is abstracted 
from the material form that provokes it, is the idea on which the Trauerspiel is grounded: “And 
the vocalized word is only visited with meaning, as though with an ineluctable illness; it breaks 
off in the midst of being uttered, and a damming up of the feeling about to pour forth awakens 
mourning.” It is in the form of the sounded word, brought also into close proximity to the more 
corporeal “sense of taste”, as Benjamin comments in this context, that an interrupted lodging 
of word and meaning transpires as if visited or haunted in the home – “heimgesucht …wird” – 
by meaning. “The ground [Grund, also reason] of sorrow” (GS I:383, O 226), according to this 
passage, is the groundlessness of meaning or of language, and thus it brings to mind another 
phrasing by Benjamin, that of “the abyss of bottomless profundity” (GS I:404, O 252).39 This 
 
39 “Abgrund des bodenlosen Tiefsinns”, a formulation that draws also on the idea of the expressionless, could be 
thought through the Kabbalistic trope of “(ten) sefirot blima/bli ma” (“ten sefirot [countings] of nothingness”). 
“blima”, evokes the figure of an empty space (“tohu”) (see Job 26:1). In its other form of writing, that of “bli 
ma”, the phrase means literally “without (bli) what (ma)”, an empty form, that which is therefore expression-
less. See Sefer Yeẓirah (The Book of Creation), Chapter 1:1-9, in Aryeh Kaplan, Sefer Yeẓirah, English & 
Hebrew (York Beach, Me.: S. Weiser, 1991), pp. 32-71.    
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opening of a space was enacted in the form of repetition (recall here also the “fort/da” game): 
“meaning is encountered here – and will continue to be encountered” (GS I:383, O 226).   
  In ending his lecture, Adorno, in what seems to be a reference to the German 
Trauerspiel notes: “It is worth remembering that emotion always accompanies the lesser, not 
the greatest art works” (NG 365, NH 124). Prefiguring a “lesser form of art”, the Trauerspiel, 
as Benjamin writes in the section of his study entitled “Trauerspiel und Tragödie”, is a 
degenerate site at which, nonetheless, a “form” comes forth. This is possible only in, and 
precisely because of, “the frail body of the feeble work, as its skeleton, so to speak” (GS I:238, 
O 41). With the figural idea of the above-mentioned “skeleton of the word” (“Wortskelett”), a 
figure that also reverberates with the intimation of the allegorical language-scape of the 
Schädelstätte, Benjamin exhibits the function of “weakening of the symbolic and 
communicative force”. The Trauerspiel, according to “Die Bedeutung der Sprache in 
Trauerspiel und Tragödie”, is involved in the evocation of feeling – “Gefühl” – which is, within 
the realm of the aesthetic, an attestation to a particular “linguistic relation”. Benjamin asks:   
     
What metaphysical relation does this feeling have to words, to the act of speech? That 
is the riddle of the Trauerspiel. What inner relation at the heart of sorrow [Trauer] 
releases it from the existence of pure feelings [Dasein der reinen Gefühle] and lets it 
enter the order of art?  
      (GS II:138, SW 1:59, translation modified) 
 
The release from the “existence of pure feelings” here indicates language’s inescapable 
subsiding into the order of the symbolic, which is also “the order of art”, of aesthetics, and also 
– of history.  
Benjamin’s meditation on the very nature or physis of the linguistic order of lament 
portrays language that is ‘fulfilled’, and hence present, ‘there’, in the ‘now-time’ of its 
reception. But still, it is in the course of the “play of sorrow” that “the site of the real conception 
of words [Worte] and speech [Rede] in art” is constituted to the extent that the “the faculties of 
language [Sprache] and hearing [Gehör] still stand equal in the scales”. This chronotopical 
figure of the scales, a figure of antecedence – to decision, to judgment and to abstraction – 
discloses that for the Trauerspiel “ultimately everything comes down to the ear of lament” [ja 
endlich kommt alles auf das Ohr der Klage an]” (GS II:140, SW 1:61, translation modified). 
Attentiveness to lament, like the mute, albeit audible lament of nature enacted through the 
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breath and rustling of plants, hence figures the disavowal of language as a double negation of 
Sinn, of both the orders of the corporeal sensorium and the symbolic.   
 In as much as “history emerges together with meaning in human language”, “this 
language is immobilized in meaning”, as it is realised in the language of tragedy: “Das Wort 
nach seiner reinen tragenden Bedeutung wirkend wird tragisch”. The word becomes tragic 
when its meaning is borne, when it is communicated, fulfilled, subduing any trait of the 
unheimlich. And whereas “the tragic threatens”, now “man, the crown of creation, is salvaged 
for feeling only by becoming king”. Benjamin’s account (drawn from Carl Schmitt’s theory of 
the theological conception of the political), shows that it is the sovereign that eventually 
succumbs to the bare state of creation: “the nature of the Trauerspiel remains a torso in this 
sublime symbol [the king]; sorrow fills the sensuous world in which nature and language meet” 
(GS II:139, SW 1:60). And for that reason, the German Trauerspiel managed to cast “the world 
of meaning, the world of historical time” into an aesthetic representation which is, uncannily, 
“emotionless” (“gefühllos[en]”). Language, proffered to acoustical perception, in divulging or 
betraying (“verraten”) nature’s blocked sorrow, a sorrow that could never be realised nor 
transposed into a mediating language, in effect translates – “übersetzt” (puts over) or 
“überträgt” (carries over) – this obstruction itself into feeling. “The word as pure bearer [reiner 
Träger] of its meaning is the pure word. But alongside this”, Benjamin writes, “we find a word 
of another kind that is subject to change, as it moves from its source [Ursprung] towards a 
different point, its estuary [Mündung]. Language in the process of change [Verwandlung] is 
the linguistic principle of the Trauerspiel” (GS II:138, SW 1:60). This other word that rolls 
over from its spatio-temporal distant origin, the source from which it springs, and hence 
renounces the speech of otherness, is, then, the inscription of language as such, staged in the 
restitution of the paradisiacal language of the name. For language’s corporeal dimension, its 
vocal manifestation, is, interestingly, captured here in the figure of the “Mündung”. The mouth 
– or perhaps mouthing – of the river is the site at which the opening and gathering of the lips 
could be imagined as a crack, a Sprung; their rendition, that is, of ex-pression but also, the 




40 Benjamin’s Denkbild brings to mind the manifold etymologies of the Hebrew word for language, safá, 
which is also the word for ‘lip’, and their link to the meanings of the finite, and to destruction, extinction, 
gathering, convergence, and by implication, to silence. See also the translators’ introduction to the 
translation of Heidegger’s Die Sprache into Hebrew. Martin Heidegger, Die Sprache, trans. Michael 
Friedman and Danit Dottan (Haifa: Pardes, 2016), pp. xv-xvi.  
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II. Stimmung, Stimme  
           
Hegel’s Phänomenologie climaxes with the comprehension of history as the new, now purely 
logical appearance, the dissolving of corporeal sensations that gives rise to meaningful totality, 
the “Golgotha of absolute spirit”, or “[the world’s] becoming-world in a new sense”,  as Jean 
Luc Nancy commented.41 Negatively upholding Hegel, Adorno’s line of criticism figures “‘the 
new’, the dialectically produced”, as that which “actually presents itself in history as the 
archaic”. “History is ‘most mythical where it is most historical [Die Geschichte ist ‘dort am 
mythischsten, wo sie am geschichtlichsten ist’]”, or as Adorno puts it slightly differently in his 
seminar on Benjamin’s Trauerspiel book (delivered in the summer semester of 1932), 
significantly substituting “world” for “history”: “Die Welt ist da am mythischsten, wo sie am 
geschichtlichsten ist”.42 It is the stubborn presence of “having-been” in what is subjectively 
construed as “the world”, not nature; for the latter is always already historicised, complying 
with  post-Fall language, as shown by Benjamin. The structure of this language, its 
“Urgeschichte”, could only be divulged in “feeling”: the intensified sensation of sorrow and 
mourning vis-à-vis figural liquefaction of meaning, as it is captured in Benjamin’s thinking 
image of the Mündung. This image, also by its indication of the categories of minority and 
maturity, of Mündigkeit, brings to mind the melancholic stance and its cognitive power 
dominating Benjamin’s analysis of the Trauerspiel (to which we turn in what follows) as well 
as his work as a whole.  
We can trace in the dialectical, thinking image of the Mündung the close proximity that 
Agamben teased out between mood – Stimmung , a term which calls to be glossed at once as 
mood and as attunement or pitching of voice, and voice – Stimme,43 as the proximity that also 
 
41 Jean Luc Nancy, Hegel: The Restlessness of the Negative, trans. Jason Smith and Steven Miller (Miniapolis, 
London: University of Minnesota Press, 2002), p. 5.   
42 “Adornos Seminar von Sommersemester 1932 über Benjamins Ursprung des deutschen Trauerspiels”, 
Frankfurter Adorno Blätter, vol. IV (Adorno Archiv. Munich: edition text + kritik, 1995), 52-77 (p. 56).    
43 The untranslatability of Stimmung, a term that could be glossed in English as ‘mood’, ‘attunement’, 
‘atmosphere’ or ‘ambience’, was accounted by Leo Spitzer. Stimmung means “the unity of the feelings 
experienced by man face to face with his environment (a landscape, nature, one’s fellow man), and would 
comprehend and weld together the objective (factual) and the subjective (psychological) into one harmonious 
unity”. Spitzer, cited in Agamben, “Vocation and Voice”, in Qui Parle 10.2 (1997), 89-100 (p. 89). For the 
philosophical and aesthetic complexity of meanings of the German term, see also David Wellbery, “Stimmung”, 
trans. Rebecca Pohl, New Formations 93 (2017), 6-45. Alois Riegl designated “mood” (“Stimmung”) as the 
“content of modern art.” In Riegl’s analysis of landscape paintings, the subjective-objective state of “mood” is 
underlined by the orders of distancing and spatiality in the act of viewing. “Mood” is achieved under the 
perceptual conditions of tranquility and far-sightedness or far-seeing. However, according to Riegl, it is the 
dialectical relations between the aesthetic experience based on distance and the sensed movements of organic or 
non-organic life (“Lebensregung”), out of which “mood” emerges. Describing a personal experience of 
contemplating a landscape, Riegl notes how a movement of natural life, acoustically perceived in the more 
“tactile” “near view”, interrupted his contemplative mode, throwing him into a mood of anxiety, into “a struggle 
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structures lament and melancholy for Benjamin. This is the Stimmung that inheres in the voice, 
never independent from the acoustical, the material expression of language: the sediment of 
what Benjamin calls speechlessness or expressionlessness that is dialectically unleashed by the 
mute sorrowfulness of nature. Stimme, according to Agamben’s explorations of the place of 
negativity in Hegel and Heidegger in his lectures on Language and Death, is a trace, a present 
lack of significance; an empty sign disclosing “the place of language”. Drawing on Hegel, 
Agamben contends that the theme of the voice indicates absolute negativity; it is consigned to 
temporality and associated with the death of the animal, of the living thing. Voice is the not yet 
meaningful speech of the conscious subject, and thus it refers to what Hegel terms “natural 
existence” (“naturliche Dasein”). For the conscious subject, as Agamben reflects, the 
preservation of the experience of death “does not take place in a Stimme, in a voice, but in a 
Stimmung, the anguish and fear in the face of death.”44 In the realm of human language, the 
voice is, according to the Hegelian logic, an “immediately vanishing trace”,45 and thus it is 
negatively or dialectically absolved in that very domain.  
In Heidegger’s conception, Dasein denotes the construction of the human whose 
elemental classification is that of always already having a world, “in-der-Welt-sein”. In this 
construction, the Stimme, the pure voice devoid of meaning that belongs to that which is just 
living and exists without having experienced the opening of a “there”, “world” or “time” – is 
pre-emptively excluded. “The living being” says Heidegger, “is probably the most difficult for 
us to conceive.”46 The analysis of Dasein, Agamben argues, is constituted on the abyss between 
the living being and its voice and man with language.47 “Being Da, man is the place of language 
without having a voice.”48 Dasein is therefore grounded on an inextinguishable link between 
history and nature in which it is “impossible to isolate something like a bare life” in 
Agambenian terms;49 nor is this definition of the human determined by “real being”, in 
Adorno’s words (NG 354, NH 116). As Agamben points out, it is in “the radical separation of 
language from voice, from Stimme” that “we must look to the full emergence of Heidegger’s 
thought of the theme of the Stimmung”. To render this break in Benjamin’s terminology would 
mean its consignment to the chasm between language as meaning in human history and 
 
for existence”. Riegl, “Die Stimmung als Inhalt der modernen Kunst”, Graphische Künste 22 (1899), 47-56 (p. 
48). 
44 Language and Death, p. 35 
45 Ibid., p. 46  
46 Cited in Agamben, ibid., p. 54. 
47  Ibid.  
48 Ibid., p. 55  
49 See “Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life”, in The Omnibus Homo Sacer, trans. Daniel Heller-
Roazen (Redwood City: Stanford University Press, 2017), pp. 1-160 (p. 126).  
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(nature’s) lament – or between history and nature, in Adorno’s gloss – renouncing their mutual 
interpenetration.  
The cohesiveness of the Heideggerian structure of “in-der-Welt-sein”, however, is a 
connectiveness attained by the existential state of Stimmung. In as much as “Dasein is never 
free of mood”, its relation to the world thus lacks intentionality or representation. This structure 
and its semiotic representation seem to have some resonance with Benjamin’s semiotic figure 
of the “Wortskelett”. And indeed, the constellation of language, spatiality and the “factical 
being” of Dasein brings us back – through Heidegger this time – to the structure of experience 
marked by Das Unheimliche. In arguing for the inseparability of Dasein and world, of being 
and its temporality, Heidegger sought to arrive at the elimination of the metaphysics of the 
subject, and this, by constituting its state of being-in-the-world upon “the fundamental 
existential mode of Stimmung”, a disposition which in its essence thwarts any distinction 
between interiority and world. Stimmung, as Heidegger stresses, “comes neither from ‘without’ 
nor from ‘within’ but arises from ‘being-in-the-world’ itself”.50 Cutting between the subject 
and the object, moods, affects or feelings form most intensely the limit or border between them, 
in such a way that Dasein’s attunements cannot be located either in the subject or outside in 
the world. Stimmung, as Agamben notes, is antecedent to “all conscious knowledge and equally 
to all sense perception, to all Wissen and to all Wahrnemung”.51 Dasein means having an 
environment, or “around-world” – “Umwelt” – that is neither primarily there, nor antecedent 
to any familiarity or object-relation, to any form of experiencing the world. Dasein is 
substantially and spatially there, “in-der-Welt-sein”, as long as it is originally attuned 
(“stimmt”), directed towards its ‘there’ as such (the double meaning of the preposition ‘um’ – 
encompassing the sense of being about and around). The structure of Stimmung, as Ilit Farber 
comments, “conveys the challenge Heidegger poses to Husserlian intentionality; namely, that 
the subject, contrary to constituting his world by objectifying it, now aims to do so by opening 
it up, subsequent to realizing that his being is always-already within the world.”52 Thus, the 
constitution of Dasein by “moods” figures the dispossession for the world of any meaningful 
structure imposed on it by a subject.  
“Precisely because Dasein is opened to the world in such a way that he is never master 
of his opening, this opening to the world has the character of uncanniness”, as Agamben 
 
50 Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, p. 138, Heidegger, Being and Time, p. 134.  
51 Agamben, “Vocation and Voice”, p. 91  
52  Farber, “Stimmung, Heidegger and Benjamin”, in Sparks Will Fly, pp. 67-94 (p. 74). 
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comments.53 In Heidegger’s words, “Being-in is the mode of the un-home” (“In-sein kommt 
in den existenzialen ‘Modus’ des Unzuhause”).54 “Being in the world”, as David Farell Krell 
comments, “is marked by the uncanny discovery that we are not at home.”55 It is the 
fundamental mood of anxiety, according to Heidegger, that renders the encounter of Dasein 
with the world as nothingness, “[the world] collapses into itself”, completely devoid of 
meaning (in “Unbedeutsamkeit”).56 And this groundlessness of meaning is the experience not 
of falling into silence, not of the “having-been of voice” as Agamben says, “since what is 
revealed here is that between language and voice there is no link, not even a negative one.” 
The experiencing of the “nonplace of language” in Agamben’s gloss, namely the negation of 
the voice which is not dialectical in character, therefore occurs: “language is not the voice of 
Dasein, and Dasein, thrown in Da, experiences the taking place of language as nonplace.”57 In 
arriving at the theme of the voice as nonplace, Stimmumg, which always refers Dasein to the 
fact of “selfsameness” (“Selbigkeit”),58 the fictive dimension of its ‘there’, to its being ‘not-at-
home’, ineluctably foreshadows the negative manifestation of the voice, of Stimme: “man is in 
the place of language without having a voice,”59 says Agamben. And just as “Being-in-the-
world” in the mood of anxiety collapses everything familiar, and in as much as the empty 
dwelling place has resonance with the dispossession of the world from any meaningful 
structure, what is negatively designated by Agamben, and certainly from the Benjaminan 
perspective on language, is that the (non-) materialisation of Stimme is inexorably relinquished 
in Stimmung; a sheer acoustical sensation which, for that reason, testifies to the 






53 “Vocation and Voice”, p. 93.  
54 Sein und Zeit, p. 189, Being and Time, p. 183, translation modified.  
55 Farrel Krell, “Das Unheimliche: Architectural Sections of Heidegger and Freud”, p. 44. We can here note that 
whereas uncanniness for Heidegger would be a fulfilled history of “being-in”, for Benjamin, as it is the line of 
argument here, this historicity is to be dialectically reversed: Unheimlichkeit is at once origin and a goal. 
(“Ursprung ist das Ziel” is a phrase from Karl Kraus that serves as a motto for the Fourteenth Thesis on the 
concept of history.)   
56 Sein und Zeit, p. 186, Being and Time, p. 180.  
57 Language and Death, p. 57.  
58 Sein und Zeit, p. 188, Being and Time, p. 182.  
59 Language and Death, p. 55.  
60 For a discussion of Benjamin’s aphorism of “Überzeugefn ist unfruchtbar” – “to convince is unfruitful” (in 
Einbahnstraße, published 1928), see Weigel’s “Eros and Language, Benjamin’s Kraus Essay”, pp. 279-280.   
  
100 
    
III. Architectural Sections of Bare Life  
 
In the past, great architectural inventions constituted their 
essential destructability, even their fragility, as a resistance 
to destruction or as a monumentalisation of the ruin itself 
(the Baroque according to Benjamin, right?)   
       – Derrida, “A Letter to Peter Eisenman” 
 
1) Rilke’s Wall and Baroque Allegory  
 
Adorno’s view regarding the entanglements of life, language and Sinn and Dasein’s discovery 
of itself in the empty place – the Unzuhause – of language, as identified by Agamben, appear 
to confront each other in an architectural scenography of modernity evoked by Heidegger in 
his 1927 lecture course Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie. Here Heidegger notes, after 
citing in length a passage from Rilke’s Die Aufzeichnungen des Malte Laurids Brigge from 
1910, that the language of poetry and literature (“Dichtung”) “is nothing but the elementary 
emergence into words [Zum-Wort-kommen], the becoming-uncovered [Entdecktweden], of 
existence as being-in-the-world”.61 In this long passage, Rilke’s narrator is struck with terror 
by the haunting imagery of a bare interior wall of a demolished house that he encounters in 
modern Paris. The wall is a material object on the verge of nonbeing: “It was, so to speak, not 
the first wall of the existing house (as you would have supposed), but the last of the ones that 
were no longer there.” This wall is fused with the organic and non-organic residuum of bodily 
life, to the extent that, as Rilke’s passage reveals, inanimate creaturely life relapses into the 
creaturely life of things: “[life] was still there; it clung to the nails that were left, stood on the 
narrow remnant of flooring, crouched under the corner beams where a bit of interior still 
remained.”62  
Rilke’s passage depicts negative existence as impressed on the surface of an 
architectural remnant of a wall. Imprints and traces of building features and facilities such as 
ceilings, floors, partitions, pipes and interior furnishing are present as an afterlife outliving its 
own pre-history of production. The wall accordingly steps forth as an after-image of its origin 
of creation – an architectural drawing. And this architectural section uncannily comes to life as 
 
61 Heidegger, The Basic Problems of Phenomenology, trans. Albert Hofstadter (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 1982), p. 172.  
62 Rilke, cited in Heidegger, ibid.  
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a result of human suffering and material ruination. This wall, an allegory for the impossibility 
of dwelling, is a post-architectural object that also conjures up the more imagistic and 
photographic attributes of stillness and silence:63 “And from these walls, once blue, green, and 
yellow, and now framed by the broken tracks of the demolished partitions, the air of these lives 
issued, the stubborn, sluggish, musty air which no wind had yet scattered.”64 The affinity to the 
medium of photography becomes further evident through the temporal mode in which the wall 
is perceived by Malte. The wall is recorded as an image worked through the logic of what 
Benjamin would call the “optical unconscious”, an image aligned with the conviction from the 
Foreword to the Trauerspiel book, according to which “truth” is not a matter of possession and 
intention. The passage from Rilke continues:  
 
You would think I had stood looking at it for a long time; but I swear that I began to 
run as soon as I recognized this wall. For that’s what is horrible – that I did recognize 
it [Denn das ist das Schreckliche, daß ich sie erkannt habe]. I recognize everything 
here, and that’s why it passes right into me; it is at home in me [es ist zu Hause in 
mir].65 
 
Here truth is cognate to “the death of the intention”, which is also the theoretical framework of 
Benjamin’s “dialektisches Bild”. Intentionless recognition is “distant from all phenomenality” 
(GS I:216, O 13), to use Benjamin’s phrasing from the Trauerspiel book, beyond representation 
or image. In it, what takes ‘possession’ in the form of (traumatic) repetition is the sinister 
transmutation of the auratic trace, the “appearance of a nearness, however far removed the 
thing that left it behind may be” – to recall Benjamin’s dialectics discussed in the previous part 
– into the experience of being seized – “bemächtigt” – by that very apparition. Rilke’s wall 
complies with a procedure in which a demolished human space is tantamount to the withdrawal 
of space as such, i.e., the oscillatory movement between presentation and representation, 
history and memory, and also – the tactile and the optical. The wall is an image that is already 
a trace, a ruin, the distance that opens up in what is apparently most close. These fluctuations 
are enacted within a space of contraction: what was once a sheltering house, is now a bare wall 
 
63 Eric L. Santner, commenting on the proximity of Malte’s experience to the medium of photography, writes:   
“Malte’s sensorium becomes such a photographic plate not so much for what is there to behold – as Heidegger 
suggested, ‘pure beholding, even if it penetrated into the innermost core of the being of something objectively 
present, would never be able to discover anything like what is threatening’ – but for the traces of past lives and 
lost possibilities.” On Creaturely Life: Rilke, Benjamin, Sebald, p. 52.  




    
in which pastness as such is sensed as meaningless loss. The latter can gain meaning only as a 
photographic-like, spectral image that emerges out of the dissolution of the object which is 
always already set opposite (qua Gegen-stand) the subject who experiences it, or houses it, as 
its complete absorption and disappearance: “es ist zu Hause in mir”.  
The wall, in Benjamin’s terms, would amount to the allegorical encounter with the 
“death’s head” of history or to the uncannily returned gaze without eyes of the skull (recall also 
the figure of the eye sockets in Hoffmann’s Der Sandmann). In Benjamin’s analysis, according 
to Adorno, allegory intimates nothing but “historical relationship”. To the extent that allegory 
is not constituted on the abstractness of the symbol nor on the arbitrariness of the sign and “the 
theme of the allegorical is, simply, history” (NG 358, NH 119) as noted by Adorno, allegory is 
therefore not structured according to human meaning in its postlapsarian state. Under the 
allegorical gaze, history resorts to the natural instance that passes away with it. “Whereas in 
the symbol, with the sublimation of downfall, the transfigured countenance of nature reveals 
itself fleetingly in the light of salvation, in allegory there lies before the eyes of the observer 
the facies hippocratica of history as petrified primal landscape.” Allegory displaces and 
deforms any “‘symbolic’ freedom of expression” and consequently “all classical harmony of 
form” that inheres in that freedom. In allegory, “History, in everything untimely, sorrowful, 
and miscarried that belongs to it from the beginning, is inscribed in a face – no, in a death’s 
head” (GS 1:343, O 174). The melancholic gaze and the abstracting functioning of language 
(“– nein”, “ – no”) are capable of reading in a “face” or countenance – “Antlitz” – the retraction 
of nature, portraying the face in question as “facies hippocratica”, just as, in a somehow inverse 
fashion, in being readable, the dialectical image becomes available to sensory perception. 
For the observer of allegory, history gains meaning only when the latter is stirred by 
nature and death. “This is the core of the allegorical vision, of the Baroque profane exposition 
of history as the Passion of the world – meaningful only in the stations of its decline.” 
Allegorical meaning constantly gives itself to death, “for at the deepest level death incises the 
jagged line of demarcation between physis and meaning” (GS I:343, O 174), an incision, a cut, 
a section – the completion or consummation of bare life, which is not only an indication for 
the uninhabitable space of the ruin, but is also in itself architectural, and so – tactile, in kind. 
Against the depths of mythical and symbolic expression, allegory is facial and depthless; it is 
bound to the experience of the surface and presupposes the positioning of the beholder at an 
aporetic distance of ‘touching’ and yet devoid of its ability to endure, hence allegory’s yearning 
for infinity. Of particular pertinence here is an image of architectural creation, interlaced into 
the section “Die Ruine” in the Trauerspiel book. It describes a construction of the master-
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builder (in the Spanish Golden Age plays of Calderón) which erupts only in the form of the 
walled-up wall of a building whose plaster has begun to crumble” (GS I:355, O 190) as “history 
is secularized in the setting” (GS I:271, O 82).  
In Heidegger’s interpretation, Rilke’s Dichtung of the bare wall is a documentation of 
Dasein’s completion: the complete internalisation of the externalised inner wall as tantamount 
to the uncanniness of being-in-the-world. And yet in the passing of mortal life, “what Rilke 
calls life”, into what Benjamin would call the Schauplatz, and the manner in which this form 
of life “leaps toward us from things” (“aus den Dingen uns entgegenspringt”), the world as 
such, as in the mood of anxiety – comes to pass, in the form of radical self-absorption. Life 
resides in this wall, says Heidegger, and the way in which it “leaps forward” is not “imagined 
[by the poet] into the wall [nicht in die Mauer hineingedichtet]”, for, what “actually is” in the 
depiction of the wall, is the “leap” (“Sprung”, also demanding to be read as “crack”) that arises 
out of “our natural relationship” to it (the wall). What is exposed here in mood or affect, 
according to Heidegger, is the world in its originality – “ursprüngliche Welt” –  produced by 
means of a “non-theoretical” composition,66 exhibiting, that is, the sheer collapse that unfolds 
in Stimmung between inside and outside, subject and world.   
In his 1934-1935 lectures on Friedrich Hölderlin, Heidegger accounts for the etymology 
of the word Dichtung, from the Latin dictare. He stresses both Dichtung’s communicative 
essence as “composing something in language”, a meaning which has later merged into the 
semantics of the poetic and poetry, and its belonging to the same root as the Greek deiknumi 
(mediated via the word tithôn), meaning “to show, to make something visible, to make it 
manifest  – not just in general, but by way of a specific pointing.”67 In highlighting the relation 
of Dichtung to deixis, to showing or exposing the truth, Heidegger, however, does not address 
these pertinences dialectically, nor their negative undertones. Close to erdichten, “dichten also 
means to invent in order to delude, or to imagine in order to deceive.”68 We might also note 
here the proximity of Dichtung with dicht (that which is dense or sealed off) – the proximity 
already alluded to by Adorno – which is to be considered  “not the result of purely accidental 
homophony.”69 Dasein’s state of being always already immersed in the activity of making 
sense of/sensing a “world” is a scenography close to that of the “world densely walled up 
 
66 Heidegger, Basic Problems of Phenomenology, p. 173. In this context of his argument, Heidegger evokes 
Wilhelm Dilthey’s concept of Lebensphilosophie.  
67 Heidegger, Hölderlin’s Hymns “Germania” and “the Rhine”, trans. William McNeill, Julia Ireland 
(Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 2014), pp. 28-29.  
68 See Barbara Cassin, et al. ed., Dictionary of Untranslatables, A Philosophical Lexicon (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2014), p. 216.  
69 Ibid.  
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by/from ‘sense’”. Yet this scenography aptly corresponds to the semantic field of spectrality, 
as this suffuses Adorno’s argument (“Scheinwelt”, “bloße[n] Bildlichkeit”, are among his 
terms); “the mythical character itself returns in the historical phenomenon of semblance” (NG 
364, NH 124), he writes. The spectral ambiguity of sensible forms (and therefore – also their 
demonic character) structures Benjamin’s polemic of the dialectical image, as we will see 
shortly.70  
It is through Dichte, the denseness or sealing off of the phantasmagorical, but also the 
phantasmagorical feature of materiality, as divulged by Rilke’s wall, that the subject is attuned 
to the facticity of this very historical setting. This attunement, however, from the perspective 
of natural history, could not be fathomed as “natural”, as Heidegger’s ontological analysis of 
“being-in-the-world” articulates it, but rather only as “natural historical”. Furthermore, the 
uncanniness that underlies Rilke’s statement “it is at home in me” is notably ‘tactile’, in 
Benjamin’s terms. The architectural fragment of the wall is “more originally” at home, we 
might say, for Malte has known it all along. Being too close, too at home, to the extent that the 
outside ‘there’ is enwrapped in the ‘here’ of the “there-being” and that the wall/world is 
(already, destined to be) swallowed by dint of the horror it provokes – this is naturalised 
according to Heidegger. 
 
2) Kafka’s Der Bau   
 
According to Benjamin, for allegorical immersion, natural history is not an ideal symbol for 
human, factical existence, but rather functions as allegory’s dialectical limit (“Grenze”). It is 
the boundary from which “the allegorical way of seeing” arcs, turns backwards, enacting   
“turnabout into holy salvation” (“Umschwung in das Heil der Rettung”) (GS I:405, O 254). 
From the perspective of Benjamin’s conception of time, the limit unfolded here would be the 
line of demarcation between empty time, on the one hand, and messianically fulfilled time on 
the other. In the light of Benjamin’s conception of life, what is framed here is creaturely life in 
as far as it cannot be separated from its “state of creation”. As Benjamin also notes in the 
section of his study entitled “Schauplatz”, “the creature is the mirror within whose frame alone 
the moral world was revealed to the Baroque. A concave mirror; for this was not possible 
without distortions [Verzerrungen]” (GS I:270, O 80). Or, to follow Benjamin’s account of fate 
 
70 On the demonic ambiguity of the image in Benjamin’s work see for example Alison Ross, Walter Benjamin’s 
Concept of the Image, p. 63.  
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(“Concept of Fate in the Drama of Fate”), it is a concept that is “meaning-full” – “sinnerfüllt” 
– “only as a natural-historical [naturgeschichtliche] category in the spirit of the restoration 
theology of the counter-reformation”. Nature, history and fate are intertwined since “the state 
of Creation still reflects the sun of grace [Gnadensonne]. Mirrored, however, in the slough of 
adamic guilt” (GS I:308, O 128). The slough or the swamp is the place – Stelle – of 
displacement and distortion (of Entstellung) wherein theological grace is deformed, yet also 
turned towards messianic Erlösung.71     
Let us, however, still linger on the figure of the bare wall and the concept of mere, 
natural life it encloses. The complete internalisation, the reversed inhabitation of the 
demolished wall, an act of walling in or walling up in resistance to self-dispersal, finds a point 
of comparison in Kafka’s narrative fragment “Der Bau”. Rilke’s unification of a fragment of a 
wall and life is mirrored in Kafka’s Dichtung: the manifestation of a complete coalescence of 
life into the process of building. Benjamin’s interpretation of the uncanniness underscoring 
Kafka’s animal stories closely corresponds to the manner in which Rilke’s wall is startlingly 
creeping in. In his essay on Kafka (““Franz Kafka, Zur zehnten Wiederkehr seines 
Todestages”, published in the Jüdische Rundschau in 1934), Benjamin contends:  
 
You can read Kafka’s animal stories for quite a while without realizing that they are 
not about human beings at all. When you finally come upon the name of the creature – 
monkey, dog, mole – you look up in fright and realize that you are already far away 
from the continent of man.  
   (GS II:419-420, SW 2:802)  
 
And this removal from the continent of man is marked not least by the architectural and the 
optical-tactile relation of the subject to it – witness the requirement of the narrative in voice in 
Die Verwandlung to identify the room in which Gregor Samsa awakes as creature, with its four 
“wohlbekannten” [familiar] walls, as “Menschenzimmer” or “human room”,72 as though the 
category of room has been removed from its implicit place with human being. Kafka’s “Bau” 
(structure, building, burrow, hole) instantiates such a logic of architectural displacement of the 
human: the demarcation of a dwelling space against an outside creaturely world and the activity 
of erecting walls and partitions draw the creaturely world most closely to home.   
 
71 Weigel comments: “If distortion in Freud is a translation without an original, from which the attempt is 
derived to paraphrase this original through association, in Benjamin distortion also means the remoteness from a 
lost and unreachable place towards which it turns in the figure of reversal.” Body- and image- Space, p. 155.   
72 Franz Kafka, “Die Verwandlung”, in Die Erzählungen (Frankfurt a.M.: Fischer, 1996), pp. 96-161 (p. 96). 
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The point of convergence with the theme of the Stimme/Stimmung is, however, the auditory 
enigma of Kafka’s fragment of a story: the creaturely soundscape of hissing and rustling that 
pervades the monstrous construction of the burrow. Within the underground space constructed 
by the creature, the story gives voice to the latter’s ceaseless thoughts and meditations on 
possible scenarios of the burrow’s destruction or invasion by an invisible threat, unfolded as 
he wanders through its endless passageways and plazas. These meditations are interrupted and 
fed by the soundscape of hissing and rustling. Hunted and distracted by these sounds, the 
narrator-mole is unable to determine whether they are real or imagined, threatening from within 
the structure or outside of it, whether they belong to some invisible animals, are just the rushing 
sounds of the soil, or perhaps, the sound he is making himself. Here the ‘home’ is literally 
constructed in and through the inability to set apart the inside from the outside, despite the 
creature’s incessant activity of shaping walls and passages within the soil of the earth. For the 
nameless creature the act of constructing walls is not meant to divide, nor to lend a distanced 
perspective: “it would not be at all necessary to make clear to myself through contemplations 
what the Bau means to me. I and the Bau belong together”.73  
While the auditory dimension of perception is emphasised, any evocation of the 
burrow’s visibility from the outside is concerned with scenarios of its destruction and loss. The 
creature states in the story’s first sentence “I have constructed my Bau and it seems to be 
successful”,74 but we soon realise that the mole dwells in a ruin, or better, a construction site, 
and that his desired shelter in which he could “hear the sound of silence” is never to be 
accomplished. Whereas the Bau is set against an unbuilt outside ‘nature’, it is by its auditory 
enigma that the story advances the collapse of extreme interiority into extreme exteriority, and 
vice versa. The creature concludes that there must be another creature whose existence is also 
determined by its uncertainty as to the existence of another creature, and so on, ad infinitum. 
As Mladen Dolar has observed, “the burrow is spatialized paranoia, entirely shaped by the 
scenario of the Other”.75 Kafka’s constructed soundscape touches upon the structure of fantasy. 
The creature’s total way of existence, marked by the perplexity of natural history, of being 
already and not yet a ruin, is thus determined by an inside-out other. Kafka, as Benjamin 
maintains, was “never tired of hearing about the forgotten [das Vergessene abzulauschen] from 
animals. They are not the goal, to be sure, but one cannot do without them”. As Benjamin also 
 
73 Kafka, “The Burrow”, in Complete Stories, ed. Nahum Norbert Glatzer, trans. Willa and Edwin Muir (New 
York: Schocken, 1983), pp. 325-359 (p. 354, translation modified, with Bau left as a marker of estrangement).  
74 Ibid., p. 325, translation modified. 
75 Dolar, A Voice and Nothing More (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2006), p. 114.  
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notes: “This much is certain: of all of Kafka’s creatures, the animals have the greatest 
opportunity for reflection [Nachdenken]. What corruption is in the law, anxiety is in their 
thinking” (GS II:430-431, SW 2:810). In exposing the threshold between the mythical sway 
over life by law and Stimm(e)-ung, Kafka’s animals incite an attunement to natural history.   
In the last passages of his lecture, Adorno points to a particular scene wherein an 
unintentional sensation of the uncanny is felt. He portrays how the sensuousness of fear, of 
“Angst”, is triggered by an evidently modern scenography, that of “certain dwellings 
[Wohnungen]”. “Das Moment der Bedrohlichkeit” means that within the manifestations of 
modern second nature, a “dwelling place” in the archaic and mythical sense is being 
recognised: “An archaic fear transpires everywhere that the illusory world [Scheinwelt] of 
convention appears in front of us. The element of threat is also always an aspect of this 
semblance [Schein]”; it subsists in “drawing everything into itself as into a funnel [alles wie in 
einen Trichter in sich hineinzuziehen]”. This working of the funnel, which is the “mythical 
element [Moment]” of semblance (NG 364, NH 124, translation modified),76 as Adorno 
contends, recalls Malte’s complete self-absorption of the house in the account given by 
Heidegger. Adorno portrays a double movement in which the world transpires, revealing itself 
in the course if its own annihilation, its withdrawal into a vortex. It is as if the world keeps 
dividing back upon itself, thus disclosing its mythical or natural and historical poles.77 The 
“world” is “there”, yet only by imagining an original loss incorporated into the registers of 
semblance and phantasmagoria.78 “Second nature”, this will be Adorno’s final conviction, “is 
 
76 Harsdörffer’s Poetischer Trichter (1650) is one of the Baroque sources comprised in the range of citations for 
the Trauerspiel book; it might also be the source for Adorno’s use of this figure. In the next part of the thesis the 
figure of the funnel will be taken up again, in the context of the chapter “Der Mond” in Berliner Kindheit. 
There, Benjamin’s dream image exhibits an uncanny Denkbild in which a swallowing funnel [Trichter] is 
“imagined” by the moon. Harsdörffer’s figure of the funnel and his poetic principle of the Baroque, which he 
derived from the Kabbalistic idea of combinatory letters as the power of creation, also brings to mind the 
Kabbalistic idea of temurah, glossed as ‘transposition’ or ‘conversion’ but also signifying fixed value. 
Connected to the latter meaning is the notion of the conceptual inverse, as well as the pertinence of material or 
moral value to their opposite meanings. From this point of view, the implication of the figure of the Trichter as 
allegorical conversion captures Benjamin’s trope of “eternal transience”. See Sefer Yeẓirah, Chapter 4:3, in 
Kaplan, Sefer Yeẓirah, English & Hebrew, pp. 162-163.  
77 This predicament of digestion and self-consuming brings to mind the myth of Kronos (the god that will later 
be associated with the Roman deity Saturn, and therefore with melancholy) as evoked by Adorno (as also by 
Benjamin), through which temporal ambivalence is set forth: “The myth of Kronos is just such a myth in which 
the most extreme godly power of creation is coupled with the fact that he is the god who annihilates his 
creations, his children” (NH 123).  
78 The term phantasmagoria is traced back to Paris of the end of the eighteenth century. It signified the new 
public shows of the magic lantern, a spectacle that took place in a dark space presenting visual sequences of 
ghostly human figures that appeared to be floating in space. The phantasmagoria was a sensory dialectical 
device, expressing a body/mind tension between truth and illusion, subjectivity and objectivity, deception and 
deliverance, life and death. It invoked the relation of rational mind to illusion and semblance, that is, the 
entanglement of Schein as a simultaneity of recognition – the spectator’s knowing of the real, and of anxiety – 
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in truth, first nature”: “Es ist in Wahrheit die zweite Natur die erste” (NG 365, NH 124), with 
the syntactical flexibility of the German leaving the identity of subject and object, and so the 
priority of first over second, suspended in indeterminacy. By drawing these two ‘natures’ into 
close proximity, Adorno demonstrates how it is precisely the touching point between the 
modern and the mythical or the primordial, between historicity and guilty creaturely life, that 
subsists in the “problem” of natural history.   
 
   
IV. Melancholic Immersion and the Sense of the Deep 
 
Tiefsinn eignet vor allem dem Traurigen  
[Depth of thinking is above all apt for the melancholic] 
– The Trauerspiel book  
 
According to Adorno, the chiasmus of history and myth is borne by a correlation between 
“Schein” and “zweite Natur” (NG 364, NH 123), the two stances constituting the Hegelian final 
subsumption of “the science of sensation or feeling” under “conceptualised [begriffne] 
history”. Adorno cites György Lukács’s definition of “second nature”, a nature which “is not 
mute, corporeal and foreign to the senses like first nature [Diese Natur ist nicht stumm, 
sinnfällig und sinnesfremd, wie die erste]: it is a complex of senses – which has become rigid 
and strange, and which no longer awakens interiority”. Forestalled and arrested prior to 
absolute knowing (Hegel), what is at play here is the uncanny, spectral rendering of the 
“Golgotha of long-dead interiorities [Schädelstätte vermoderter Innerlichkeiten]” in Lukács’s 
terms (NG 357, NH 118). It is prior to “reconciliation”, in Adorno’s words, or to history as the 
possibility or promise of reconciliation. “Reconciliation”, Adorno stresses, also “inheres in 
semblance” (NG 365, NH 124). And as he further cites Lukács: “This second nature could only 
be brought back to life, if ever, by a metaphysical act of reawakening the spiritual element that 
created or maintained it in its earlier or ideal existence, but could never be experienced by 
another interiority” (NG 357, NH 118, translation modified).  
 
the spatio-temporal experience of what could possibly be real. The phantasmagoria evoked the “uncanny” as we 
know it from Freud, awakened when something is experienced as “intellectual uncertainty”. See  
Tom Gunning, “Illusions Past and Future: The Phantasmagoria and its Specters”, Media Art History. 




    
Lukács’s definition of nature’s “Sinneskomplex” accords with Benjamin’s approach to 
language and his understanding of allegorical meaning. The manifestation of inarticulacy, the 
ineluctable registration of loss of any signifying articulation, of inoperative signs, alludes to 
“nature’s other muteness” in Benjamin’s sense, and as such invokes lament and melancholy in 
relation to meaning in history. Whilst the Trauerspiele presented historical events as the 
content and meaning of secularised history, it was the presence of mythical nature – of what 
Adorno defines as “fatefully [schicksalhaft] predetermined [vorgegebenes] being underlies 
history and appears in history” (NG 346, NH 111), namely the presence of mythical nature in 
it –  that inescapably pointed to the forces of fragmentation and decay. Therefore, it was 
Benjamin, according to Adorno, who introduced “a decisive turning point with respect to the 
problem of Naturgeschichte”. Framed with a Benjaminian vocabulary of the allegorical 
physiology of perception, Adorno notes that “the re-awakening [Wiedererweckung] of second 
nature” was brought “out of infinite distance [unendlichen Ferne] into infinite closeness 
[unendliche Nähe]”, as is the case with the coalescence of “allegory and the allegorically 
meant” (NG 357, NH 119).  
The etymological derivation of allegory from the Greek seems to be of significance 
here, split as it is into its etymological parts of allos – other, and agoreuein – to speak publicly. 
It is another speech that is imparted to the open space, the marketplace of the agora, the site of 
collectivity and assembly. Compared to this scenography, the Schädelstätte, the site for 
gathering together of the remains of the dead, could be staged as a reversed image, that of a 
mortified convocation or collectivity. There is another topos that comes to mind with the word 
Schädelstätte. It is Golgotha, the hill outside Jerusalem, derived from the Aramaic gulgulta, 
meaning “the place of skulls”. Kathrin Pahl highlights the “confusion” of this place (the 
“confusion” of the Schädelstätte was highlighted by Benjamin, to recall) by noting that,  
     
Schädelstätte has the very profane meaning of mass grave: a place where a large 
number of skulls come to lie either at once (due to war) or as accumulated over time. 
Golgotha was Jerusalem’s place for executions; it is a site of serial killings. Jesus died 
on a heap of bones; he simply added one to the numberless skulls that were already 
amassed there. He was one among many. Similarly dies “absolute knowledge.”79  
 
 
79 Kathrin Pahl, Tropes of Transport: Hegel and Emotion (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 2012), 
pp. 87-88.  
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Rebecca Comay, defining Hegel’s decision to end the tale of the phenomenology of the spirit 
as “under the sign of Saturn”, comments: “could such an undecidable figure – the very figure 
of indecision – serve as the final figure of the dialectic? Walter Benjamin thought so.”80  
Let us return, however, to Adorno’s indication of a new historical meaning of infinite 
closeness, as Benjamin uncovered it, through the prism of the finite and ephemeral category of 
das Taktische, whose characteristic disposition is also drawn from “the realm of affectivity 
[Affektivität]” and marked by the subjective intentionlessness (and therefore by the “truth”) 
that the melancholic, brooding contemplation incites, according to Benjamin. “For whereas, in 
the realm of affectivity, attraction [Anziehung] does not seldom alternate with estrangement in 
the relation of an intention to its object, mourning is capable of particular heightening, 
continuous deepening [kontinuierlichen Vertiefung], of its intention” (GS I:318, O 142). In the 
state of melancholy, a particular case of intentionality, but also its deformation, is in play. 
Melancholy, according to Benjamin, was a reaction to the vestige in Baroque time of a “dark 
belief” in the subjection of man to fate, his “Schicksalsverfallenheit” (GS I:317, O 141). As 
Andrew Benjamin notes, “this connection [that] ties melancholia and fate together” indicates 
“that central to that relation is a conception of subjectification that incorporates humanity in its 
totality. There is therefore a generalized subject for whom the world is dead”.81 The relation to 
transcendence has been disrupted, yet still, the subjection of man to fate prevails in consonance 
with the deprivation of human action of “all value”: “Something new came into being: an empty 
world” (GS I:317, O 141). This emptiness has conjured up a relation marked by a desire of 
attachment to dead objects, to the phantasmatic creaturely life in them. Under the melancholic 
gaze, lifeless objects present themselves to the mourner through the fading away of life in them.   
“In contrast to a word like e-motion”, Rainer Nägele comments, “‘affect’ does not 
suggest an expressive motion from an assumed interior to the outside, but puts the accent on 
an impact that might leave traces, traits and perhaps wounds; reminders of something to be 
read.”82 The melancholic disclosure of the world, borne by the dialectic tension between 
distanciated contemplation and irresistible drawing nearer and immersion, is that of an image-
reading. A (dialectical) image, in other words, a figure wherein not only time is transformed 
into something pictorial – “bildlich”, as stated in the Passagen-Werk – but the imagistic as such 
 
80 Comay, “Hegel’s Last Words”, in The Dash – The Other Side of Absolute Knowing, eds. Rebecca Comay and 
Frank Ruda (Cambridge Mass.: MIT Press, 2018), pp. 65-86 (p. 69).  
81 Andrew Benjamin, “Benjamin and the Baroque: Posing the Question of Historical Time”, in Rethinking the 
Baroque, ed. Helen Hills (England: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2011), pp.161-182 (p. 171).   
82 Nägele, “The Laughing Tear: Constructions of Allegory in Modernism”, in New Directions in Emblem 
Studies, ed. Amy Wygant (Glasgow: Glasgow Emblems Studies, 1999), pp. 77-91 (p. 77).  
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is nothing more than a sign to be read, as the later formulations of the dialectical image betray. 
In the state of melancholy, the “feelings” responding to the “objective structure of the world 
[gegenständlichen Aufbau der Welt]” are defined as “motorial reaction” (recall here also the 
“shattering experience” underlining “play” as “habit” and also “second nature”). Benjamin 
considers melancholia through a dialectics of deepened sense (“Tiefsinn”) of an object and a 
tenacity (“Beharrlichkeit”) of intention (GS I:318, O 141). It is a constellation that subsists in 
the extremes of an unattainable object together with the sensation of yearning for or desiring 
it.  
As accentuated by Benjamin, “mourning is capable of particular heightening, 
continuous deepening [Vertiefung] of its intention”; attuned to its object, the melancholic 
subject penetrates, but thereby also dissipates it (an idea in itself performed and staged by 
Benjamin’s own use of language): “On the road to the object – no: on the path in the object 
itself” (GS I:318, O 142). Not only does the object, in dissipating, become allegorical, with its 
wreckages or splinters reassembled in a constellation; the object is also thought of as a 
container, Hülle, for something like a temporal progression which belongs, as Benjamin’s 
ensuing thinking image betrays, to the political order: “this intention progresses as slowly and 
ceremoniously as do the processions of those in power” (GS I:318, O 142). This thinking image 
aptly intimates the role of the prince in the Trauerspiele as the paradigmatic melancholic figure. 
“Mournful melancholy dwells for the most part in palaces”, as Benjamin quotes (GS I:322, O 
146). 
  Worked through his or her state of “immersion in the life of creaturely things”, “the 
wisdom of the melancholic”, Benjamin writes, submissively “hearkens to the deep”. However, 
nothing of “the voice [Laut] of revelation [Offenbarung] reaches” this form of cognition. As 
he also adds, “Everything to do with Saturn points into the depths of the earth” (GS I:330, O 
157). We might trace here the negativity of the voice that Agamben exposed as the nonplace 
of language in the Being-there of Dasein, yet Benjamin’s formulation is borne by a dual 
negation. Melancholy, with its acoustical disposition of the bare voice of revelation, not only 
manifests the experience of language as the limit between speech and the living being, but also 
– portrays revelation to be an empty sign.83 Instructing interpretation and meaning, melancholy 
is the exposure to the nothing of expression. Seeking fulfilment or “satisfaction” (“Genüge[n]”) 
 
83 The issue of the “nothing of revelation” (“das Nichts der Offenbarung”) stands at the core of the debate 
between Scholem and Benjamin on Kafka’s work. On Scholem’s epistolary exchange with Benjamin on the 
topic of Kafka and divine justice, see Vivian Liska, “Kafka’s Other Job”, In: The Book of Job. Aesthetics, 




    
in the emptied-out world (GS I:318, O 141), mediated by the experience of nothingness, 
melancholy bears on a broken relation of the earthly, profane order to revelation.  
It is the ambivalence of melancholy, issuing out of the spatial disposition of the figure 
of Melancholia in Albrecht Dürer’s engraving (Melancholia I, 1514), that Benjamin stresses, 
namely the interplay of nearness and distance in terms of the immersion (“Versunkenheit”) of 
the melancholic figure in its immediate surroundings – “Umkreis”. Within this image- and 
body space, also deprived of the mechanisation of habit, “active life lies unused on the ground 
around the figure, as objects of brooding [Grübeln]. This engraving anticipates the Baroque in 
many respects” (GS I:319, O 143). Melancholia, in the accounts given by Benjamin, initiates a 
manifold interplay of madness and creativity, of mythical powers and the intimation of 
salvation (“a reflection of a distant light coming from the depth of immersion” [GS I:334, O 
163]), of negative sickness (more associated with the feminine), of falling prey to bad dreams 
and madness (expressed by the emblem of the sleeping hound) and artistic (masculine) genius. 
It is a dialectical tension, however, between creaturely fate and the deadly sin of acedia (GS 
I:332, O 160) that is chiefly instantiated in Dürer’s engraving. This is expressed in 
Melancholia’s apathetic relation to the unused tools lying to the side, her alienation from the 
activity of construction labour (the tools are, for the most part, an indication for the activity of 
creating and building). Lacking any sense of purposiveness, and of touch, these objects conjure 
up the excess of meaning:  
 
Insofar as this symptom of depersonalization was grasped as an advanced stage of 
mourning, an incomparably fruitful context was established for the concept of this 
pathological condition – this state in which the most inconspicuous of things  [jedes 
unscheinbarste Ding], because the natural and creative relation to it is lacking, appears 
as cipher of an enigmatic wisdom.  
    (GS I:319, O 143) 
 
Benjamin’s construction of the melancholic as a particular form of knowledge and 
relation to the world in which an intentional relationship to objects is rendered unfulfilled and 
unattainable is intimated in terms of visuality and perception by the emblem of the stone. With 
this emblem, whose significance has been overlooked by interpreters, says Benjamin (GS 
I:331, O 159), the emotional attachment to objects as the “sense of the deep”, between the 
optical and the tactile, distinctly unfolds. Drawn to the ground and yet turning away from it, 
Melancholia’s gaze, charged with intentionality, is directed elsewhere, looking at, as it also 
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reaches beyond, an unpenetrated mass of matter, a tactile surface of a well-shaped stone. The 
stone, symbolising the heaviness in the feeling of acedia and sloth, is a stony blockage of 
feelings; it represents the fullness (“Fülle”) of an object that is intimately bound (also, it seems, 
by a kind of assonance) to feelings (“Fühlen”) (GS I:318, O 142).  
 
V. The Secularisation of History in Space in The Dialectical Image  
 
For “radical natural historical thought”, Adorno writes, “every being [Seiende] is transformed 
into rubble and fragments, into […] a charnel-house [Schädelstätte] where signification is 
discovered, in which nature and history interweave and the philosophy of history is assigned 
the task of their intentional interpretation” (NG 360, NH 121). As “Ur-history of signification”, 
experiencing a presence of something that we conceive of as timeless fixity, at that extreme 
point full of ‘natural’ significance, ‘naturalness’ conjures nature’s other meaning – that of 
temporal disintegration, of falling apart. This can also be thought of in a reverse way. History, 
and with it, temporal progression, appears under the destructive sign of repetition. We might 
evoke here again the spatio-temporal constellation of the fort/da game in which time is 
summoned by space, and space, or presence, is spectrally summoned by (repetitive) linguistic 
expression, bound to a repressed, and therefore, mythical, other. This is the archaic, symbol 
world of unchangeable nature.84 Not only is that a spatial dimension  – da – pertaining to 
‘being’ or ‘presence’ temporalised; history, oriented to time, is acoustically 
naturalised/spatialised as ‘there’ by dint of the mournful pronouncement “fort”, “gone”, a 
pronouncement whose essence is, therefore, the perpetual incompleteness of “what has been” 
in Benjamin’s sense. What is staged by the child by means of a hand touching/releasing an 
allegorical object (the reel as stand-in for the absent mother) is disappearance as such, recalling 
history’s “Zeichenschrift der Vergängnis” (GS I:353). It is the “first act”, that of the departure, 
as Freud notes, which is what is staged as an endless game of returns.85 Comparable to the 
child’s articulation in Adorno’s view of natural history is “transitoriness” (“Vergänglichkeit”), 
which is “the deepest point [tiefste Punkt] where history and nature converge” (NG 357-358, 
 
84 “In the interior, archaic images unfold: the image of the flower as that of organic life; the image of the orient 
as specifically the homeland of yearning; the image of the sea as that of eternity itself. For the semblance 
to which the historical hour condemns things is eternal.” Adorno, Kierkegaard: The Construction of the 
Aesthetic, cited by Benjamin in the Passagen-Werk (GS V:575-576, AP 220).  
85 Freud, “Beyond the Pleasure Principle”, p 16. For the idea of the fort/da game as a dramatic play see also 
Comay, “Mourning, Work, Play”, Research in Phenomenology 23.1 (1993), 105-130 (p. 110).  
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NH 119), recalling the point conceived of by Benjamin as the “abyss of bottomless profundity” 
(GS I:404, O 252).  
The melancholic perception of the world as populated by empty signifiers might be 
read in congruence with Benjamin’s insistence on a structural loss of Schein. “Any adequate 
veiling of content is missing in the typical works of the Baroque” (GS I:356, O 192). The 
German Trauerspiele, with their allegorically constructed Schauplätze, advanced towards what 
Benjamin terms “Scheinlosigkeit” – the state of lacking radiance/semblance. Comay remarks 
that “for Benjamin, the Baroque inaugurated the age of the world picture (so to speak) and as 
such the ultimate return of a repressed or banished opsis”.86 But in its resistance to 
transitoriness, the optical dimension is profoundly attached to the tactile which it seems to 
deny. In a comment that might be considered as dialectically drawing on what is ‘beyond the 
pleasure principle’ Benjamin observes that “In the true work of art, delight [Lust] knows how 
to make itself fleeting, how to live in the moment, disappear, become new [sich flüchtig zu 
machen, im Augenblick zu leben, hinzuschwinden, neuzuwerden]”. By contrast, “The Baroque 
work of art wants nothing more than to endure, and so clings with all its organs to the eternal” 
(GS I:356, O 192); that is, with the complete sensorium, apprehended through the persistent 
tactility or hapsis of clinging.  
 
Allegory has transformed into “the key figure of a new philosophy of history in Benjamin’s 
later writings: the dialectical image”,87 the key theoretical figure underlying his historico-
philosophical entries in convolute N of the unfinished Passagen-Werk. Among these 
fragments, deliberating on a dialectical method of redeeming (the term is ‘erlösen’, with its 
implication of release) images from the past, there are two rare references to Heidegger. In one 
of them, Benjamin seems to bind the temporal structure of Dasein to the underlying trope of 
his Trauerspiel book, namely, the secularisation of history or time in space. As Benjamin notes, 
it is against the backdrop of the “Säkularisierung der Geschichte bei Heidegger” that his former 
description of the allegorical outlook is to be viewed: 
 
Pursue the question of whether a connection exists between the secularisation of time 
in space [Säkularisation der Zeit im Raume] and the allegorical mode of perception 
[allegorischen Anschauung]. The former, at any rate (as becomes clear in Blanqui’s 
 
86 Comay, “Mourning, Work and Play”, p. 124.  
87 Nägele, “The Laughing Tear: Construction of Allegory in Modernism”, p. 77.   
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writing), is hidden [versteckt] in the “worldview of the natural sciences” of the second 
half of the century. (Secularization of history in Heidegger). [N8a,4]  
           (GS V:590, AP 472)88 
 
The other entry in which a reference to Heidegger appears reads:  
 
What distinguishes images from the “essences” of phenomenology is their historical 
index (Heidegger seeks in vain to rescue history for phenomenology abstractly 
[abstrakt], through “historicity” [Geschichtlichkeit]). These images are to be thought 
of entirely apart from the categories of the “human science”, from so-called habitus, 
from style, and the like. For the historical index of the images not only says that they 
belong to a particular time; it says, above all, that they attain to readability [Lesbarkeit] 
only at a particular time. And, indeed, this acceding “to readability” constitutes a 
specific critical point in the movement at their interior. Every present day is determined 
by the images that are synchronic with it: each “now” is the now of a particular 
recognizability [jedes Jetzt ist das Jetzt einer bestimmten Erkennbarkeit]. In it, truth is 
charged to the bursting point with time. (This point of explosion [Zerspringen], and 
nothing else, is the death of the intentio, which thus coincides with the birth of authentic 
historical time, the time of truth.) it is not that what is past casts its light on what is 
present, or what is present its light on what is past; rather, image is that wherein what 
has been [das Gewesene] comes together in a flash with the now to form a constellation 
[worin das Gewesene mit dem Jetzt blitzhaft zu einer Konstellation zusammentritt]. In 
other words: image is dialectics at a standstill. For while the relation of the present to 
the past is purely temporal, the relation of what-has-been to the now is dialectical: not 
temporal in nature but figural [bildlich[er] Natur]. Only dialectical images are 
genuinely historical – that is, not archaic – images. The image that is read – which is 
to say, the image in the now if its recognizability – bears to the highest degree the 
imprint of the perilous critical moment on which all reading is founded. ([N3,1] 
 
            (GS V:577-8, AP 462-463)  
 
In the mute realm of material artefacts, like the nineteenth-century Parisian arcades, the 
“refuse of history” as Benjamin defined it, muteness and visibility are inextricable. When the 
 
88 The background to this remark is probably Heidegger’s text of 1916 “The Concept of Time in the Science of 
History” in which he reflects upon the function of time in modern sciences as grounding his concept of 
historical time. See Heidegger, “Der Zeitbegriff in der Geschichtswissenschaft”, Zeitschrift für Philosophie und 
Philosophische Kritik, 161 (1916), 173-88. 
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critic’s language desists, the non-human, inanimate world is expressed, and the image 
(conceptualised as “dialectical”) – becomes readable. Imagistic thinking thus becomes a 
method – or better – a medium, precisely on account of the fact that the image can unfold a 
linguistic essence. That is, as Benjamin emphasises, what constitutes its readability, its 
Lesbarkeit. Significantly, as he stresses, “dialectical images” are dialectically formed by the 
relation they establish with “archaic images”, and it is “in language” that one encounters them 
in their genuine fashion, without the archaic trait that nevertheless informs them: “Only 
dialectical images are genuine images (that is, not archaic); and the place where one encounters 
them is language.” [N2a,3] (GS V:577, AP 462). Not only do archaic images hinder the 
(dialectical) image from its pretence to standstill; they are the index for the abstraction that 
Benjamin ascribes to Heidegger. In arguing that “historicity”, the phenomenological essence 
of human Dasein as earthly existence, “in-der-Welt-sein”, is informed by a non-phenomenal, 
“abstract” dimension, Heidegger’s vain attempt to “rescue” “history for phenomenology” is 
laid bare. Heidegger, as Benjamin implies, reveals history as exposed to the danger of being 
missed; it “flashes up at a moment of danger” (to use Benjamin’s words from the Sixth Thesis 
on history) – and hence the need for rescuing that is involved.89 
The theoretical constructions of the “dialectical image” as “a theory of knowledge” aim 
at the textual presentation of a spatio-temporal montage wherein “what-has-been” comes 
together in a flash with the now to form a constellation. “What-has-been”, held dialectically in 
the “image”, is also what ignites the very mechanical reproduction of the image (“in a flash” 
of light, in time), but also its effacement: the image always already slides into the sphere of 
language between reading and recognition. Yet all the same, in its “now”, the image is 
propelled towards the “death of the intention”, from which it has also originated, in the act of 
explosion, of “Zerspringen”. To the extent that these formulations emphatically register the 
more visual and imagistic modes of experience, in Benjamin’s terms, the idea of “truth” they 
deploy can only be attained by dialectically consigning the concept of the ‘image’ to that of 
‘language’ or ‘readability’. The crossing of borders between image and language transpires in 
one of Benjamin’s best-known dictums: “Method of this project: literary montage. I have 
nothing to say. Only to show.” (GS V:574, AP 460). Benjamin’s method, we might say, is 
dominated by a disfigurement – Entstellung – of Dichtung that is missed in the account given 
 
89 “Wo aber Gefahr ist, wächst das Rettende auch” (Hölderlin) is a phrase that holds significance for Benjamin, 
Heidegger and Adorno alike. On the notion of rescue in Benjamin and Adorno, see Gerhard Richter, “Can 
Anything Be Rescued by Defending It?”, in Afterness: Figures of Following in Modern Thought and Aesthetics 
(Colombia University Press: 2010), pp. 72-87.    
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by Heidegger. In Benjamin’s “literary montage”, history, what has been, eludes the realm of 
language and of saying in order to enter into a different order of representation, that of 
“showing”: “Nur zu zeigen”. With this, history, the realm of human structures of signification, 
underscored, that is, by both the ambiguity of the sign and the abstractedness of the symbol – 
dissolves into nature. And this allegorical mode of perception, says Benjamin, “is kept hidden” 
(“versteckt”) in abstract, ‘empty, homogeneous time’; allegory is veiled by it and as such, also 
tenable within it. 
 
 
VI. A Baroque Balcony and the Allegorical Disclosing of an Empty Space  
 
1) Baroque Body- and Image-Space 
 
Benjamin’s uncovering of the “Antinomies of the Allegoresis” (GS I:350, O 184) is close to 
his conception of the theories of the name and language (meaning that “all language 
communicates itself in itself”), when he states:   
 
In the very fall of man emerges the unity of guilt and signifying before the tree of 
“knowledge” as abstraction. The allegorical lives in abstractions; as abstraction, as a 
capacity of the spirit of language [Sprachgeist[es]] itself, it is at home in the Fall [ist es 
im Sündenfall zu Hause]. For good and evil, being unnameable as they are nameless 
[Namenlose], stand outside the language of names, the language in which paradisiacal 
man named things and which in the abyss opened by this question, he forsakes. The 
names is, for languages, only a round in which the concrete elements are rooted. The 
abstract elements of language, however, are rooted in the judging word, in judgment. 
    (GS I:407, O 256)   
  
Allegory, emerges, just like human language, from the myth of the Fall which befalls both, as 
a submission to myth, in the form of abstraction. In the case of allegory, evil is expressed in its 
inexhaustible double infidelity, signifying “something other than it is” (GS I:406, O 255). In 
the case of human language, it is its deformation and displacement into a moral-legal order, the 
pronunciation of good and evil, the conceptual entities that were originally barred from the 
paradisiacal “Namensprache”. The concrete language of paradise lacks ambiguity and judgment 
(good and evil), whereas in fallen language, knowledge of evil pertains to having no concrete 
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object. This dialectic is set out by Benjamin in another section in the Trauerspiel book entitled 
“Honor”. “Honor”, and Benjamin is citing here from Hegel’s Vorlesungen über die Ästhetik, is 
“the absolutely violable” (GS I:265, O 74). “And the name”, so Benjamin comments in regard to 
Hegel’s observation,  
 
which in its own inviolability would attest to the seemingly abstract inviolability of the 
person, is nevertheless, in the context of creaturely life (otherwise than in the context 
of religion), nothing in and for itself, merely the shield destined to cover the vulnerable 
physis of the human being.  
            (GS I:265-266, O 75) 
  
With the passing of the language of names into the language of judgment the name gains tactile 
essence; it covers the vulnerable physis of the human body, and as such, it is also capable of 
ab-stracting the concrete body, laying it bare. Nameless, “the person without honor is outside 
the law [vogelfrei]” (GS I:266, O 75) The functioning of the name as cover is congruous with 
Benjamin’s rejection of beauty, and Schein as body and architectural ruin converge on the idea 
of being imageless. Bildlos also describes the figure of the ruin stripped of its original grandeur, 
“allegories are in the realm of thoughts, what ruins are in the realm of things” (GS I:354, O 
188).  
The ruin, the ultimate manifestation of the Unzuhause, is the figure subsisting in the 
melancholic imagination of history, a manmade creation through which the particular 
temporality of “eternal transience” is translated into a feeling, a mood or attunement 
(Stimmung). Natural history is the actualised profanation of catastrophic or tragic fate, 
perpetually captured “as process of incessant decline” in the form of the ruin. “In the ruin, 
history has passed perceptibly [sinnlich] into the setting” (GS I:353, O 188).90 Ruins are natural 
historical entities crucial to the Baroque since they reveal the manner in which history is at 
once a monument and a ruin, a ruined monument which is nonetheless identifiable as a dwelling 
place:  
Dwelling in their monuments (the ruins), as Agrippa von Nettesheim put it, are Saturn’s 
animals [Saturntiere]. With decay, and with it alone, historical occurrence shrinks and 
withdraws into [schrumpft […] und geht ein in] the setting. The quintessence 
 
90 “What lies broken in pieces, the highly significant fragment, the scrap: this is the noblest material of Baroque 
creation” (GS I:354, O 189). For the conceptualisation of “fate as ruin” see Birnbaum’s “Variations of Fate”.  
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[Inbegriff] of those decaying things is the extreme opposite of the concept 
[Begriff] of transfigured nature held in the early Renaissance.    
          (GS I:355, O 190-191) 
 
Conveying yet another ambiguity of Scheinlosigkeit, Benjamin notes that “as it is 
manifested in the word, so too is the allegorical manifest in the figural and the scenic” (GS 
I:367, O 204). In a line of thought that resonates with the meditation on the “word-skeleton”, 
Benjamin indicates how allegory’s linguistic essence is intertwined with a repressed visuality 
and opticality. In the Trauerspiel book’s section on the “Origin of Modern Allegory” (dated to 
the sixteenth century), Benjamin draws on the development of Baroque allegory out of the 
symbolism and the arbitrariness of the Egyptian hieroglyphs. He notes that “the Baroque goes 
back, in a mystical and natural-historical sense, to antiquity. It is the Egyptian antiquity, but 
soon also the Greek”. This was incorporated into the Trauerspiel’s stage: “What prevails is the 
rigid countenance of signifying nature, and history is to remain once and for all shut up 
[verschlossen] in the stage property”. Benjamin further reflects upon this spatial scenography 
of concealed spirit or history (a scenography resembling world or history that are “walled-up” 
in Adorno’s gloss) when he cites Karl Borinski’s interpretation regarding the true meaning of 
the word ‘grotesque’ according to which its origins is to be  
 
traced back not to grotta in the literal sense but to the sense of “the hidden”, “the 
hollowed out”, which the cavern and grotto express.… For this, the eighteenth century 
still had … the expression of what has crept into hiding [des Verkrochenen]. Thus the 
“enigmatic” was at work here from the beginning.   
        (GS I:347-348, O 180)  
 
This enigmatic effect is akin to an uncanny-spectral sensuousness, that of a space that has been 
carved out, as it has been preserved in the mysterious character of the “balcony painter” in a 
story by E. T. A.  Hoffmann, as Borinski notes, in a passage also cited by Benjamin. Notably, 
in this description of spatial negativity in relation to the architectural element of a balcony it 
also possible to trace a sort of presentiment of a Baroque balcony in Bamberg (“ein[es] 
Bamberg[er] Altan[s]”), an optical-architectural conjuration that profoundly informs the final 
section of the Trauerspiel study.   
According to the logic of the setting or Schauplatz developed in the Trauerspiel book, 
courtly interior spaces provided an allegorical “image” – “Bild” – as the “key for historical 
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understanding” (GS I:271, O 82). The image of the palace, the Schauplatz of the Trauerspiel, 
is a constellation whose idea is that of the (un-)home-like, produced by the subjective view of 
melancholy: it is the dwelling place of the sovereign, symbolising political power, but a 
dwelling place also suffused with the mourning of the creature. “The absolute vices, as 
instanced in tyrants and intriguers, are allegories”, abstractions extracted by the sense of the 
deep gaze of melancholy, which only refers to their own inability to look: “they signify only its 
blindness” (GS I:406, O 255). The meaning of the tactile, as has been discussed, also lies in its 
destructive relation to the integrity of the optical. This resonates, in turn, with Benjamin’s 
meditations on the inexpressively acoustical dimension of language, so that the dialectical 
relation between vision and touch is triangulated with (nature’s) inarticulate sound. The final 
thinking image of the Baroque study is another architectural one: the figure of a ruined palatial 
construction that bears upon the disclosure of fallen and mute nature as the allegorical 
expression of history. This scenography allows a dimension to unfold in which a certain 
attentiveness to the destruction of the image is commensurate with the acoustical category of 
lament, of Klage as Stimmung, the form of expression that inescapably divests language of its 
symbolic dimension.  
In the fragment “Phantasie” (dated 1920-1921), a form of dissolution which “does not 
destroy” (“zerstört”), but “only deforms” – “entstaltet” (SG VI:115, SW 1:280), takes the guise 
of acoustical, but also – of tactile quality. Suggestively, here we find an implicit yet passing 
definition of the tactile. According to this fragment (to which we will return in more detail in 
the final part of this thesis), non-human nature lends itself to meaning only when comprehended 
as intertwined with human history, when it transpires, that is, as being in decline: a messianic 
interminable downfall. Tactility here flows out of the paradoxical melancholic enactment of 
extreme Nähe while appealing to remoteness and inapproachability. According to the fragment, 
alongside the realm of light (“Lichtwelt”), in which transfusions of light and colour within 
painting amount to expressions of becoming as passing away, “de-formation” – “Entstaltung” 
– also comes about in the domains of the acoustic (“im Akustischen”) and the tactile (“im 
Taktischen”). In its auditory form, “sounds recede as they withdraw into the ground of night’s 
single great humming”, and “in tactility”, clouds dissolve into blue colour or rain: “die Wolken 
im Blau oder im Regen sich auflösen” (GS VI:116, SW 1:281). Tactile perception, as reflected 
in this thinking image, is “pure” by dint of a deformative power which is involved in a 
contradictory double gesture of concentration and disappearance. The untouchable bare 
materiality of the clouds is transformed either into the more touchable materiality of rain or the 
most attenuated, unclouded materiality – the almost pure colour without substrate – of the blue 
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sky. Renouncing the realm of the image,91 these perceptual instantiations nevertheless engender 
a tactile surface, a veil, devoid of any object or meaning.92  
 
2) “No Pictorial Detour”: The Borderline Case of Architecture  
 
The intersection of corporeal immediacy and figural images, to the extent that the pictorial 
quality of the latter dissolves and deforms into the former, is an idea that is framed within 
architectural theory and history in Carl Linfert’s “Die Grundlagen der Architekturzeichnung”. 
Linfert’s study of the “borderline case” (“Grenzfall”) of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century 
architectural drawings was published in the first volume of the Kunstwissenschaftliche 
Forschungen (1931). Reviewing the latter in his “Strenge Kunstwissenschaft”, Benjamin 
accounts for the peculiarity of these architectural figures. Benjamin reflects that these 
architectural representation are experienced as surrounding space (“Umraum”) without sensing 
the distancing effect of the frame of pictorial space (GS III:368, SW 2:670), the two cases in 
point that inform his distinction between the optical and the tactile.93 Benjamin’s review takes 
account of what Levin calls “the detail, the marginal phenomenon, the work as a cultural 
cipher”.94 Linfert’s “material content” (“Sachgehalt”), namely the traces of architectural 
descriptions within painting and painterly techniques within architectural representations, deals 
with the more “accidental” aspect of these works. Instigating a certain “focus on materiality”, 
“material content”, lacking abstractness and meaning that has become severed from it, thus 
closely bears on “meaning-content (“Bedeutungsgehalt”) (GS III:372, SW 2:668, 669). This 
idea is intimately close to Benjamin’s indication, in the framework of his discussion of the 
figure of the ruin, of “historical occurrence [das historische Geschehen]” that “shrinks and 
withdraws into the setting” (GS I:355, O 190). Elsewhere, Benjamin further explains against 
the backdrop of his work on Goethe’s Wahlverwandtschaften, that “shrinkage [Schrumpfung] 
should be defined as the entrance of truth-content into material content” (SW 2:415-416).95   
 
91 In “Die Ferne und die Bilder”, one of the Denkbilder in “Kurze Schatten II”, physical distance, at which 
manifestations of natural deformations (of clouds, of water) could not be sensed, assents to the beholder’s 
“surrender to the images [Bildern sich zu überlassen].” (GS IV:427, SW 2:701).   
92 Werner Hamacher, in unfolding the logic of distorted similarity taking shape between words and clouds in 
Benjamin’s Berlin Childhood wrote: “The word-cloud-is the becoming imageless and wordless of the word”. 
Hamacher, “The Word Wolke – If It Is One”, trans. Peter Fenves, Studies in 20th & 21st Century Literature 
11.1 (1986), 113-163 (p. 161).  
93 On the possible influence of Linfert’s account of the visual mode of architecture on Benjamin’s “Kunstwerk” 
essay see Schwartz, Blind spots, p. 65.  
94 Thomas Y. Levin, “Walter Benjamin and the Theory of Art History”, October 47 (1988), 77-83 (p. 80).  
95 See also the translator’s note in the Origin of the German Trauerspiel, p. 258.  
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For Linfert, the qualities of architectural drawings emerge concretely on the basis of the 
unavailability of the “view”, conflicted as it were with the demand of “looking” 
(“Hinblicken[s]”), which applies to the “fortune of any image”.96 The “language of expression” 
of architectural drawings is that of objectivity, attesting to the ascendancy of “the constructive 
[bauenden] eye” over its counterpart – “the picturing [bildenden] eye.”97 Such architecture is 
not primarily “seen” but rather is experienced, in Linfert’s words, as a “sensing- or tracing-
through of structures [Durchspüren von Strukturen].” Suggestively, the negative medial effect 
of this imagistic form is that architectural drawings “know no pictorial detour [Bildumweg]”; 
what is permanent in them is a “visual rotation around the building”.98 Their technique of 
description, amounting to the very absence of a (perspectival, optical) “view”, is thus 
transferred into an intensification of bodily presence (fig. 1). 
Confounding image and thinking of the conditions of representation, Benjamin 
foregrounds the foreclosure of any signifying relation set forth by these figures: “As for the 
images themselves, one cannot say that these architectures [Architekturen] represent 
[wiedergeben]. They are present in the first place. [Sie geben sie allererst.]” (GS III:373, SW 
2:669). As Linfert has shown, the “last displacement” of the architectural drawing, instigated 
by the aesthetic domain of the Baroque, finally resulted in the “objectification of the 
architectural imagination per se”. Under the new logic of “Gesamtordnung” (see also 
Benjamin’s comment in the Trauerspiel book regarding the Gesamtkunstwerk as the ideal of 
the Trauerspiel, GS I:356, O 192), the architectural mode of non-pictorial representation has 
been disintegrated into its own technicization (“Technisierung”).99 In this part of his study 
Linfert alludes to Benjamin’s analysis of the dominance of the allegorical expression in the 
Trauerspiel book. In a letter to Linfert of 18 July 1931, Benjamin describes the impact that the 
visual world of the study had on him: 
 
The subject you have chosen [architectural drawings] – despite having been foreign to 
me up until now – has taken an extraordinary hold on me. Even before I turned to the 
text, I was met by a faintest and stirring air emerging from the plates. I decided then, 
 
96 “Die Grundlagen der Architekturzeichnung”, p. 135.  
97 Ibid., p. 143.  
98 Ibid., p. 135, cited in Benjamin (SW 2:670).   
99 “Die Grundlagen der Architekturzeichnung”, p. 154. In the Passagen-Werk, Benjamin quotes Sigfried 
Giedion’s remark regarding the blending of architecture with the plastic arts, established in the baroque, as 
architecture’s “disaster”. It is followed by Benjamin’s note: “This indicates that architecture was historically the 




    
postponing my current scribblings, to turn my whole attentiveness to your work. You 
will believe me when I say that it is full of meaningful insights for me.100  
 
More attuned to the “faintest and stirring air” emerging out of these images of the human built 
environment, Benjamin is gripped not by the represented objects or figures, but rather, by their 
Stimmung or mood, bound up with the state of mourning he had explored in the Trauerspiel 
book (fig. 2).  
In bypassing representation, architectural drawings bear upon the decisive moment of 
“the antinomies of the allegorical, the dialectical treatment of which cannot be avoided if the 
image of the Trauerspiel is in fact to be evoked”. This touches upon the freedom of the sign:  
 
To become aware of the lack of freedom, the imperfection and brokenness of the 
sensuous of the beautiful physis [Gebrochenheit der sinnlichen, der schönen Physis], 
was something forbidden to classicism by its very nature. But this is precisely what 
Baroque allegory, beneath its mad pomp, proclaims with unprecedented insistence.   
          (GS I:352, O 190-186) 
 
 As Benjamin reflects, the Baroque indicates the expulsion of the “false appearance [falsche 
Schein] of totality”, the breaking away from classicism’s separation between form and content, 
between material object and transcendent meaning – and hence – their ultimate (auratic) 
cohesion. As Linfert notes, the relay between the “fundamental spiritual habitus” (“geistige[n] 
Grundhabitus”) of the Baroque and “the objectivism of architectonic fantasy per se” lies in the 
separation of architectural construction “from the immediate realisation of organic, physical 
beauty in art”.101 As Benjamin had shown, the allegorical mode of perception brings artistic 
constructions (plastic and rhetorical) into completion yet in the form of an inexorable process 
of decay and disappearance. Consequently, it was this turnaround of the philosophy of history 
that has urged “uninhibited, sinister imagination [Phantasie] to be felt” in the domain of 
architectural aesthetics,102 according to Linfert.   
Reflecting upon the traceable “Verfallsprozeß” captured by Linfert, Benjamin’s 
epistemological question concerning the dialectical potential of a vanishing material content to 
cast itself (‘in tactility’, we might say, but also acoustically, through lament) into an “image” 
 
100 Benjamin, Gesammelte Briefe vol. IV, p. 43.  
101 Linfert, “Die Grundlagen der Architekturzeichnung“, p. 156, footnote 1.  
102 Ibid.    
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– is laid out:  
But how does this “process of decay” become transparent here? The architectural 
prospects open up in order to take into their core allegories, stage designs, and 
monuments! And each of these forms in turn points to unrecognized circumstances 
which appear to the researcher Linfert in their full concreteness: Renaissance 
hieroglyphics, Piranesi’s visionary phantasies of ruins, the temples of the Illuminati, 
such as we know them from the “Magic Flute”.  
       (GS III:373, SW 2:670) 
    
 
 


























    
In his letter, Benjamin accounts for this focus on irreparable decay. Using a “figural 
expression” which is also one of his most cited Denkbilder, for Benjamin, “unlike the great 
mass of historians who polish the past over and over again” and turn it into “a threadbare top 
hat [fadenscheinigen Zylinder]”, Linfert has “brushed history against the grain”. Now “every 
aspect (oeuvre)” – namely, “the essence of architecture and the ingenuity of the Baroque” – 
“stands out in its singularity” to the extent that “the viewer [der Betrachtende] may peer 
between these singular elements, into the common grounds from which they have arisen.”103 
This gives us cause to look more closely at the inescapably interspersed disposition of 
architecture, and hence of tactility, and the ingenuity of the Baroque, as exemplified by allegory 
according to Benjamin.  
 
3)  Baroque Schauplatz and the Being of Architecture  
 
Where, in the final scene of the Trauerspiel book, “allegory goes away empty-handed [leer aus 
geht die Allegorie]”, emptily leaving the scene, allegory’s own border is made manifest: what 
exists in signification is “to be sure”, “precisely the nonbeing of that which it represents” (GS 
I:406, O 255). This technique, Benjamin notes, evades even the “contrast between semblance 
and being [der Gegensatz von Schein und Sein]” (GS I:405, O 253). Allegory holds on to its 
sensorial forms only in, and in the form of, fading away, as they are “secularised in space”. If 
“the allegorist awakes in God’s world” (GS I:406, O 254), it is so since encountering the 
Baroque death-images, “intention finally does not faithfully [nicht treu] abide in sight of bones, 
but faithlessly [treulos] leaps across to resurrection” (GS I:406, O 255), as opticality is taken 
over – but also intensified – by and in a tactile leap. Thus, Allegory’s “greatest arc” always 
loops its gaze back, in order “to redeem”. “With this one turnaround” – “mit 
jenem einen Umschwung” – “allegorical immersion has to clear away the final phantasmagoria 
of the objective” (GS I: 406, O 232, translation modified), an idea connected by Linfert to the 
“objectification of the architectural imagination per se”.104 This idea dominates the last passage 
of the Trauerspiel book. Here, by dint of the coalescence of an architectural setting, of the 
Schauplatz, with the acoustical expression of lament, the final, vanishing “Umschwung” of 
allegory could be thought. The “final phantasmagoria of the objective” is foreshadowed by a 
 
103 Gesammelte Briefe vol. IV, p. 42. Compare one of Benjamin’s comments from the early sketches to the 
Passagen-Werk: “All true insight forms an eddy. To swim in time against the direction of the swirling stream. 
Just as in art, the decisive thing is: to brush nature against the grain” (GS V:1011, AP 843).  
104 “Die Grundlagen der Architekturzeichnung”, p. 156.  
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scenography around which the closing passage is hinged, a balcony that remains empty as 
scene of enactment or of viewing.    
As Linfert’s reference to Benjamin’s study indicates, the final absorption of the 
architectural representation into circumscribed spatial distance had collapsed into allegorical, 
illusory immersion. Benjamin’s account of the inexhaustible double infidelity of allegory, its 
demonic “non-being of what it represents”, is captured in an empty space which the final 
sequences of the Trauerspiel study strive to unearth. This spectacle is shaped by the peculiarity 
of Baroque architecture, what Linfert termed “part constructive, part a question of optical 
form”.105 Such construction is fleetingly evoked in the last pages of the Trauerspiel book:  
 
In the worldview of allegory, then, the subjective perspective is incorporated without 
remainder [restlos] into the economy of the whole. Thus the columns of a Baroque 
balcony in Bamberg are designed to present in reality exactly the appearance they 
would have if seen from below in a regular construction. 
 
Benjamin goes on to argue by citing Borinski’s study of the grotesque and the Baroque from 
1914:  
It is the Aristotelian idea of the thaumaston [θαυμάζειν], the artistic expression of 
wonder (the biblical semeia [sign]), that, since the Counter-Reformation and especially 
since the Council of Trent, has dominated [architecture and sculpture as well].… What 
is to be awoken is the impression of supernatural forces at work in powerfully 
projecting and ostensibly self-supporting structures precisely in the upper regions, 
structures interpreted and accentuated by the perilously soaring angels of the sculptural 
decoration.… Solely in order to reinforce this impression, the reality of these laws is 
recalled in an exaggerated manner from the other side – in the lower regions. Why the 
constant references to the power of these sustaining and heavily laden forces, these 
immense pedestals, the doubly and triply augmented projecting columns and pilasters, 
the measures taken to reinforce and secure their cohesion, all in order to support – a 
balcony – why, if not to make vivid the wonder suspended above by illuminating the 
difficulties involved in supporting it below? The ponderación misteriosa, the 
intervention of God in the work of art, is presumed possible.  
   (GS I:407-408, O 257-258) 
  
 
105 Ibid.  
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Borinski’s description of the balcony conveys how opticality is violently at work to master the 
very scene of observation, forcefully directing the gaze to sense its way through projected 
heights, towards an image of open confinement or confined openness. Significantly, opticality, 
with all its references to the “phantasmagoria of the objective”, as this passage conveys, could 
only divulge its ‘material content’ as clasped to its ‘meaning content’ when the concealment 
of the acoustical is acknowledged. This is put into play in this long quotation reproduced by 
Benjamin when the dialectical relation between vision and touch is also triangulated with 
inarticulate sound. This is intimated with the two theological concepts, the “Aristotelian idea 
of wonder” and the “biblical sign” which is an acoustical phenomenon (the Greek “sēmeia” 
seems to resonate the Hebrew root shama, ‘to hear’). This fundamental difference in terms of 
the optical and the acoustical functions of knowledge and experience, between the image and 
vocal sound, was pointed out by Agamben. “Thaumszein, astonishment or wonder”, are, 
“according to a very old and constant tradition, the arche of philosophy”. As Agamben further 
explains: “for the Greeks, the originary opening belonged to the optical sphere – thaumszein is 
theasthai, to look – whereas for Heidegger and, in general for us moderns, it is located in the 
acoustic sphere (Stimmung from Stimme).”106  
Among Linfert’s collection of architectural drawings, it is an architectural projection 
of a ceiling painting that might have caught Benjamin’s attention as an instance of the 
“ingenuity of the Baroque” (fig. 3).107 The “tectonic-unpictorial character” of the architectural 
outlook,108 in Linfert’s terms, overlaid with the more pictorial view, lays bare the “borderline-
case” of architectural drawings, and, of the German Trauerspiel. The opening up of space and 
so the sensuous withdrawal of history into the setting, is precipitated by a constriction of space; 
the non-realisation (in architectural terms) of the “Bamberger Altan” precisely imparts that this 
space is designed to be tactile in character. For, to recall here the “Kunstwerk” essay’s division 
of the perceptual realm between the two extremes of the optical and the tactile, habit, 
Gewohnheit, cannot be taken up by opticality and contemplation. The semantic field of 
Wohnung, of habitancy, in its proximity to Gewohnheit, discloses that this optical-tactile space 
cannot be occupied as such. As Nina Zimnik has pointed out, “no actor enters it; no sovereign 
takes hold of this space to observe theatrical performance from above.”109 The balcony as site 
 
106 “Vocation and Voice”, pp. 93-94.  
107 This drawing brings to mind a Baroque trompe-l'œil, a balcony projected into the ceiling painting of the 
imperial hall of the Neue Residenz in Bamberg, perhaps the Bamberg balcony Benjamin had in mind with his 
reference in the Trauerspiel book.  
108 “Die Grundlagen der Architekturzeichnung”, p. 144.  
109 Nina Zimnik, “Allegorie und Subjektivität in Walter Benjamins Ursprung des deutschen Trauerspiels”, The 
Germanic Review: Literature, Culture, Theory 72.4 (1997), 285-302 (p. 297).  
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for acts of viewing and being seen, for acts of taking hold and being held, and of listening and 

































  Figure 3 
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It is in stressing the incessant, incomplete form of an ultimate optical, subjective immersion 
that the German Trauerspiele were never able to bring about (by comparison with 
contemporaneous Spanish drama) that Benjamin’s study ends (GS I:408, O 258). In the 
Schauplatz of the German Baroque mourning play, this empty, non-space, the allegorical lack 
of the gaze, or the hold, or the speech of the sovereign, is taken over by the character of the 
intriguer, whose domain is that of “intellect and will” (GS I:274, O 85). “But whereas in the 
Spanish drama the primary characteristic of the court was the splendour of royal power, the 
German Trauerspiel is dominated by the gloomy [düster] tone of the intriguer” (GS I:276, O 
87). And this acoustical tone or mood of voice, of vocation (the Stimmung drawn from the 
Stimme) also permeates the final architectural Denkbild of Benjamin’s study:   
 
Because the idea [die Idee] of the building plan speaks [spricht] more impressively 
[eindrucksvoller] from of the rubble [Trümmern] of grand buildings than from even 
the best-preserved of lesser structures, the German Trauerspiel of the Baroque has a 
claim [Anspruch] to interpretation. In the spirit of allegory, it is conceived from the 
outset as a ruin [Trümmer], a fragment [Bruchstück]. Others may shine resplendently 
as on the first day; this form holds fast to the image of beauty to the very last.  
                 (GS I:409, O 258, translation modified)  
  
This thinking image superimposes two distinct layers of architectural “Daseinsformen”.110 The 
one is the graphic character of the architectural line, and the other is its effacement by its own 
after-image of real ruination and disintegration. Whereas the “Bauplan” pertains to the 
interiorizing of space, where sound as such can be contained, it is through the permeable 
brokenness and dissolution of a previously enclosed building that a different effect of voicing 
emerges. Significantly, what is seen within this image is audibly mediated, yet carried by the 
unity of meaningful sound, of speech, Eindruck collapses in a dialectical reversal into 
Ausdruck, and thence into das Ausdruckslose. It is what the essay on Goethe precisely posits 
as the countervailing ruinous force to beautiful semblance: “only the expressionless completes 
the work by shattering it into a thing of shards [Stückwerk], into a fragment of the true world, 
into the torso of a symbol” (GS I:181, SW 1:340). The art of building, directed against the 
demise of life, is equivalent, according to the dense paragraph closing Benjamin’s study, to the 
preservation of beauty and of truth, and therefore – is pertinent to the ‘object in its veil’. 
Nevertheless, as cast in a veil or a cover, it is poriferous. By contrast to the well preserved, or 
 
110 “Die Grundlagen der Architekturzeichnung”, p. 151.  
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the not yet realised building, which is always set to succumb to ruin, “this form” (that is, the 
ruined monument, the German Baroque Trauerspiel, the shattered symbol) is that in which the 
vanishing of semblance itself is held fast.   
 
At this point, it seems, we are once more confronting Adorno’s scenography of a world 
“densely walled-up by/from ‘Sinn’”. Having started with the walled-up logic of Adorno’s 
chiasmic architectural figure, this part of the thesis has thus opened out at its end onto another 
kind of space on the side of the Unzuhause: the empty or trompe-l’oeil balcony, tangible and 
yet untouchable, as the expression(less) image of the Baroque foldedness of a wall.111 The next 
part sets out to further expound on the incorporation of tactility in the structure of language in 
Benjamin’s writings, with the view that the more ‘tactile’ his thinking images are, the more 













111 This intimation regarding the foldedness in the Baroque thus opens up into the monadological structure, a 
scheme evoked by Benjamin: “The idea is a monad – this means, in nuce: each idea contains the image of the 
world. For the task of its presentation nothing less is required than to inscribe, in its abbreviation, this image of 
the world” (O 27-28). For the role of Leibniz’s monad in Benjamin’s thought see Andrew Benjamin, “Time and 





The Crypt, the Funnel and the Presentiments of Myth in Berliner Kindheit 
 
In her discussion of the “disappearing of the ‘Other’ in [allegory’s] ‘other speech”, Weigel 
suggests “that the ‘other’ in the sense given to it in psychoanalysis becomes dominant in the 
allegorical writing of modernity”. While “pre-modern allegorical techniques – such as indirect 
speech, pictorial representation, personification, allegorical schemata and narrative structures 
– go into this writing”, she continues, these are “transformed in such a way that the ‘other 
speech’ becomes the ‘Speech of the Other’”. In this transformation, she notes: 
 
The pictorial representations metamorphose into a figurative language of the 
unconscious or into read images, embodiments (Verkörperungen) become semiotic 
bodies (semiotische Körper), body- and image-spaces for the imaginings 
(Imaginationen) of the subject, while metaphorical (literally transferred) representation 
becomes distorted representation, or translation without an original.1 
 
Benjamin’s task at hand, we might say in respect to these observations, is the making manifest 
of what Weigel calls the “disappearing of the ‘other’” in the “other of speech”, which is the 
imperative underlying Benjamin’s messianic approach to modernity and the latter’s 
theorisation in relation to myth. Adorno’s “Die Idee der Naturgeschichte”, as we have seen, 
also corresponds to the structures of the unconscious, to the logic of compulsive repetition, in 
which sensuous uncanny phenomena arise by the presence of “having been” conjoined with a 
disturbing quality of its “thereness”. These are to be found, as Adorno glosses, in Freud’s 
account of primal words (“Urworte”) (NG 363, NH 123), in which contradiction dissolves,2 
and also, in the phenomenon of déjà vu. The experience of déjà vu, marked by a conjuration of 
ambiguous existence in time and space devoid of intention, judgment or subjective memory, 
proves pertinent to the polemic of natural history. According to Adorno, the idea of natural 
history bears on a proximity to the elaboration of the question regarding the return of “the 
mythical character itself” in “the historical phenomenon of semblance”. A threatening element, 
that of “Bedrohlichkeit”, is also an aspect of this semblance, one of whose “mythical elements 
is to have the character of drawing everything into itself as into a funnel [alles wie in einen 
Trichter in sich hineinzuziehen]” (NG 364, NH 124). With this perturbing topographic figure 
 
1 Weigel, Body- and Image- Space, p. 95. 




of deformation, the disappearing of what is hidden, secret and uncanny is liberated in another 
form of otherness, a form Benjamin would call ‘messianic’: an inconspicuous trait susceptible 
to an absolute Other. Naturgeschichte, and its idea, in this respect, should be set as a 
counterposition to the category and idea of myth. It foreshadows, precisely, the history of 
nature as history divested of mythic forms of experience; yet both forms converge in the 
“downfall of the earthly”. The section “Der Mond” from Berliner Kindheit is constituted upon 
this position regarding the “reconciliation of myth”,3 as will be shown in the last section of this 
part of the thesis.   
 
I. The Echo from the Crypt  
 
The autobiographical writings of Berliner Kindheit, which Benjamin composed between 1932 
and 1934 and revised in 1938, unfold a topographical map of mythic spaces extracted from 
bourgeois constructions of habitation. In two of its chapters, the figure of the funnel makes an 
appearance. In the first version of “Der Mond”, an allegorical device of a funnel generates a 
climactic scene of ruination. While in “Die Siegessäule”, a dark geological crater is imagined 
to be a site of suffering in hell, the exact opposite “to the sphere of grace that encircled the 
radiant victory overhead” (GS IV:242, SW 3:349). Thus, the figure also has an iterative 
character, inhabiting both the domestic interior and the public monument as an uncanny form 
of vortex-space, a foundation of ruin. In “Die Idee der Naturgeschichte” Adorno contends that 
along with the phenomenon of the uncanny, as already discussed, it is “the phenomenon of 
déjà vu, of re-recognition [Wiedererkennen] [that] is to be analyzed at this point” (NG 364, NH 
124, translation modified), and this is certainly also the case for Benjamin’s natural historical 
constructions of architecture, both public and private. 
In a fragment written in 1929, Benjamin alludes to the phenomenon of déjà vu in 
relation to childhood experiences based on reiteration such as “images and rhyme”:  
 
Is the intensity with which we, as children, absorb the world, but also images, rhyme, 
etcetera, not mixed together with some kind of presentiment? So that many of the things 
 
3 “The reconciliation [Versöhnung] of myth is the theme of Benjamin's philosophy”. Adorno, “A Portrait of 
Walter Benjamin”, in Prisms, trans. Samuel Weber and Shirley Weber (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1981), 
pp. 227-241 (p. 234). For an account of the concept of myth in Benjamin’s work see Joseph Mali, “The 





of which we are reminded in later life do not just remind us of actual situations, but 
also of presentiments. 
                     (GS VI:204)4 
 
The intertwinement of intensity (“Intensität”) with presentiment (“Vorahnung”) pertains to the 
act of recollection which is nonetheless directed towards a future. Ernst Bloch, in an essay of 
1929, “Images of Déjà Vu” (which features a reference to Benjamin), captures this uncanny 
sense of similarity pervading both space and time through the notion of prophecy.5 “In déjà 
vu”, Bloch comments, “one has the impression of knowing exactly what will happen in the 
next instant (but never beyond that): the event that is expected – indeed awaited with positive 
certainty – appears ineluctably to emerge, thus heightening the shock effect.”6 The 
manifestation of a past that is in effect not available as mnemonic act constitutes a leap forward 
or Sprung – that is at the same time a crack – pointing to an element of repetition that is enfolded 
in what has yet to happen. In the Passagen-Werk, referring to this idea with regard to a 
collective dreaming and awaking, Benjamin states that there is “not-yet conscious knowledge 
of what has been” whose structure is that of “awakening”, as is set out in a statement of 
programmatic importance (GS V:572, AP 458).7  
A short meditation on a domestic scene of déjà vu that appears in the section entitled 
“Todesnachricht” in Berliner Kindheit sheds light on this peculiar short-circuit of amnesia and 
its redeeming character in the form of the “now of recognizability”. This childhood memory 
reports how Benjamin’s father enters his room while the five-year-old Walter lies in his bed 
before falling asleep, in order to inform him about a death of a cousin. This memory is preceded 
by Benjamin’s pondering over the possible inversion of the definition of déjà vu, and of the 
ecstatic experience of “Entrückung”, of “the rapture with which a moment entered our 
conscious as already lived”:  
 
4 Translated by Tom Vandeputte for the workshop “Intensität in Walter Benjamin’s Philosophy”, Hannover, 
April 2018.  
5 “Benjamin has observed that children often wish a certain time of day could be prolonged, even wanting time 
to stand still at the exact hour of some scene portrayed in their picture-books, when the leg of a chair is casting a 
certain shadow”. Bloch, “Images of Déjà Vu”, in Literary Essays, trans. Andrew Joron (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1998), pp. 200-209 (p. 202).   
6 Ibid., p. 204.  
7 This phrasing, Benjamin notes, is borrowed from Ernst Bloch. “The Not-Yet-Conscious is thus solely the 
preconscious of what is to come, the psychological birthplace of the New. And it keeps itself preconscious 
above all because in fact there is within it a content of consciousness which has not yet become wholly manifest, 
and is still dawning from the future. Possibly even content that is only just objectively emerging in the world; as 
in all productive states which are giving birth to what has never been there. The forward dream is disposed 
towards this, and Not-Yet-Conscious, as the mode of consciousness of something coming closer, is charged 
with it; here the subject scents no musty cellar, but morning air.” Bloch, The Principle of Hope, vol. I, trans. 





It is a word, a rustling or knocking, that is endowed with the power [Gewalt] to call us, 
when we are unprepared, into the cool crypt of the once [die kühle Gruft des Einst], 
from whose vault the present seems to resound only as an echo. Strange that no one 
has yet inquired into the counterpart of this transport – namely, the shock with which 
a word makes us pull up short, like a forgotten muff in our room. Just as the latter points 
us to a strange woman who was there, so there are words or pauses [Worte oder Pausen] 
pointing us to that inconspicuous [unsichtbar[e]] stranger – the future – which left them 
in our place.  
(GS IV:251-252, SW 3:389-390, translation modified) 
 
The memory experience of the double or of repetition, the subjugation to the power of what 
has been – and will have been again, which for Benjamin relates to the experience of the merely 
acoustical, of sounds that lack significance, is transformed into the experience of a “shock”. 
Now it is a word or its acoustic absence, a pause – that is: mediation and difference, the very 
attributes of bourgeois, fallen language – that initiates a particular case of the trace, a ghostly 
simultaneous presence of both origin and future. However, it is by the evocation of the feminine 
which is related to an actual event and to real presence and indicated by a physical trace that 
the future’s aporetic act of laying down linguistic traces is made available to re-recognition, to 
déjà vu. The muff as a trace (and also a kind of étui – the kind of cover in which traces of 
having been there may be impressed or otherwise left) amounts to a sheer correspondence 
between a sign and the passing presence it designates. And this mode of representation echoes 
and is intensified in the sphere of language in the second part of Benjamin’s comparison (“so 
there are words or pauses”).  
According to an early version of the exposé for Passagen-Werk, the dream images of 
the epoch are images in which the future and the past are intermingled (Benjamin alludes here 
to the ancient world, to prehistorical or primitive cultures), and that which is primal to the life 
of a society, its primordial history, is associated with “classless society”. These images are 
regarded as stored in a case – “Depot”– which is the “unconscious of the collective” whose 
content, the experiences (“Erfahrungen”) of classless society, “take up elements of natural 
history into their movement [nehmen Elemente der Naturgeschichte in ihre Bewegung]”. This 
movement “produces, in combination with what is new, the utopia that has left its trace in a 




893, translation modified). Here too, what is timeless – that is, utopian – appears as a trace 
which is also a figure of desire.    
  In Benjamin’s autobiographical writings, what draws the subject into the experience of 
shock is the encounter with that which is already a missed encounter. The familiar room is 
displaced into an origin taking the guise of a “cool crypt”. From this interior cavity’s vault 
“news of death” only later on in life will echo back speechlessly, in non-articulation and non-
actualisation. In the final version of the piece, Benjamin notes: 
  
I was already well into adulthood when I learned that the cause of the cousin’s death 
had been syphilis. My father had come by in order not to be alone. He had sought out 
my room, however, and not me. The two of them could have wanted no confidant.  
        (GS VII:411, SW 3:368) 
 
The spatiality of that which is expressionless and the expressionless character of space are 
hinted at here by way of the deformation, or indeed encryption, of the room into a crypt (the 
father, too, is a crypt, in that he silenced the cause of the death and kept it for himself). In the 
longer, earlier version of the piece, Benjamin concludes: “I did not absorb much of what he 
[his father] said”. It was another form of knowledge or experience: the compulsion to imprint 
that evening, the room and his bed, in his memory, 
 
just as a person pays closer attention to a place when he has a presentiment [ahnt] that, 
one day, he will have to retrieve from it something forgotten. Only after many years 
did I learn what that something was. In this room, my father had kept from me part of 
the news.  
         (GS IV:252, SW 3:390) 
 
It is the functioning of language that is the true content of this memory. Read against the 
designation of the “dream image” in the Passagen-Werk (where it is conflated at times with 
the “dialectical image”), Benjamin’s ‘images’, with their tactile quality of non-referentiality, 
thus belong to the realm of “language as such”.    
In Das Unheimliche Freud ties the heimlich maternal body, the primal dwelling place 
always beyond the reach of one’s experience – to the experience of déjà vu. He refers to The 
Interpretation of Dreams, where he explains that “occurrences of	déjà vu in dreams have a 




of having been there once before” are places that are invariably “the genitals of the [dreamer’s] 
mother; of no other place can it be asserted with such certainty that one has been here before.”8 
Reflecting on this passage, Elissa Marder comments that “Freud here seems to suggest that 
when the experience of ‘déjà vu’ occurs in dreams, (as opposed to ‘lived life’) it does not 
function like a dream image at all”, that is, it does not correspond to “the recollection of an 
unconscious phantasy”, as Freud maintains in The Psychopathology of Everyday Life. In 
Marder’s account, the experience of déjà vu that occurs in dreams is “the mechanical 
reproduction of an impossible image (the image of our birth) that was seen (but not by any 
subjective presence) without having been seen.” As such, the “the reproduction of the image 
through the dream resembles something like a ‘photographic reproduction’ of an un-
photographable event.”9  
To return to Benjamin’s childhood bedroom, this room is a space of interiority in which 
a violent scenography is yet to take place – in “Der Mond” – the last but one section of the first 
version of Berliner Kindheit. Here, an uncanny construction of domesticity sets forth a 
shocking violence that is enacted by the allegorical device of a funnel. The funnel generates a 
spatial deformation that transpires upon a – characteristically ambiguous – temporal threshold 
(“childhood was almost already behind me”). The narrator and his family members are placed 
on a spatial threshold, the balcony between the domestic space and the city (the agora). They 
observe “the moon … in the sky of a dream”, yet they are themselves already an antecedent 
image, or better, an old photograph, “like those figures in a daguerreotype”. In an abrupt 
immediate violence, their bodies [Leiber] then disintegrate: “The funnel [Trichter] which the 
moon formed in approaching, sucked everything in. Nothing could hope to pass through it 
unchanged” (GS IV:302, SW 3:406, translation modified).10 The room, which has been 
imprinted in the subject for uncanny returns, is the scenographic apparatus of the spectral 
character of the future made present by a particular structure of violence. This enactment of 
 
8 Freud, “The Interpretation of Dreams”, in The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of 
Sigmund Freud, vol. 5 (1900-1901), ed. James Strachey et al., (London: Hogarth Press, 1955), p. 399.  
9 Marder, The Mother in the Age of Reproducibility: Psychoanalysis, Photography, Deconstruction (New York, 
Fordham University Press, 2012), p. 171.  
10 This violent scenography that resembles a voracious, open mouth also brings to mind the first poem in 
Baudelaire’s Les Fleurs du mal, as translated by Benjamin, the text to which the essay on translation served as 
an introduction. One of the stanzas of “Au Lecteur” (“To the Reader”), which deals with what could be termed 
the Stimmung of boredom, reads, in Benjamin’s translation (GS IV:68):   
Bleibt ein gemeinstes ärgstes zu erwähnen!  
Wenn es auch nicht auf Lärm und Mimik hält  
Wünscht es den Erdball sich als Trümmerfeld  




“Gewalt” (a word that can signify ‘power’, ‘violence’ or ‘authority’), as indicated by Benjamin 
in “Todesnachricht”, is engaged in a certain logic of language and its signifying function.   
 Moreover, the absent, the forgotten, the trace inside the room in the form of a tactile 
feminine cover, recalls the sense of touch that “more originally” and in an (un-)home-like 
manner dwells within the architecture, as well as the vanishing of Eros enacted by the trace. 
Tellingly, Benjamin thinks messianic time through sexual difference, death and Eros.11 As 
already indicated, the echoing sounds from the crypt bear upon a particular form of linguistic 
architectonics. The crypt, it can be argued, belongs to the conceptual realm of the 
“Wortskelett”, Benjamin’s semiotic form of writing as instanced in “– Turm –”. And the 
allusion to the Babelian scene, in turn, invites a close reading of “Die Aufgabe des 
Übersetzers”, Benjamin’s preface to his own task of translating Baudelaire’s Tableaux 
parisiens (translated and written in 1921 and published in 1923). Of particular significance 
here are the anticipatory and the auditory motifs that permeate the “Translator” essay as well 
as Benjamin’s childhood memories. In the last section of this part, the figure of the funnel will 
be taken up once more, when the fundamental scene of natural-historical deformation enacted 
by the moon will be underscored by reference to a further prism: Benjamin’s essay “Zur Kritik 
der Gewalt” (1921). We turn first, however to the task of the translator.  
 
 
II. The Architectonics of Original and Translation  
 
1) On Some Tactile Motifs in the “Translator” Essay 
 
Tantamount to a world “densely walled-up by/from ‘meaning’”, to evoke Adorno’s figure once 
more, Benjamin’s thinking images of translation are formed through a chiasmus of perception 
and language, adhering precisely to a dual self-manifestation (prior to the idealist division of 
the subject and the object) of what Benjamin would call “expressionlessness” – “das 
Ausdruckslose” – and, “inconspicuousness” – “das Unscheinbare”. Read allegorically, the 
productive groundlessness, the suspension over the abyss,12 that is released here is the locus 
 
11 For this point see Elissa Marder’s comment: “Benjamin (following the language of Stendhal and Baudelaire) 
invokes happiness as the promise of (sexual) happiness in the phrase ‘women who could have given themselves 
to us’”, as stated in in the Second Thesis on history. As Marder stresses, “here, as elsewhere in Benjamin, 
elaborations of messianic time and the time of history are often linked to sexuality”. See her “Inhuman Beauty: 
Baudelaire’s Bad Sex”, differences 27.1 (2016), 1-24 (p. 22, footnote 7).   
12 For the idea of the philosophical task “to make suspension over the abyss possible and prevent a fall into the 




and source of all meaning, yet also the place where the “speech of the Other” (to adopt Weigel’s 
term once more), as that which is most densely or tightly walled-up, is always already 
inscribed: the wall of Babel.13 In the Wahlverwandtschaften essay it is said that in opposition 
to groundless abyss and infinite distance, it is through an affective encounter with the ground 
that true cognition is formed therein: “den Grund, wo die wahre Erkenntnis sich bildet” (GS 
I:127, SW 1:299). Emphasising the revelatory dimension of representation, while underscoring 
also the problem of the law of language, but also that of the language of the law, that of 
sovereign power/violence, the “Translator” preface is suffused with auditory and tactile motifs 
at the border of language. 
Benjamin’s figurative language is saturated with such a tactile sense of closeness to a 
ground. His thinking images consistently have recourse to the convoluted semantic field of 
Sinn, exposing the threshold between the corporeal/sensory and the significative, between the 
natural, almost biological affinity between languages and any content they seek to reproduce 
in translation, their activity of “Sinnwiedergabe”. In the essay on language, this threshold is 
characterised through a figure of “density”:   
 
languages relate to one another as do media of varying degrees of density [Dichte], and 
with this the translatability of languages into one another is established. Translation is 
the leading over [Überführung] from one language into another through a continuum 
of transformations [Verwandlungen]. Translation passes through continua of 
transformation, not abstract precincts of identity and similarity.  
    (GS II:151, SW 1:70, translation modified)  
 
What is revealed in this act of removal, the “leading over” from one language to another, is 
compared in the “Translator” essay to the act of peeling the skin of a fruit. Notwithstanding 
this act of de-layering, whose motivation is a fidelity to the transmitted content of the work, a 
fidelity corresponding to the communicability of the work, there is still a remainder, a trace of 
non-communicability. This expressionless component is “quite close and yet infinitely remote, 
concealed or distinguishable, fragmented or powerful”; amounting to “the nucleus [Kern] of 
 
Mankowsky, “Hanging Over the Abyss”, in Hermann Cohen’s Critical Idealism, ed. Reinier Munk (Dordrecht: 
Springer Netherlands, 2005), pp. 161-190.  
13 Gillian Rose suggests reading the tower of Babel as “a wall that has been made continuous, completed as a 
circle and then elevated. This idea of the perfected and the elevated wall by contrast to the linearity of a wall 
which stands as a barrier, implies that the centre has been appropriated and become radial – the former barrier or 
limit transgressed by being denied as a limit”. Rose, “Architecture to Philosophy – the Post-Modern 




pure language itself” (GS IV:19, SW 1:261). The fundamental character of expressionless 
figures is the “entering and disappearing” into truth, “in sie Eingehen und Verschwinden”, and 
this most appropriate bearing in relation to truth contrasts with “thinking/meaning in 
recognising [Meinen im Erkennen]”, as is stated in the Foreword to the Trauerspiel book (GS 
I:216, O 12). Translation reveals, by its acts of concealment, the effacement of the original that 
keeps echoing back in this task; it exposes an ‘object in its veil’ that is predominantly founded 
on the Babelian logic. For the task of the translator, consisting in bringing the seed of pure 
language into ripening, is all the same its unavoidable “renunciation”, its “Auf-gabe”, and by 
implication, the refusal of the gift (“Gabe”) of language, as Benjamin seeks to demonstrate.14 
The auditory motif surfaces in Benjamin’s polemic of translation. “The task of the 
translator consists in finding the particular intention toward the target language which awakes 
[erweckt] in that language the echo of the original” (GS IV:16, SW 1:258, translation modified). 
Intentionality in translation consists in acoustical procedure, the awakening of the “echo of the 
original” in the translated language. The relation of translations to their originals is a relation 
underscored by a dialectical movement between fidelity and freedom (“Treue und Freiheit”). 
It is the liberty from the constraints of translation, the withdrawal of the original within a 
translated work, that not only makes the transmission of its meaning possible but also brings 
into proximity a possible revelation of “pure language” or “language as such”. “Pure 
language”, which does not intend nor express, is the “powerful and indeed the only” 
(“gewaltige und einzige”) capacity of translation, manifesting itself as “expressionless and 
creative [schöpferisch[es]] word”. In this “pure language”, that which is communicated can be 
so only in processes or procedures of concealment and vanishing. Therefore, in it, “all meaning 
[Sinn] and all intention” (the Babelian intention to build a tower and a city might be evoked) 
eventually dissolves, “destined to be extinguished [zu erlöschen bestimmt sind]” in – (a 
‘tactile’) layer or stratum – “Schicht” (GS IV:19, SW 1:261). Tactility, in itself encrypted within 
the echo-space of architecture, is what draws this thinking image focused upon “erlöschen” 
into close proximity with erlösen, audibly imbuing, echoing, earthly disappearance and 
extinction with messianic meanings of redemption.   
 
14 To follow Derrida: “The translator is indebted, he appears to himself as translator in a situation of debt; 
and his task is to render, to render that which must have been given. Among the words that correspond to 
Benjamin's title (Aufgabe, duty, mission, task, problem, that which is assigned, given to be done, given to 
be rendered), there are, from the beginning, Wiedergabe, Sinnwiedergabe, restitution, restitution of 
meaning. How is such a restitution, or even such an acquitting, to be understood? And what about 
meaning? As for aufgeben, it is to give, to dispatch (emission, mission) and to abandon”. “Des Tours de 




 The materiality of language in pure sound (this is indicated in the first instance in the 
untranslatability of the proper name of Babel, a name in itself in accord with the Hebrew 
word for ‘confusion’), is the particular mode of representation (“Darstellungsmodus”) 
inherent to translation. In the opening passage of the “Translator” essay, Benjamin states 
that works of art are not concerned with their receivers’ attention (“Aufmerksamkeit”). Even 
if aesthetic forms assume the nature (“Wesen”) of the human as both physical and spiritual 
existence, they do not pertain to the logic of an attentive subject postulating its object. It is 
rather, by implication, Zerstreuung – associated, as we have seen, with more “tactile 
reception” according to the “Kunstwerk” essay – that better defines the relation between 
works of art and their addressees. And so is translation conditioned by distraction in relation 
to its original. The law of translation is that its “form” (“Form”) cannot be grasped unless 
one “goes back” to the original (GS IV: 9, SW 1:254). This logic of return or turning back 
bears on the meaning of the more (temporal) circularity of a maelstrom (a figure resonating 
the Trichter), and thus invokes the formulation of origin stated in the Foreword to the 
Trauerspiel book, the “whirlpool in the stream of becoming” which also takes in any 
originary materiality:  
Origin, although a thoroughly historical category, nevertheless has nothing in common 
with genesis [Entstehung]. By “origin” is meant not the coming-to-be of what has 
originated but rather what originates in the becoming and passing away. The origin 
stands as eddy [Strudel] in the stream of becoming and vigorously draws [hinreißen] 
the emerging material [Entstehungsmaterial] into its rhythm. In the naked, manifest 
existence of the factual, the original never allows itself to be recognized; its rhythm 
stands open only to a dual insight. On one hand, it demands to be recognized as 
restoration, restitution, and on the other hand – and precisely on account of this – as 
something incomplete and unclosed. Determining itself in every origin-phenomenon is 
the formation in which, again and again, an idea confronts the historical world, until it 
lies there complete [vollendet] in the totality of its history. The origin, then, does not 
arise from the facts attested but concerns their fore- and after-history. The guidelines 
of philosophical contemplation are inscribed in the dialectic intrinsic to origin. It is by 
virtue of this dialectic that, in everything essential, singularity and repetition prove to 
be reciprocally determined. The category of origin is therefore not, as Cohen holds, 
purely logical, but rather historical. 




Thinking the origin as a vortex spatially and temporally circumscribes it within the becoming 
of phenomena.15 According to the dialectic of origin presented by Benjamin, that which is a-
priori to any empirical knowledge, sensibility or subjective imagination, and so “pure” (in the 
sense of the Kantian Kritik der reinen Vernunft, or “logical” in the sense that Herman Cohen 
interpreted it in his Logik der reinen Erkenntnis),16 cannot be thought in discontinuity from 
what follows it, from its afterness.17 Translation participates in the dispersal/distraction of the 
original in order to bring into revelation “pure language”, in which an original kinship 
(“Verwandtschaft”) between languages resides (GS IV:12), notwithstanding the variable 
“Dichte” of the forms they present. The phenomenon of language, as revealed in translation, is 
always caught-up between its Vorgeschichte and what comes after – nach, that is, “bourgeois 
conception of language”, according to the essay on language (GS II:144, SW 1:65). 
To think of translation as a form therefore requires temporality to be arrested ‘there’ – 
‘da’ – between “Fortleben”, the continuation of the life of the translated works, their subject 
matter and what they intend to mean, apprehended by dint of this meaning’s intertwinement 
with the “‘survival’” – “‘Überleben’” – of the original. In enclosing the word Überleben in 
quotation marks Benjamin hints at the complexity of meanings of the concept (“Begriff”) of 
mortality underlying his discussion on translation, as at once “out-living”, “living-on”, and also 
– “over-living”. Translation blurs any distinction between life and death, to the extent that the 
origin lives on: “For in [the original’s] continuation of life [Fortleben] which could not be 
called that if it were not a transformation and a renewal of the living thing [des Lebendigen] – 
the original changes itself” (GS IV:12, SW 1:256 translation modified). Accordingly, the 
original is, as in Benjamin’s definition of origin, not “purely logical, but rather historical”. 
Origin too, then, is to be viewed as participating in “Fortleben”, and this, as the above cited 
passage on origin betrays, by taking or giving its singular life away, fort. The original, like the 
origin, is a point of contact and of letting go, the point or drop at the origin of the swirling that 
all the same sucks everything in (as counterpart to the funnel). Whilst “Fortleben” implies the 
ongoing realisation of natural life, “Aufleben” dialectically indicates a higher form of life: its 
 
15 Agamben, in a short aphorism entitled “Vortexes”, referring to Benjamin’s famous comparison of the origin 
to a vortex, comments: “Insofar as the origin accompanies historical becoming, trying to understand the latter 
will not mean taking it back to an origin separated in time, but comparing and maintaining it with something 
that, like a vortex, is still present in it. The Fire and the Tale, trans. Lorenzo Chiesa (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford 
University Press, 2017), p. 59.   
16 That is, thought as the production of experience, as in Kant, yet as unable to “safeguard the ‘givenness’ of 
experience”, see Deuber-Manikowsky, “Hanging Over the Abyss”, p. 171.  
17 As Deuber-Manikowsky also notes, it is the “historicity of thought which has been lost in Cohen’s logic of 
origin” according to Benjamin, that is, the very logic of Naturgeschichte, now understood as the history of the 




‘uplifting’ enacted through self-negation (repression, recollection). That is, it echoes with the 
double meaning of the Hegelian “Aufheben”, in itself an antithetical primal word.18
 Translation, therefore, “embryonically or intensively” (“keimhaft oder intensive”) 
succumbs to the manifestation of an expression of life which is “rarely met within the sphere 
of non-linguistic life”. In the sphere outside language, such “anticipative” (“vorgreifende”) and 
“indicative” (“andeutende”) “realisation” cannot be found (GS IV:12, SW 1:256). Noting that 
this seemingly obvious relation between “life and purposefulness” (“Leben und 
Zweckmäßigkeit” GS IV:11, SW 1:255) does not participate in logical or intellectual cognition, 
Benjamin anchors the polemic on translation in his metaphysical view on language. It is not 
that the content, of things, of ideas, is imparted or conveyed through the language of translation, 
but rather a spiritual essence is expressed, mediated, and so sensed, in the very essence of 
language. Translation lays bare a temporal plane whereby “languages are a priori and apart 
from all historical relationships”, exposing the manner in which the affinity between languages 
converges on intentionality, “on what they want to say” (GS IV:12, SW 1:255, translation 
modified).19 And yet, this point of convergence is an opening of an empty space, or non-space, 
like the heavens which the builders of Babel inescapably failed to reach. For precisely, their 
intention was determined, destined to have transpired but also to be redeemed. This idea seems 
to be worked through the resonance of a deformation yet without destruction, that of erlösen 
in “erlöschen”. Moreover, the whole Babelian scenario was already mounted by dint of a 





18 For this point see Rebecca Comay and Frank Ruda, The Dash – the Other Side of Absolute Knowing, p. 56.  
19 Werner Hamacher considers “translatability” to be, in Benjamin’s analysis, the “transcendental of languages”: 
“With Benjamin, the Kantian subject-object relation was transformed into an interlinguistic and, moreover, an 
intralinguistic relation. If translation is the paradigmatic form in which languages find access to other languages 
and, thereby mediated, to their linguisticality, then in fact they do so just as the category of reality, in the 
transcendental consciousness, finds the material of perception as an intensive quantity in sensation. That is, just 
as the linguistic categories and hence transcendental language anticipate the intensivum of sensory material, so, 
too, does translatability anticipate a language and translation, concretely speaking, language as such”. See 
“Intensive Languages”, p. 507.  
20 Genesis 11:1. Echo, duplication, repetition – all these are already instilled or placed in this very origin of the 
myth of translation according to the biblical story, from its very beginning. The one language possessed by the 
people of earth resounds in duplication of words according to the first sentence of the tale. Repetition also 
underscores intention: the sons of shem (meaning ‘name’ in Hebrew) endeavoured, in the act of building a 
tower, to make themselves “a name”/ “shem”, the untranslatable name they already had as a proper name. “The 
theory of proper names”, Benjamin notes in the essay on language, “is the theory of the frontier between finite 
and infinite language. Of all beings, man is the only one who names his own kind, as he is the only one whom 




2) Translation as Schauplatz 
 
Benjamin’s view on translation enables him to postulate a concept of life in relation to the 
chiasmus of nature and history, the elasticity of meaning connoted by the idea of 
Naturgeschichte. He uses the term Schauplatz in order to articulate this, or better, to make it 
perceptible. To recall, “the place of showing and looking” was presented in the German 
Trauerspiele as a space of alterity, the place for the allegorical “speaking otherwise”, in which, 
and for that reason, semblance, Schein, dissolves therein. In the “Translator” essay it is noted 
that the concept of life “comes to its own right only when everything that has a history and is 
not merely the setting [Schauplatz] for history is endowed with life [Leben zuerkannt wird]”. 
Now, significantly, it is “the task of the philosopher”, says Benjamin, to understand “all natural 
life [alles natürliche Leben] through the more encompassing life of history” (GS IV:11, SW 
1:255 translation modified). According to Hegel, “the development of history falls into time” 
(“fällt die Entwicklung der Geschichte in die Zeit”, a citation which would also appear in 
Heidegger’s Sein und Zeit, in the section at which Adorno’s critique in “Der Idee der 
Naturgeschichte” seems to be aimed).21 In the account given by Benjamin, the stream of 
becoming enacted by translation destructively grows towards (or goes down into – as in a state 
of ‘Untergang’) – the “messianic end” of “the history of languages” (GS IV:13, SW 1:257). If 
language falls into history, translation exposes its Naturgeschichte in laying bare a 
“suprahistorical kinship between languages [überhistorische Verwandtschaft der Sprachen]” 
(GS IV:13, SW 1:257). Therefore, it is the original, Benjamin tells us, echoing the Babelian 
scenography, that in translation “rises up into a higher and purer, an airy region of language 
[Luftkreis der Sprache] as it were”.22 Translation, although it does not bring into realisation the 
“realm of reconciliation and fulfilment of languages” (GS IV:14-15, SW 1:257, translation 
modified) participates in the anticipation of this realm. This is made perceptible in that which 
does not enter translation, in the residues of untranslatability, as in the case of a proper name.23 
And there is a more ‘tactile’ relation that is constitutive of a spatio-temporal 
constellation of proximity/distance and intelligibility, establishing the relation between 
translation and revelation:  
 
21 Heidegger, Being and Time, p. 406. Adorno comments extensively on Heidegger’s turn to Hegel (NG 353, 
NH 116) 
22 Unlike the essay on language, the “Translator” essay does not name the story of Babel, yet Benjamin’s 
rhetoric of genealogy, of kinship and of transmission of family seed – all allude to the biblical text.   




If, however, these languages continue to grow in this way until the messianic end of 
their history, it is translation that catches fire from the continued life [Fortleben] of the 
works and the infinite renewed life of languages [Aufleben der Sprachen]. For it is 
translation that keeps putting the holy growth of languages to the test: How far removed 
is their hidden meaning from revelation [Offenbarung]? How close can [this revelation] 
actually be brought by the knowledge [Wissen] of this remoteness [Entfernung]?”  
   (GS IV:14, SW 1:257, translation modified) 
 
What is at stake is a logic defined by a “remoteness from creation”, a phenomenology of 
nearness and distance that can be signaled as a constant motif in the “Translator” essay and in 
Benjamin’s writings.24 This logic is worked through in the analysis of translation as the form 
of human linguistic activity in which the distance from “pure language”, a distance enacted by 
the Babelian scene of the multiplicity of languages, amounts to the former’s revelatory 
manifestation, like a “weak messianic force” instantaneously becoming conspicuous. For in the 
original, “language and revelation” are merged “without tension” (GS IV:21, SW 1:262-263). 
In a key thinking image, Benjamin alludes to the Kabbalistic image of the broken 
vessel, an object in which the funnel functions as a pivotal point of transformation and 
mediation between the two parts of the amphora. In evoking this image, he conceives of 
translation as a complementarity without resemblance, the production of meaning, bereft of 
abstraction. Benjamin uses the Jewish mystical figure of the broken vessel in order to explain 
the abstruse origin of the demand for literalness (“Wörtlichkeit”) inscribed by translation, often 
distorted in the practice of translation into incomprehensibility:        
 
Fragments of a vessel that are to be glued together must match one another in the 
smallest details, although they need not be like one another. In the same way a 
translation, instead of imitating the sense of the original, must lovingly and in detail 
incorporate the original’s way of meaning, thus making both the original and the 
translation recognizable as fragments of a greater language, just as fragments are part 
of a vessel.  
      (GS IV:18, SW 1:260) 
 
24 Weigel comments: “Benjamin’s thinking about secularization is elaborated topographically, via 
historical constellations which appear in the form of thought-images and scenes into which history has 
passed. One of these images, and one which is at the very core of his theory of history, is the remoteness 
from Creation. It is a figure to be understood as literally the foundation and central thought-image of his 
historico-theoretical reflections”. See Weigel, “Between Creation and Last Judgement, the Creaturely 
and the Holy. Benjamin and Secularization”, trans. Georgina Paul, Paragraph 32.3 (2009), 359-381 (p. 




According to this phenomenology of translation, languages amount to the fragments of a vessel. 
Its cracks (the Sprünge, we might say, that intervene with regard to Ursprung), where languages 
at once touch and are detached, figure a veil or cover that nevertheless comes to be seen through. 
It is an implement of fragments for carrying over or mediation which intimates the original pure 
language which is at the same time yet to come and yet uncannily already ‘there’, perceived in 
its negative process of becoming, recalling the motif of language’s decay into a tactile layer. 
The disjointed tactile surface of the vessel is superimposed with another interrupted surface, 
which is architectural in kind: 
  
A real translation is transparent; it does not cover the original, does not block its light, 
but allows the pure language, as though reinforced by its own medium, to shine upon 
the original all the more fully. This may be achieved, above all, by a literal rendering 
of the syntax which proves words rather than sentences to be the primary element of 
the translator. For if the sentence is the wall before the language of the original, 
literalness is the arcade [Arkade, closer to the architectural element of the colonnade].  
          (GS IV:18, SW 1:260) 
 
Translation, according to this architectural thinking image, is worked through procedures of 
‘walling-up’ of/by meaning or sense. This is also auditorily portrayed. In Benjamin’s gallery 
of translation thinking-images, the figure that sensually captures the tension of remoteness 
from revelation inherent in translation – and with it, the possibility of this phenomenology of 
closeness and farness to transform itself into a cognition or knowledge – is that of the rendition 
of the echoing space of translation as “Bergwald” (GS IV:16). The compound of the 
“mountain” and the “forest/wood” is in itself a precursory echo of the scenographic features of 
the aura. Translation, whose task is to awaken the “echo of the original”, lingers on the verge 
of the “forest of language” in which the language of literary works dwells, bound to remain 
opposite (“gegenüber”) the “mountain-forest of language” (“Bergwald der Sprache”), outside, 
that is, the referential structures of language.25 It is through the acoustical dimension of this 
scenography that an essential inaccessibility to the original is set forth. The auditory motif is 
 
25 For this point see Rodolphe Gasché, “Saturnine Vision and the Question of Difference: Reflections on Walter 
Benjamin’s Theory of Language”, Studies in 20th Century Literature 11.1 (1986), 69-90 (p. 77). As Gasché also 
points out, “Bergwald der Sprache” resonates with Benjamin’s image of the “wooded interior” of the symbol in 
the Foreword to the Trauerspiel and is a possible reference to Baudelaire’s poem “Correspondences”, in which 




enhanced by the rendition of the “mountain forest of language”.26 Unable to cross the forest’s 
border, the translation calls (“ruft”) the original to enter inside, as far as that singular place 
(“einzigen Orte”) where “the echo, in its own language, is able to render the resonance 
[Widerhall] of a work in the foreign language” (GS IV:16, SW 1:258-259, translation 
modified).  
The vacuum acoustically generates repetition and similarities by the fact that sounds 
encounter, ‘touch’, the surrounding, natural world. The echo of translation can neither prevent 
the original from disappearing, nor admit its return; it belongs to a future that left it behind:  
 
If there is such a thing as a language of truth, a tensionless and even silent depository 
of the ultimate secrets for which all thought strives, then this language of truth is – the 
true language. And this very language, in whose presentiment [Ahnung] and 
description lies the only perfection [Vollkommenheit] for which a philosopher can 
hope, is concealed in intensive fashion in translations.  
   (GS IV:16, SW 1:259 translation modified) 
 
Another dialectical figure of concealment by translation is set out in another, double Denkbild 
incorporated in the essay: 
 
Whereas content and language form a certain unity in the original, like a fruit and its 
skin, the language of the translation envelops its content like a royal robe with ample 
folds [wie ein Königsmantel in weiten Falten]. For it [the language of translation] 
signifies a language which is higher than itself, and therefore, remains unsuitable, 
forceful and foreign [unangemessen, gewaltig und fremd] to its content. This 
brokenness [Gebrochenheit] prevents transference [Übertragung] and at the same time 
makes it superfluous.  
  (GS IV:15, SW 1:258, translation modified)  
 
In Benjamin’s exposure, pure language, inexpressible and inconspicuous, resides in an 
extraterritorial space between the folds or the fractures of its dispersal/distraction in translation. 
The “royal robe of translation” figures an empty space for a dual body: neither a ‘flesh’ to be 
covered and sheltered nor the body touching the robe from the inside are there. By contrast, in 
the original, meaning lives on, unfolded in the very form of revelation, the peeling of the skin. 
 
26 The acoustical meaning is elided in the English translation which omits the significant physical element of the 




This form of life, which is also that of historically exposed nature as mere and bare natural life, 
is thus doubled and so absorbed into another empty locus. Natural, mortal life finds its 
‘afterlife’ in a historical Schauplatz, the space of appearance for the sovereign.  
At issue here is the close proximity of the structural dynamics of translation to the 
structure constitutive of sovereignty, a topic already glossed in the discussion on Benjamin’s 
description of the world of the Baroque and the articulation of sovereignty there. What is 
disclosed in the figure of the “royal robe of translation” is the impasse opened up in considering 
the relation between translation and the content of the original. For, it is by means of the very 
contrast between the natural and the more worldly, fleshly figure of the naked body lacking all 
semblance and covered by a royal robe, that the law of translation, in excluding the imparting 
of content, touches upon the fundamental, paradoxical structure of the law. Translation, like 
the royal robe, represents the power of language.27 As Hamacher reflects upon the matter, 
“translatability is the high law, the trans-law [Über-Gesetz], so to speak, of language as such”.28 
What is indicated, in other words, is the possible “state of exception”, the power on the part of 
the sovereign to suspend the law, in the name of the law, to make it “forceful” and “foreign”, 
external to the rule of law.29 This is the “breakdown” that precisely thwarts the act of carrying 
over or “transference” (“Übertragung” – significantly, not merely “translation”, as in the 
English translation of the essay) and at the same time prefigures its excess, namely, “language 
as such”. It is an excess that is figuratively captured in the untouchable, inconspicuous and so 
expressionless folds of the royal robe. These folds, we might say, pertain to a figuration that is 
seen, heard and felt as an indistinguishability of cover and interior. Just like the crypt, the fold 
might be said to contain “words or pauses” that, we recall, point us to “that inconspicuous 
stranger” that is the future and therefore belong to the order of the invisible trace that was left 
“bei uns”, “with us”, in the sense of  in “our place”, the space that we inhabit.  
The “Translator” essay associates these folds with literary works (works of “Dichtung”, 
where the “dicht” of material density is arguably operative), in which “pure language” resides 
in concealment, awaiting its messianic redemption. Its architectural counter-image from the 
end of the essay is on the side of the most densely (‘am dichtesten’) walled-up, in the “Urbild” 
 
27 The royal robe might be considered as this point equivalent to the intimation of the figure of sovereignty 
evoked in the last sentence of  “Zur Kritik der Gewalt”: “Divine violence, which is the sign and seal but never 
the means of sacred execution, may be called sovereign [waltende] violence” (GS II:203, SW 1:252). 
28 Hamacher, “Intensive Languages”, p. 493.  
29 See Benjamin’s chapter “Theory of Sovereignty” in the Trauerspiel book, and Giorgio Agamben, “The 
Messiah and the Sovereign: The Problem of Law in Walter Benjamin”, in Potentialities: Collected Essays in 





or original image of Hölderlin’s translations. These are translations in which “dwells” 
(“wohnt”) the “original danger” (“ursprüngliche Gefahr”) that the “gates” of a language thus 
extended or worked through (“durchwaltet[en]”) would fall to and lock (enclose or exclude) 
the translator in silence or expressionlessness (GS IV:21, SW 1:262, translation modified). It 
seems that the Hölderlin Tower (in which the poet was enclosed in his benighted last years) 
has an implicit imagistic presence here, as a kind of outpost of the Tower of Babel.30 Language, 
however, is let go in this extreme case of sheer translatability; its meaning (“Sinn”) plunges 
“from abyss to abyss” (“von Abgrund zu Abgrund”).31 There is a “stop” – “es gibt ein Halten” 
– to this whirl that takes all meaning in, a handle or a grip to be found solely in the holy 
scriptures. Benjamin’s contention that translatability is limited is based on a figuration of the 
scriptures to be a language-scape worked through practices of interlinear scripting. In this 
graphic form, the translation, cast as a poriferous veil over the original, is laid bare as a 
fragment of language. Devoid of meaning and governed by literariness, the interlinear 
translation thus stands in close proximity to “truth” and to “Lehre”, textual objects that are 
“translatable par excellence” and hence, are the origin of all translations and of all languages. 
With this form, the tensionless (“spannunglos”) relation between original and translation finds 
its ideal expression. Meaning is no longer considered a “watershed” differentiating between 
the two streams of language (recall here the figure of the “estuary” and lament): the stream of 
language and the stream of revelation (GS IV:21, SW 1:262-263). In the Schauplatz of 
translation, both comes to light as meaning-less and expressionless. And this leads once more 
to the dialectic of image and language.  
 
 
III. “Phantasie” between Expressionlessness and Inconspicuousness   
 
Phantasie ist im letzten Welttag und im ersten.  





30 I thank Andrew J. Webber for pointing out this allusion to Hölderlin’s tower.   
31 Derrida traces in this final passage of Benjamin’s essay a negative movement of descending of the ascendant 
Babel, a counter-movement that is inscribed not only in the Babelian situation but in the Babelian text itself, a 
text that “lays down the law it speaks about, and from abyss to abyss it deconstructs the tower, and every turn, 




1) On the Power of Deformation in the “Phantasie” Fragment   
 
Can the image that informs the set of Benjaminian imagistic figures – namely, the thinking 
image, the memory image, the dream image or the dialectical image – overcome its own 
negation, traverse its own threshold, be disentangled from illusion and semblance? How does 
the deficient and limited method of the image succumb to philosophical truth? Benjamin’s 
childhood memories, involved in a dialectic of remembering what was never subjectively 
experienced as origin yet to be revealed, are stored in what he describes as abandoned sites. 
Contemplating the dwelling places of animals in the zoological garden in the section “Der 
Fischotter”, the child’s gaze is hindered by a “prophetischer Winkel”. From this corner or 
angle, what is revealed is that  
 
just as there are plants that are said to confer the power to see into the future, so there 
are places that possess such a virtue. For the most part, they are deserted places – 
treetops that lean against walls, blind alleys or front gardens where no one ever stops. 
In such places, it seems as if all that lies in store for us has become the past.  
     (GS VII: 407, SW 3:365) 
 
What is prophetically sensed is the life to come already subordinated to demonically fateful 
existence or to the temporality of mythic eternal return. In the fragment on “Phantasie” 
Benjamin draws a distinction between “prophetic vision” (“Sehertum”) which is “the ability to 
perceive the forms of the future [der Blick für werdende Gestaltung]”, and “imagination” or 
Phantasie, defined as “the awareness [or sense] of the de-formations of the future [“Sinn für 
werdende Entstaltung”] (GS VI:117, SW 1:282). Phantasie has to do with “Sinn”, the sensing 
of that which is to be separated from – as marked by the prefix ‘Ent’ – what is prophetically 
perceived as a sealed form. Viewed in terms of the “Zur Kritik der Gewalt” essay, imagination, 
defined as “pure” (“Reine Phantasie”), bears a close affinity to Benjamin’s idea regarding a 
godly or divine violence (“göttliche Gewalt”), the power or force that annihilates mythic, 
created formations, thus counteracting what is humanly formed: “pure imagination, therefore, 
is not an inventive power [erfindende Kraft]” (GS VI:117, SW 1:282).32  
 
32 In this regard see Sami Khatib’s interpretation of Benjamin’s messianic thought in relation to the language of 
theology, through the “radical Entstellung, deformation and displacement, that Benjamin’s (de)figuration of the 




In the difficult and dense fragment, Benjamin draws the subtle yet crucial distinction between 
a dimension of human imagination defined as “Phantasie” and the realm of the fantastic - das 
Phantastische, and this by staging a pivotal crossing between the perceptual realm, designated 
as the optical, tactile and acoustical de-formations or disfigurements, and language. Both 
converge on a messianic natural historical plane marked by “eternal ephemerality”. Tellingly, 
the fragment opens with a linguistic deficiency: “The German language does not possess a 
proper word for the forms [Gestalten] of the imagination [Phantasie]. Only the word 
‘manifestation’ [Erscheinung] may in one specific sense be regarded as such” (GS VI:116, SW 
1:280, translation modified). Eli Friedlander observes that “Benjamin uses the term Phantasie 
instead of the more philosophically common term Einbildungskraft, to highlight the 
manifestations of the imagination he wants to investigate.” In attempting “to put aside, as it 
were, the productive (or reproductive) character of the imagination”, for Benjamin, “Fantasy 
would be imagination that is purely receptive – that is, would involve no activity of imagining, 
no formative deployment of an active capacity.”33  
According to Benjamin, what is intrinsic to Phantasie, is that it “moves around its forms 
in a game of dissolution [um die Gestalten ein auflösendes Spiel treibt]”.34 While it takes its 
manifestations or appearances  – “Erscheinungen” – from its forms, those manifestations are 
to be conceived of as the “de-formation” – “Entstaltung” (a coined term alluding at once to 
Entstellung and Gestaltung) – of what has been formed. Phantasie is associated with a negative 
force of dissolution bereft of ruination. To the extent that its “prime law” is that it “de-forms” 
(“entstaltet”), never destroys (“zerstört”), it is close in its nature to Benjamin’s definition in 
“Zur Kritik der Gewalt” of non-mythic violence. Despite its destructive force, Phantasie leaves 
the imaginable forms that are subjugated to it intact. De-formation, therefore, is tantamount to 
preservation in the form of the disappearance of otherness, and hence, of desire and of guilt. 
De-formation underlines translation in which meaning is carried over, as if funnelled, 
conveying a disappearing trace of lost Babel. Michal Ben-Naftali observes that Babel is the 
establishment of desire by “turning the tower to a textual signifier only, without a referent, 
without accomplishment”. This is why, she writes, “it is a disappearing figure, coming and 
 
33 Friedlander, “Learning from the Colors of Fantasy”, Boundary 2 45.2 (2018), 111-137 (p. 118).  
34 And we might evoke here the form of consciousness performed by the collective in regard to architectural 
forms, as it is stated in the “Kunstwerk” essay: “Dagegen versenkt die zerstreute Masse ihrerseits das 




going, superfluous, concealed, like God and like the mother.”35 And this observation brings to 
mind Benjamin’s conceptualisation of origin as swallowing its own emerging material.  
Julia Reinhard Lupton notes that “in English emergency is defined by the state of 
emerging, a condition in which forms are no longer fixed, when new – potentially dangerous, 
revolutionary, or counterrevolutionary – forms of political life can arise.” The different 
etymology of the German word “Ausnahmezustand”, as she also points out, “is ruled by the 
idea of exception. The Ausnahmezustand is that condition in which what is outside the law – 
the exception to the rule – comes to define the very essence of the law through the cut of the 
sovereign’s de-cision.”36 In Benjamin’s analysis in the Trauerspiel book, to recall, the 
sovereign succumbs to being a creature too. Creaturely here is not to be located merely in 
earthly vulnerability,	always on the verge of being de-nuded, as the thinking image of the figure 
of wrapping and the tower of Babel of translation portray. Rather, it is out of the brokenness 
of transference/translation, imagined as the deformations taking shape upon the surface of the 
royal robe, that the sense (in the allegorical, twofold gloss of the word) of creaturely life 
emerges. As this thinking image betrays, translation’s ‘state of emergency/exception’ is the 
exposure to a “higher language”. In as much as “all higher language is a translation of lower 
ones” (GS II:157, SW 1:74), as Benjamin says in the essay on language, the Fall of language 
from its origin of the name is bound up with a violent other.  
The emergence of a form and its exception as that which has been disfigured, displaced 
or de-formed that is assigned by Benjamin to the faculty of “Phantasie” is rendered by a 
crossing between two subjective positionings. The one, defined as “spontaneity”, is where the 
constructive elements of fantastic formations (“phantastischen Gebilden”) are linguistically 
pronounced from the side of the subject – “vom Subjekt aus gesprochen”. The other proclaims 
a particular, subjective point of view – “vom Subjekt aus gesehen”, which is “un-constructive”, 
“purely de-formative” and “purely negative” (GS VI:116, SW 1:280).37 What is associated here 
with the optical sphere is a purely negative, what Benjamin calls elsewhere a “bare gaze” 
(“bloßer Blick” [GS II:610]), a phrasing to which we will return), which is therefore devoid of 
the distance of Eros – or better, attests to the effacement of this distance – and therefore, is 
tactile in nature. As Benjamin states in his essay on language, the language of things passes 
 
35 Michal Ben-Naftali, preface to the translation of Derrida’s “Des Tour de Babel” into Hebrew (Tel Aviv: 
Resling, 2002), pp. 7-33 (p. 10).   
36 Reinhard Lupton, “Creature Caliban”, pp. 5-6.  
37 The English translation of the fragment omits this significant distinction between the subject’s speech and the 
subject’s point of view, which bears not only on “Weltanschauung” but also implies the more sensuous 




into names when man contemplates (“anschauen”) them, this is what is dubbed “primal 
hearing” in the Foreword to the Trauerspiel book, associated with the power of the name. 
Naming is a power given to man as language; in it, a separation, a cut, is inscribed: “It is this 
being [the name] that determines the givenness of ideas” (GS I:216, O 13). Significantly, in the 
essay on language, it is said that “conception and spontaneity together [Empfängnis und 
Spontaneität zugleich]” is a uniqueness to be found only in the linguistic realm, for which 
“language does possess a proper word”. It is “translation” in the sense of the “translation of 
the language of things into that of man”, where “a word applies also to that conception 
[Empfängnis] of the nameless [Namenlos[en]] in the name” (GS II:150, SW:1 69, my 
emphasis). Being nameless also means the state of being expressionless, a state which is at 
once the “for-and after-history” of the Fall of “Ursprache”. And this state was established in 
the architectural episode of Babel. 
Being nameless in the face of the language of man also comes to grips with the 
existential state of anxiety in the face of dispersal, the tearing apart of family kinships, that has 
incited the imagination and the desire of the people of Babel. This anxiety initiated the two 
intertwined projects: the one is the inventive architectural formation of a tower reaching up to 
the heavens, through which this people sought to give itself a name,38 to translate in their own 
language the fear in the face of that which is untouchable, expressionless and nameless; the 
second is the establishment of a collective existence in the form of a city. Recall here the 
collective “Rezeption in der Zerstreuung” enacted by architecture according to the 
“Kunstwerk” essay and the designation of the “instructive laws” of this reception. Here, 
precisely, the form of recognition inhering in the name corresponds to the anxiety of being 
nameless, of non-being, that gives rise to the emergence of a new form at the border of the real 
and the symbolic, hence “the conception [Empfängnis] of the nameless [Namenlos[en]] in the 
name”, as noted above.   
De-formation, Benjamin emphasises in “Phantasie”, is to be distinguished from the 
“destructive decay of the empirical by two features”. The decay – “Verfall” – in question 
concerns the body with its twofold aspects of corporeal and experiencing body, of Körper 
and Leib, as reflected in Benjamin’s terminology of birth, pain, and death. Evoking his idea of 
eternal ephemerality or passing away as the rhythm of the messianic, the fragment thus 
conflates intellectual and corporeal/reproductive conception (“Konzeption”/“Empfängnis”). 
 
38 See the genealogical lists recorded before and after the tale of Babel in Genesis Chapter 10 and the rest of 




This conflation is in play in relating dissolution and decay, associated with de-formation, to an 
element which is “without compulsion” (“zwanglos”), “free” and “painless [schmerzlos]” and 
to a “painless birth”. With the “Untergang des Scheins”, akin to the separation from myth (to 
recall Benjamin’s interpretation of Die Wahlverwandtschaften) and with the allusion to 
Scheinlosigkeit – the lack of radiance/semblance that marked the Trauerspiel’s setting – the 
historical experiencing body is that which is discharged. And yet, aporetically, this natural 
historical body, painless, lacking desire and disassociated from birth – is all the same 
discharged from corporeality.   
 In a thinking image that exactly captures ‘tactility’ as it is worked in the idea of natural 
history, “de-formation”, it is said, “is like the sun setting over the abandoned theatre set of the 
world [Schauplatz der Welt] with its deciphered ruins. It is the unending dissolution of the 
purified beautiful semblance [schöne[n] Schein], freed from all seduction.” “The setting of the 
sun” is a natural phenomenon merging into an archaeological image of history in ruins, an 
image which is a zone of convergence between nature and history, as pointed out by Adorno: 
  
in the language of the Baroque, the fall of a tyrant is equivalent to the setting of the 
sun. This allegorical relationship already encompasses the presentiment [die Ahnung] 
of a procedure that could succeed in interpreting concrete history as nature and to make 
nature dialectical under the aspect of history. 
      (NG 360, NH 121, my emphasis)   
 
The dissolution of beauty that is coupled, according to this image, with a semiotic 
imperative in the form of the “deciphered ruins”, is further developed in “Phantasie” through 
two evocations of “pure appearances” rendered by painting. The idea of an infinite dissolution 
of the purified beautiful semblance is issued through the painterly description of phenomena 
of light and colour. Significantly, the painterly materialisation of colour through light and 
shadows, as Benjamin notes in one of his other early fragments on colour, sets out an infinite, 
spiritual concept of space.39 In paintings, by way of the surface, things develop not through 
their extension in space but through their being disposed toward space or a room, their “Dasein 
zum Raume” (GS VII:563). The paintings Benjamin fleetingly evokes in “Phantasie” render 
visible transcendental moments and their medium-specific receptivity to these subjects lies in 
their materialisation of coloured light effects. One concerns “the radiance [Glanz] that lies over 
 




things in Paradise” (Benjamin is thinking here of the German Romantic painter Philippe Otto 
Runge [1777-1810]); the other is the “gray Elysium” in the paintings of Hans von Marées 
(1837-1887). With the former, the gloss of “the mute magic of nature, [from which] the word 
of God shines forth”, as it is said in the essay on language, is recalled. This mute nature, as is 
set out in this programmatic essay, although receptive and yet un-creative (“nicht schaffend”) 
still begets conception (“Empfängnis”) (GS II:150, SW 1:69). For precisely what emerges is 
that mute nature gives birth to recognition, to “Konzeption” grounded on the translation of the 
creative divine language into the language of names. What stems from the second example of 
a “world of pure appearance” and has become perceptible in the third example, is therefore, 
precisely, language’s after-ness of deformation and mergence, or indeed e-mergence, into 
human language, and henceforth into history. Thus, the interplay between speech and sight 
established in “Phantasie” through pictoriality, is revealed through the evocation of the 
mournful aspect of the “expressionless” – that which is “diminished”, “extinguished” “or 
subdued”. The expressionless, the mark of pure semblance, of “Schein” as “rein”, enters the 
field of vision through colour – “the gray Elysium we see in pictures by Marées”. These 
pictures, “show this”, Benjamin succinctly writes (GS VI:115-116, SW 1:281, translation 
modified, my emphasis).40 In gesturing, by “pure semblance”, towards “pure language”, 
namely the language beyond utilisation and symbolic function, another form of purity, that of 
“pure means” and “pure violence” is incorporated here as well, as we will see.41   
 
2) The Eye That Lays Bare  
 
“For only language is able, in the most fortunate case [im glücklichsten Falle], to keep the de-
forming powers under control [die entstaltenden Mächte in ihrer Gewalt behalten]”, says 
Benjamin; and Shakespeare, in his comedies, is the master of this (GS VI:116, SW 1:282). In a 
fragment whose subject is Shakespeare’s As You Like It (“Shakespeare: Wie es euch gefällt”, 
 
40 In another related note from the fragment “Sokrates” Benjamin writes: “Möglichkeit der elysischen Farbe bei 
Marées durch die Umkehrung des Verhältnisses: die Farbe entsteht aus dem Grau, nicht das Grau aus der Farbe” 
(GS VI:120). “Pure imagination” becomes perceptible through that which is expressionless when the (colour) 
grey does not emerge from the paint (“Farbe”) but the paint, which has no expression, only its material 
manifestation in space, emerges out of its colour, which belongs according to this note to the realm of Schein. 
Significantly, an analogous allusion to glowing light in painting is made in another early text, referring to the 
famous altarpiece of Matthias Grünewald. As Benjamin fleetingly remarks there, stressing the moment at which 
what comes forth in glory is in fact dispersed, the radiance of the saintly gloriole or aura surfacing out of the 
“greenest of blacks”, “is true only where it is refracted in the nocturnal; only there it is great, only there it is 
expressionless, only there is it asexual and yet of supramundane sexuality” (GS II:130, SW 1:52-53). 
41 On the notion of purity in Benjamin and its link to the Kantian tradition, see Carlo Salzani “Purity (Benjamin 




dated to 1918), Benjamin comments that Shakespeare’s comedies are to be regarded as “the 
dissolution of the cosmos into the infinite”, and for this reason Shakespeare is the “most 
sensuous and the most immediate” of writers. The most ‘tactile’, we might say. This is made 
evident in Benjamin’s use here of the figure of the dissolving clouds, the figure that informs, 
to recall, his definition of “tactility”, of “im Taktischen”, from the “Phantasie” fragment. It is 
the sense of touch, as this rare and fleeting definition of the tactile denotes, that allows 
fulfilment in earthly transience, in passing away.42 Shakespeare is the poet, says Benjamin, “of 
the bare gaze made of [aus] an eye that lays bare”. This is the gaze upon pure, self-dissolving 
semblance. Just as “in tactility”, “clouds dissolve into the blue”, the naked gaze is the gaze that 
loses itself in the infinite blue: “So wie der geistig erhobene Blick auf das unendliche Blau des 
Himmels trifft und frei schweifend sich in ihm verliert.” Benjamin’s commentary (in which the 
later definition of the aura is glimpsed) continues:  
 
This piece [As You Like It], according to Shakespeare, should be viewed as one looks 
at summer-clouds when they dissolve into the blue to the extent that all dissolution into 
the infinite behind their symbolic forms, represents, at the same time, that which is the 
most profound, the most delightful. 
 
“This piece”, Benjamin adds, “should be taken into consideration together with the 
Tempest, to which it can be viewed as a prologue [Vorspiel], as it were”. Alluding to the 
epilogue of Shakespeare’s The Tempest, it is there, Benjamin says, that the “infinity of 
existence [or being, Dasein] has got close [nahe gekommen]”. This is the moment when the 
audience ‘blows the wind’, through their clapping hands and breath is expended (“daß dem 
Menschen der Atem ausgeht”), when “Prospero lays down the magic wand out of his hand” 
(GS II:610-611, my translation). Shakespeare’s laying bare gaze conjures up the staring gaze 
of the angel of history as detailed in the Ninth Thesis of history. Into this thesis’s image-space, 
 
42 The cloud specifically functions, in iconographic or scenographic terms, as veil (between luminescence and 
opacity) for the breaking out of glorious light. The figure of cloud formations or deformations bears a particular 
significance in Benjamin’s thought, and incorporations of “weather-like” epistemology into his Denkbilder can 
be found in his Passagen-Werk and in his autobiographical thought-images in Berliner Kindheit among other 
places, as in the entry in convolute N of the Passagen-Werk: “in the fields with which we are concerned, 
knowledge comes only in lightning flashes. The text is the long roll of thunder that follows. [N1,1]”. In “Der 
Regenbogen” (1915), a character of a painter explains that it is “through color [that] the clouds are so near the 
imagination”. And the figure of the clouds sets out an ambiguous notion of secularization: “In the end, religion 
transposes its sacred realm into the clouds and its blessed realm into paradise”/ “Endlich versetzt die Religion 
ihr heiliges Reich in die Wolken und ihr seliges in das Paradies” (GS VII:25). Weigel, stressing that 
secularization, as Benjamin maintains on several occasions, is essentially spatial, points out that the ambiguity 
of this Denkbild lies in the fact that the meaning ensuing from it is “neither theological nor secular’”. Weigel, 




as we have seen, the disintegrated tower of Babel also seems to emerge in the form of refuse, 
before which the angel is cast, and his wings are blown ever open by the wind. In “Shakespeare: 
Wie es euch gefällt”, Benjamin thus concludes: “The tempest no longer blows as you like it, 
or, because it did this once more: you may hear nothing more” (GS II:610-611).43 Such 
soundless dissolution is also in play with the “breathing the aura”, its “shattering” that in 
Benjamin’s semantics is intimately close to a collective “Sammlung”, like the audience in the 
theatre. It is through mimetic actions and relations – between breathing and blowing, combined 
with the tactile gesture (and tactility, to recall, primarily counteracts opticality) – that 
semblance and likeness dissolve, it is de-formed and thus freed from semblance in pure 
Phantasie: “[Shakespeare’s] creation [Schaffen] dies of immortality” (GS II:610-611).  
 
IV. The Presentiments of Natural History  
  
De-auraticisation is identified by Benjamin as at work in Shakespeare’s dislocation of the 
beholders into the setting in tactility. The dissolving (summer) clouds as (tactile) dissolution 
into the infinite leads back to the memories of Berliner Kindheit, this time to the “work of the 
Mummerehlen”. This distorted expression (of “Muhme Rehlen”) derived from a children’s 
rhyme, provides the title of – that is, names – the section “Die Mummerehlen”. Here Benjamin 
lays down the contours of what he perceives as the clouds of language, or of words. Here the 
“Lehre vom Ähnlichen” is transposed into an image of a cloud.44 As Benjamin recalls: 
“Beizeiten lernte ich es, in die Worte, die eigentlich Wolken waren, mich zu mummen”. 
Signifying nothing, “Mummerehlen” makes it possible to mask oneself, “zu mummen”, which 
means to become the word itself by inhabiting it. In this “constellation of figurative tableaux”, 
Gerhard Richter observes, “Benjamin’s corporeal self disappears into language itself”.45 The 
body cloaked in words amounts to an inexorable ‘tactile’ movement of dissolving and fading 
away from view. Although constructed as images, the scenographies of disappearing bodies 
(as both Leib and Körper) that pervade Berliner Kindheit cannot be fixed into a (photographic) 
 
43 The link between The Tempest and the Ninth Thesis was suggested in a talk by Freddie Rokem entitled  
“‘But a storm is blowing from Paradise’/ ‘Aber ein Sturm weht vom Paradiese her’: Walter Benjamin and The 
Tempest”, in the conference Walter Benjamin and Shakespeare, London, November 2018. In this event 
Benjamin’s Shakespeare fragment was also discussed by Julia Ng in a talk entitled “As You Like It: Benjamin’s 
Comic Infinite”.  
44 See Hamacher’s “The Word Wolke – If It Is One” for this point and for his discussion of the sensuous 
similarity “as Worte steps into Wolke” that predicates Benjamin’s childhood memories.  




image;46 the demise they enact is “allegorical”, as Adorno observes.47 The representation of 
the body as simultaneously constructed by memory and shattered or dissolved by it forms and 
deforms the short sections of Berliner Kindheit. This logic is predicated on the recognisable 
belated ‘nonsensuous’ relation of likeness between words, i.e. language as instrument of 
cognition, and the realisation that when rendered sensuous, words are in truth formless, 
untouchable clouds.    
   Viewed from the predicament of the body dissolving into language, the texts 
comprising Benjamin’s autobiographical work map public and private spaces as well as objects 
whose dark depths and interiorities are the instigations and also the settings for the child’s 
mimetic activity. Naming a spirit (“Geist”) of creation, a creature (“Geschöpf”) released from 
the nursery rhyme (“Die Muhme Rehlen”), the mispronounced “Mummerehlen”, originating 
in linguistic non-referentiality and auditory confusion, has positively “displaced the world” for 
Benjamin the child: “Das Mißverstehen verstellte mir die Welt”. Worte/Wolke make it possible 
to become an image, to mimetically be displaced into “dwelling places [Wohnungen], 
furniture, clothes” (GS VII:417, SW 3:391). This was possible, once more, through figures of 
clouds. In producing similarities, in painting, as it is said in the section “Die Farben”, “what 
happened with my watercolors, [is] when things would take me to their womb [Schoß] as soon 
as I overcame them in a moist cloud” (GS VII:424, SW 3:380). Or in the first version of “Die 
Mummerehlen”, the child is “disguised by them [i.e., colors, Vermummten sie mich selber]”, 
even before applying them to the drawing, “when wet, they flowed together on the palette, I 
would take them warily onto my brush. As though they were clouds about to dissipate” (GS 
IV:262, SW 3:393). 
Following this remark, Benjamin names the Chinese colourful porcelains (stressing the 
fact that they were only “cheap export articles”) as his preferred objects of mimesis. They 
captured the presentiment of likeness. “The gift [die Gabe] of perceiving similarities is, in fact, 
nothing but a weak remnant of the old compulsion to become similar and to behave 
mimetically. In me, however, this compulsion acted through words”, as he notes earlier in this 
section (reproducing, that is, the tropes from the essays “Über das mimetische Vermögen” and 
“Lehre vom Ähnlichen” of 1933). This compulsion, acted through words, drew closer the 
“work of Mummerehlen”, a word, that just as in the reflections on the inverted déjà vu, is 
germane to the recollection of that which has not yet happened. The passage continues by 
 
46 This applied, as Benjamin confers, to his own image. “Never to my own image, though. And that explains 
why I was at such a loss when someone demanded of me similarity to myself” (SW 3:391).   




retelling the story of the Chinese painter who was swallowed into a narrow opening, the little 
door located in his picture of a landscape. Funnelled into the work of representation, the old 
painter’s vanishing body effaces any traces of opticality and of distance, and so – of the auratic. 
What is left as a trace is a wall, a veil wrapped around this very mortification and the walling 
up of the subject in the porcelain container through displacement into the cloud: “In the same 
way, I too, when occupied with my paintpots and brushes, would be suddenly displaced into 
the picture. I would resemble the porcelain which I had entered in a cloud of colors” (GS 
IV:262, SW 3:393).  
The section “Der Mond” with its startling scenography of a geological funnel created 
by the moon can be regarded as a scenographical intensification of the child’s coloured and 
clouded entry – “mit einer Farbenwolke”– into or onto the porcelain. Or, alternatively, it can 
be posed as its obverse: in the room’s child, subjugated to the light of the moon, acoustical and 
visual similarities, uncannily, like an echo – do not dissolve, but reverberate. In the closing 
lines of its final, shorter version (from which the deformation of the scene by the moon through 
a funnel has been omitted) Benjamin records his “own existence” as a disappearing figure. This 
form of being designates that “nothing was left except the residuum [Bodensatz] of its 
abandonment [Verlassenheit]” (SW 3:383, GS VII:428, translation modified). The first 
version’s final sentence reads:  
 
For this awakening set no limit to the dream, as others did, disclosed no goal, but 
instead revealed to me that its goal had escaped the dream, and that the sovereignty of 
the moon [das Regiment des Mondes] – which I had to come to know as a child – had 
failed for another world time [für eine weitere Weltzeit gescheitert war]. 
 (GS IV:302, SW 3:407, translation modified) 
 
The moon names the object of this textual vignette and is at the same time the entity 
that names the apparatus by which the conditions of visibility and therefore – of perception and 
cognition, are deployed: 
 
The light, that streams down from the moon, has no part in the scene-setting 
[Schauplatz] of our daily existence. The region it equivocally illuminates seems to 
belong to some opposite or near earth. This is not the earth to which the moon is 
subjected as satellite, for it itself transformed into a satellite of the moon. Its broad 




back home and may once more put on the widow’s veil, which the day had torn off. 
The pale beam [blasse Strahl] that stole into my room through the blinds gave me this 
understanding [gab mir das zu verstehen]. 
(GS IV:300, SW 3:405, translation modified) 
 
The rhetoric of melancholy and the rhetoric of photography with its arrested temporality are 
initiated from the “pale beam” that penetrates the room, displacing it into a pre-photographic 
device, a camera obscura.48 The image produced by the room and the different effects of light, 
those of the moon but also of the sun, are constituted as a constellation of relations between 
the photographic image and the production of meaning, meaning ‘photographically’ developed 
in silence outside language, as it were. Between the two governments, the day and the night, 
stretches that which is familiar and natural. Cast by the moonlight, lost origin and a mournful 
return to it are subject to Benjamin’s concept of the “optical unconscious”. Worked 
dialectically through the room as a photographic construction, when it is not mediated by the 
pale beam that has stolen into the room/camera and thus visible to the naked eye, the “widow’s 
veil of creation” is exposed to a blinding daylight capable of annihilation.49 Tearing the veil, 
which is now also inducive of the auratic, alludes to nature in its state of otherness, in 
‘speaking’ differently to the camera (as mediated by the moon and the room) than to the eye 
(the sober light of day).    
 Having been awoken, bodily presence is removed and the child’s room appears to be 
 
48 For the rhetoric of the photographic media in Berliner Kindheit see Michael Jennings, “The Mausoleum of 
Youth: Between Experience and Nihilism in Benjamin’s Berlin Childhood”, Paragraph 32.3 (2009), 313-330, 
and Chapter Four of Richter’s The Corpus of Autobiography.   
49 “Widow’s veil” is also the manner in which Benjamin (in following Proust) figures the unknown woman that 
“mysteriously and mutely borne along by the crowd” crosses the poet’s field of vision in the sonnet “A une 
passante” in “On Some Motifs in Baudelaire”. The passing woman, which for Baudelaire figures an erotic figure 
of unfulfilled desire, is transformed in Benjamin’s act of casting the veil. As Elissa Marder comments, Benjamin 
“suggests that the erotic loss narrated in the poem was already figured in the widow’s prior loss of her husband. 
The figure of ‘the lost husband’ would thus stand as a synecdoche for the specifically erotic nature of the loss 
(as distinct from the loss of the non-eroticized object”. See Marder, Dead Time, Temporal Disorders in the 
Wake of Modernity (Baudelaire and Flaubert), (Stanford: Stanford University Press 2001), p. 75. In “The Paris 
of the Second Empire in Baudelaire”, the veil serves as a figure capturing the invisible crowd that nevertheless 
is prominently present in Baudelaire’s poem according to Benjamin. “Only when this veil tears”, will an 
“undistorted view of the big city” be revealed to the flâneur. And in another phrasing that constellates crowd, 
veil, city, room and (mythic) phantasmagoria, Benjamin notes: “The crowd is the veil through which the 
familiar city beckons to the flâneur as phantasmagoria – now a landscape, now a room.” The uncovering of the 
phantasmagoria as the work of the mythical is worked through the overcoming of Eros by sexuality and death: 
“the delight of the urban poet is love – not at first sight, but at last sight. It is an eternal farewell, which 
coincides in the poem [A une passante] with the moment of enchantment. Thus the sonnet deploys the figure of 
shock, indeed of catastrophe. But the nature of the poet’s emotions has been affected as well. What makes his 
body contract in a tremor […] is not the rapture of a man whose every fibre is suffused with Eros; it is, rather, 
like the kind of sexual shock that can beset a lonely man. [These verses] reveal the stigmata which life in a 




occupied by what now seems to be a physical realisation of the moon: “When [the moon] was 
there in the room and I awoke, I was unhoused, for my room seemed willing to accommodate 
no one besides the moon” (GS IV:300, SW 3:405, translation modified). Occupied by the 
sovereign authority of the moon, a spectral “mythical character of semblance” (to evoke 
Adorno’s phrasing) suffuses the room. It now violently manifests itself in acts of resemblance 
and repetition, both tactile, borne out by allusions to feminine body parts, clothes and their 
sartorial details,50 and acoustical:  
 
The first things that attracted my gaze were the two cream-colored basins on the 
washstand. By day it never occurred to me to dwell on them. In the moonlight, 
however, the band of blue that ran around the upper part of the basins was a source of 
irritation. It pretended to be a woven band encircling a skirt-hem. And in effect, the 
brim of each basin was pleated like a ruffle. Between the two basins stood pot-bellied 
jugs, made of the same porcelain with the same floral pattern.  
 
And mythical semblance exerts a power over physical existence and life:  
 
When I climbed out of bed, they clinked, and this clinking was reproduced [pflanzte 
sich … fort] over the washstand’s marble surface and to its basins and bowls. As happy 
as I was to receive from the nocturnal surroundings a sign of life [ein Lebenszeichen] 
– be it only the echo of my own – it was nonetheless an unreliable sign, and was waiting 
like a false friend to dupe me at the moment I least expected it. It happened when I had 
lifted the carafe with my hand to pour some water into a glass. The gurgling of the 
water, the sound with which I put down first the carafe and then the glass – all struck 
my ear as repetition. For every spot on this alternate earth to which I was transported 
appeared wholly occupied by what had once been. As such, every sound and moment 
approached me as a double of itself. When I had endured this for a while, I would draw 
near my bed gripped by the fear of finding myself already stretched out upon it.  
(GS IV:300-301, SW 3:405-406, translation modified)   
 
The acoustical intensification ruled by the law of repetition constitutes the nocturnal 
scenography. This law might be interpreted in terms of the manifestation of the fall of language 
and the violence accompanying it. For the production of false signs inevitably coalesces into 
self-negation: the impossible encounter with one’s corpse, the experienceable horror of being 
 




at once Leib and Körper. This doubleness is all the same the disturbance or dissolution of their 
constitutive relation. To that “strangeness which the moon had brought” in manifesting the 
horror of mere natural life at the border of death and non-being, might be, however, “another 
side”, Benjamin suggests. The domestic setting in “Der Mond”, laid open to the flickering light 
of the moon, evaporates into language that nonetheless escapes any linguistic designation; it is 
an image-space in which awakening, as stated in the last passage of its first version, set “no 
goal” to a dream (GS IV:302, SW 3:407).  
The nocturnal occurrences in the room continue in a repetitive movement between the 
room that lay in darkness, after the fear (“Angst”) subsides, and the dark room of photography, 
wherein images loom as out of a photographic plate. These images record an anticipatory, 
unavoidable vicious falling prey (“anheimzufallen”) to the net of the dream. In another 
performance of semblance, underscored by military tropes, “the hand” is the first to “bravely 
dive over [Über ... zu tauchen] the trench [Grabenrand] of sleep”, where it previously found a 
“cover [Deckung] from the dream”. Yet this rescuing is dominated by a fateful Untergang, as 
the next image makes clear: “just as sometimes, after the end of a battle an unexploded bomb 
[Blindgänger] catches up”, so the hand, on its way (“unterweg[s]”), “remained in expectation 
for its belatedly falling prey to a dream”. And the Denkbild continues: 
 
When the nightlight, flickering, then brought peace to my hand and me, it appeared 
that nothing more remained of the world than a single, stubborn question. It may be 
that this question nested in the folds of the door-curtain that shielded me from noise. It 
may be that it was nothing but a residue of many past nights. Or, finally, it may be that 
it was the other side of the feeling of strangeness which the moon had brought on. The 
question was: Why is there anything at all in the world, why the world? With 
amazement, I realized that nothing in it could compel me to think the world. Its 
nonbeing would have struck me as not a whit more problematic than its being, which 
seemed to wink at nonbeing. The moon had an easy time with this being [Der Mond 
hatte ein leichtes Spiel mit diesem Sein]. 
 
The indecisiveness and ambiguity, oscillating between Schein and Sein, inflicted by the 
sovereign power of the moon, lead to a subjective articulation of the ontological question of 
being. “This world”, as Benjamin writes, “can only present itself” – be “vorhanden” – in the 
form of a recurrent, pronounced, yet unanswerable question (GS IV:301, SW 3:406, translation 




alongside the realms of the optical and the acoustical (as the triangulation comprising the pure 
deformations in the realm of pure Schein outlined in “Phantasie” has it) – sets the scene for the 
moon’s final violent act.51  
 
V. “Der Mond” as a Critique of Violence 
 
The manner of Benjamin’s textual construction in “Der Mond” and its advancement through 
‘architectonic’ decomposition could be seen to be predicated on another ambiguous logic of 
similarity or likeness, manifested in the relay between two modalities of nature: mythical, 
fateful nature and pure liberatory or messianic nature. The ‘material content’ of the text 
culminates with its own mortification by the work or the medium of the moon/dream, like the 
eye that lays bare, like the “ear of lament”. In the Wahlverwandtschaften essay, it is stated that 
“truth is not in itself visible” (SW 1:351), a statement that is echoed in an assertion made in 
“Zur Kritik der Gewalt”. The “expiatory power of violence”, it is said there, cannot “lie open 
[nicht zutage liegt]”, be visible to men, as the concluding passage of the essay affirms (GS 
II:203, SW 1:252, translation modified). Let us observe the final scene of “Der Mond” as it is 
unfolded in the first, more detailed version. The scene takes place on a dual temporal threshold. 
The one is biographical: “Die Kindheit lag schon beinahe hinter mir”. The other is the twilight 
time between the day and the night, a threshold bearing not only on the impaired conditions of 
visibility; it is a borderline about to be transgressed by the moon:  
 
the moon seemed willing to assert its claim [Anspruch] to the earth by daylight, a claim 
which previously it had made only at night. High above the horizon – large but pale – 
it stood, in the sky of a dream, looking down on the streets of Berlin. It was still light 
outside.  
  (GS IV:301-302, SW 3:406)  
 
In terms of “Zur Kritik der Gewalt”, the power or violence implemented by the moon is 
“lawmaking” (“rechtsetzende Gewalt”). The moon “demands sacrifice” in the form of “mere 
life for its own sake”, the exertion of power Benjamin names mythic; the moon will finally 
 
51 See in this context Agamben’s comment: “To the eternal question ‘why is there something, rather than 
nothing,’ culture responds by exploring the mystery that Benjamin once called ‘that object, to which in the last 
instance the veil is essential’ [the quotation is from the essay on Goethe, SW I:351]; culture transports us to a 
region where ‘nothing’ and ‘something,’ ‘life’ and ‘death,’ ‘creation’ and ‘negation’ reveal themselves as 
inextricably bound, bringing us to the very limits of language’s possibilities.” Agamben, “On the Limits of 




take the guise of “pure power over all life”, it will “take in” sacrifice “for the sake of the living” 
in its complete disappearance, into language, as we will see, as the “dissolution of legal 
violence” – in terms of the essay on violence (GS II:199, SW 1:250).  
The transgression of the moon is immediately followed in “Der Mond” by an allusion 
to the other facet of mythic violence, namely the “law-preserving” violence/power 
(“rechtserhaltende Gewalt”), and this through the text’s evocation of the daguerreotype: 
“Gathered around me were the members of my family, a little rigid like the figures in a 
daguerreotype.” With this pre-technology of photography to which Benjamin ascribed 
elsewhere a trait of a deadly, inhuman likeness,52 both features of the mythic law thereby 
coincide. The moment that is photographed, although reproduced, is all the same unique and 
nonreproducible, like the one-off initiation and imposition of the law. The daguerreotype image 
and the successive scene of ruination and disappearance into the encompassing movement of 
the funnel both accords, therefore, with Benjamin’s enigmatic critique of violence. That is, the 
re-evaluation of the essence of the political (according to Schmitt): the capability of the 
sovereign to exert “Gewalt” – meaning at the same time violence, force, power, or authority.    
“Der Mond” continues:  
 
Gathered around me were the members of my family, a little rigid like the figures in a 
daguerreotype. Only my sister was missing. “Where is Dora?” I heard my mother 
exclaim. Suddenly, the full moon up in the sky began ever more rapidly to expand. 
Coming nearer and nearer it tore the planet asunder. The railing of the iron balcony, on 
which we all had taken our places overlooking the street, disintegrated into pieces, and 
the bodies [Leiber] which had been there flew apart in all directions. The funnel 
[Trichter] which the moon formed [bildete] in approaching, sucked everything in. 
Nothing could hope to pass through it unchanged [Nichts konnte hoffen, unverwandelt 
durch ihn hindurchzugehen].  
 (GS IV:302, SW 3:406, translation modified) 
 
This horrific scene is, suggestively, a mise en abyme of the sections in “Zur Kritik der Gewalt” 
where Benjamin presents the distinction between mythic violence (whose origin is Greek), and 
divine violence (whose origin is Jewish and monotheist). Divine violence does not shed blood 
according to Benjamin, it is “bloodless” since it is separated from expiation, it is “entsühnend” 
 
52 “What was inevitably felt to be inhuman – one might even say deadly – in daguerreotype was the (prolonged) 
looking into the camera, since the camera records our likeness without returning our gaze” (SW 4:338), as 




[GS II:199, SW 1:250). The divine names that which expels the two mythic forms of the law 
and is associated with the Jewish tradition, “God’s sphere that opposes myth”, as Benjamin 
comments. The principle of “all divine endmaking [Zwecksetzung]” is justice, “power [Macht] 
is the principle of all mythic lawmaking” (GS II:198, SW 1:248).  
 Mythic violence is exemplified by the story of Niobe; divine violence – by the story of 
Korah. The final scene of “Der Mond” seems to superimpose the two scenes of horror that 
respectively correspond to these two references of violence: the myth of Niobe who was 
punished by the gods and turned into a weeping stone after witnessing the instant killing of her 
children; and the Biblical story of Korah and his company, according to which “[T]he ground 
beneath them split; the earth opened its mouth and swallowed them and their homes.”53 Yet, 
as the analogy to “Der Mond” reveals, the two stories are in fact rigorously knitted together. In 
keeping with the performativity of the echo that also features in “Der Mond”, as we have seen, 
the paragraph in “Zur Kritik der Gewalt”  that seemingly sets out to establish the opposition 
between the two orders of violence and their references to bare life, could be read, instead, as 
a dialectic at a standstill.54 In the difficult passage Benjamin writes:  
 
If mythical violence is lawmaking [or law-positing, rechtsetzend], divine violence is 
law-destroying [rechtsvernichtend]; if the former sets boundaries, the latter 
boundlessly destroys them; if mythic violence brings at once guilt and retribution, 
divine power only expiates; if the former threatens, the latter strikes; if the former is 
bloody, the latter is lethal without spilling blood. 
   (GS II:199, SW:1 249-250)  
 
The eternally lamenting Niobe stands in close proximity to the logic of violence underwriting 
the daguerreotype image in “Der Mond”. The violence that was inflicted on her, notes 
Benjamin, is more concerned with the imposing power of the law than it is a punishment for 
the breaking of an existing law. The dual disposition of petrified bodies and the stories to which 
these bodies testify bear some resonance in their details concerning a catastrophic event, 
maternal love, rescuing, guilt and the manifestation of fate. Both are the “mythic manifestation 
of immediate violence [unmittelbare[n] Gewalt]” to which “divine violence” serves as “an 
 
53 Numbers 16:32.   
54 Attentive to the visual in Benjamin’s evocation of these scenes of horror, Ariella Azoulay proposes a 
photographic reading of them, as scenes watched by their spectators, showing how the similarities between the 
stories prevent them from illustrating a real opposition between mythic and divine violence. As she concludes, 
both Niobe and Korah are rebels and belong to what Benjamin defines as “the tradition of the oppressed”. 




antithesis in all respects” (GS II:199, SW 1:249).  
Both Niobe and the daguerreotype image are set in relation to a counter-violence 
associated with divine violence, that which strikes also immediately, yet “without warning and 
without threat”, a pure violence or force that is not a means to an end, and as such closer to 
Benjamin’s definition of justice. This is what is characteristic of the sudden taking place of the 
expansion of the moon and the effacement of the very scene of memory and dream it brings 
about, as the domestic room, at first opens up to the city, only to be annihilated completely in 
public. Niobe, in contrast, does not disappear, but she does merge into the earth. She is arrested, 
materialised, as an afterimage of the striking bloody violence: “violence therefore bursts upon 
Niobe from the uncertain, ambiguous sphere of fate. It is not actually destructive [Sie ist nicht 
eigentlich zerstörend]”. This violence that “brings a cruel death to Niobe’s children”, still 
“stops short of claiming the life of their mother, whom it leaves behind, more guilty than before 
through the death of the children, both as eternally mute bearer of guilt and as a boundary stone 
on the frontier between man and gods” (GS II:197, SW 1:248). Niobe is eternally entangled 
with fate as a manifestation of mere, natural life without dissolution, without expiation, 
secularised in space.  
In contrast to this, it is the annihilating character of violence that “Der Mond”, the 
moon, ultimately ascribes to the dream image. The sheer destructiveness that bursts asunder 
the daguerreotype view of the family standing on the balcony is self-negated by the dissoluble 
functioning of the funnel, as the ground becomes groundless and expressionless. For, as Werner 
Hamacher observed, “[T]he moon, which makes everything stop speechless, [has] been 
transformed into a voracious mouth – ein Mund”.55 Striking without a threat, speechlessness 
reveals itself as irreducible, a medium without a purpose or a goal. For everything is mediated, 
channelled, yet in a reversed, destructive manner; it is spatially there, yet in an act of dissolving 
withdrawal. To the extent that everything is sprachlos, bildlos, blutlos – “nothing could hope 
to pass through unchanged”. The funnel, in making the world disappear, sucks “everything” – 
“alles” – in, and yet, in this complete annihilation, the manifesting, authoritative law is 
nevertheless preserved in the form of an echo or a trace: in as much as “Nothing could hope to 
pass through it unchanged”, everything is changed – “verwandelt [ist]” (GS IV:302, SW 3:406).   
The balcony – the place of viewing the city, the open space or the agora, has thereby 
turned into a Schauplatz, which is not only the place of being viewed and photographed, but 
also – the place of awaiting judgment and redemption, subject to the “easy”, or light “play” 
 




(“leichte[s] Spiel”) of the moon, a phrasing that seems to signal the dialectics of justice and 
law. Encrypted into an allegorical figure of death and ruin is the second nature architecture of 
the house and its inhabitants, the bourgeois family; the “everything” which is transformable, 
allegorical. It is as if this intensification of the functioning of bourgeois language eventually 
irrupts as what could be put in terms of the essay on violence as the “ungeheuren Fällen”, the 
terrible cases in which fatal divine violence and its law come about.56     
In the very last lines of “Der Mond”, the functioning of language is in play in its relation 
to the predicaments of violence under the rule of the moon:  
 
“If there is pain now, then there’s no God,” I heard myself conclude, and, at the same 
time, I collected what I wanted to take across. I put it all in a verse. It was my farewell. 
“O star and flower, spirit and dress, love, grief, time, and eternity!” But even as I 
hastened to entrust myself to these words, I was already awake. And only now did the 
horror [das Grauen] which the moon had just inspired seem to grip me for all time, 
without any hope of reprieve. For this awakening set no goal to the dream as others 
did, but instead betrayed to me that it had evaded the dream, and that the rule of the 
moon [das Regiment des Mondes], which I experienced as a child, had failed for 
another world time [für eine weitere Weltzeit gescheitert war].  
(GS IV:301, SW 3:406, translation modified) 
 
To the extent that the rubble is swallowed by the total, transformative moment (which touches 
at the same time on the logic of eternal return), this complete reversal might be seen as a 
reference to pure revolutionary violence. This is the violence that is eventually glossed in “Zur 
Kritik der Gewalt” in historical terms, as “ein neue[s] geschichtliche[s] Zeitalter”, and is the 
violence that informs Benjamin’s evaluation of the general proletarian strike (GS II:202, SW 
1:252). The last line of “Der Mond” indicates an inaugurated new historical age which 
nevertheless immediately collapses. Presentiment of such downfall is implied in Benjamin’s 




56 On Benjamin’s use of the phrase in the context of his argument in regard to a conscious decision to not follow 
or disregard the commandment not to kill, see Weigel, Walter Benjamin: Images, the Creaturely, and the Holy, 
pp. 59-78. According to Weigel, the phrasing “in monstrous cases” has to be construed separately from 
Schmitt’s concept of “state of exception”, a link established among other reasons by the English translation: “in 
exceptional cases”. As Weigel reflects, Benjamin’s line of argumentation is drawn back to the question of the 
sacredness of life, to the bond established between the human and the in-human on the basis of the biblical 




Every epoch, in fact, not only dreams the one to follow but, in dreaming, pushes 
towards awakening [träumend drängt sie auf das Erwachen hin]. It bears its end within 
itself and unfolds it – as Hegel already noticed – by cunning. With the destabilizing of 
the commodity economy, we begin to recognize the monuments of the bourgeoisie as 
ruins even before they have crumbled.  
    (GS V:59, AP 13) 
 
“Der Mond”, too, ends with an ambiguous dialectics at a standstill: a particular kind of image 
that nevertheless prefigures the flight from the mythic dimensions of the dream, carried out by 
the logic of “Entsetzung”: the disestablishment of what has been set, posited, formed, to the 
extent that, in terms of “Zur Kritik der Gewalt”, “a new historical epoch is founded” (SW 1:252, 
GS II:202).  
This dialectic is inscribed in the rule of the moon and the oscillation inflicted by it, 
between being and non-being, between mere life, the outcome of the challenging of fate and 
mythic violence, where life takes the form of a sacrifice, and Benjamin’s other reference to 
violence: divine law and justice. It is with the latter, as the essay on violence has it, that “man 
cannot, at any price, be said to coincide with the mere life […] including even the uniqueness 
of his bodily person” (SW 1:251, GS II:201).  The residue of a failure that the final enactment 
of the moon left echoing back, although pointing to a manifestation of mythic Schein, is also 
eclipsed by another dimension, that of the imageless and the expressionless. These are the traits 
in Benjamin’s writings that are inescapably bound to what this thesis has aimed to propound: 
the idiosyncratic semantics of ‘tactility’ or the sense of touch, and with it, Benjamin’s concepts 
of life and creaturely, distorted existence. Furthermore, the melancholic tone of the last 
sentence of “Der Mond” seems to be drawn from Benjamin’s photographic logic, according to 
which, although what is presented is always already in the past, we ought to search the picture 
for the “inconspicuous spot” that coincides with  “the tiny spark of contingency” (“das winzige 
Fünkchen Zufall”), as the essay on photography has it (GS II:371, SW 2:510). In Benjamin’s 
looking backwards, he seeks the image of that which is un-photographable: utopia and the 
radical dark room of the crypt.   
In a fragment on Baudelaire written in 1921, Benjamin, postulating a variation of this 
naked, tactile, gaze, designates a mental capacity, ascribed solely to Baudelaire, as 
presentiment, as “Ahnung”. Indicating that “earthly time” cannot be reproduced in a 
hypothetical state of its pertinence to a photographer dispossessed of the means to develop his 




of essence a presentiment of its real picture. And from this presentiment speaks the negative of 
essence in all his poems” (GS VI:133, SW 1:361). With this postulation of “the negative of 
essence”, the threads that compose the concept of tactility might come into relief. The tactile, 
as a borderline concept within the aesthetics and the realm of the beautiful, as we have asserted 
here, in particular through the discussion of architecture, operates, as Benjamin’s idiosyncratic 
construal of the tactile has it, as the negative impulse in the order of things. Exposed bare to 
the eye as a photographic negative, in a state of creaturely Untergang, “earthly time” is thus 
inscribed in the anti-figural logic of the tactile, an imageless and expressionless more than 






Tactility and the More than Origin of the Law (Benjamin With Kafka) 
(Conclusion) 
That the idea or the medium of architecture are indicative of an art form impervious to myth 
and to Schein could be gleaned from Benjamin’s remark on Kafka already cited in the 
introduction to this thesis: “No human art appears as deeply compromised as the art of building 
[Baukunst] in Kafka. None is more vital [lebenswichtiger], and none makes perplexity 
[Ratlosigkeit] more perceptible [vernehmbarer, also more audible] (GS II:1219, my 
translation). From this reflection, the strands suffusing Benjamin’s writings, as they were 
postulated and explored in the different parts of this thesis, could be extrapolated: the moods 
of anxiety and uncanniness inextricable to architecture as well as the dialectics of distraction 
and attentiveness assigned to this medium. The chiasmus of “natural history” and the linguistic 
episode of Babel also form part of the scenographic apparatus that is at stake here. As has been 
suggested (in Part One) with reference to Kafka’s “Vor dem Gesetz”, the thinking image of 
“Die taktische Dominante” dwelling “in der Architektur”, where it is more  originally 
“zuhause”, calls to mind a characteristic Kafkan “cloudy spot” (GS II:420, SW 2:802). Both 
figures of concealment, marked by anti-opticality, and therefore, by the precept of the 
imageless and its grounding on the double-sidedness of the sensing/substantial body, give 
contour to Benjamin’s stance concerning the antinomies of the image and of the law (as shown 
in Part Three).  
By way of resumption of the central arguments of the thesis, drawn together at its end, 
the following remarks conduct a brief, final, return to Kafka. With this move, what this thesis 
sought to stake out as the workings of tactility in Benjamin’s body of work, also with reference 
to Kafka’s “Der Bau”, will be framed with a set of other architectural imaginaries as projected 
by Kafka. It will be suggested in conclusion that tactility – mediated here once more through 
ideas of architecture – bears witness to Benjamin’s theologico-political outlook of the law as 
it is constructed and performed in Kafka.1   
The arguments in the preceding pages have emanated, for the most part, from two 
principal conjectures and figurations of the tactile. The first, to recall, is “Die taktische 
 
1 In a letter of October 1934 to Gershom Scholem, Benjamin indicates that in his Kafka writings he is 
“confronted with two ends at once, the political and the mystical”. The Correspondence of Walter Benjamin and 
Gershom Scholem 1932-1940, trans. Gary Smith and Andre Lefevere (New York: Schocken books, 1989), p. 
143. In a letter of July 1934 to Scholem, objecting to the theological interpretations of Kafka’s work, as 
exercised by Max Brod and others, Benjamin reflects on the “broad theological side [breite theologische Seite]” 
that governs his own response to Kafka, yet this side, he notes, is “admittedly overshadowed” (“freilich 




Dominante”, which, through its uncanny residency in architecture, connotes the remoteness of 
that which is comparatively “more original”. The second, “im Taktischem”, is an aesthetic 
phenomenon characterised as dissolution into the infinite, predominantly associated with the 
faculty of touch, which instigates, through “de-formation”, the expressionless, the mark of pure 
semblance, that of “Schein” as “rein” (as detailed in Part Three). The first of these conjectural 
definitions, unearthed from the first version of the “Kunstwerk” essay (in the line that was 
omitted in the following two versions of the essay), is predominantly spatial and impregnated 
with a mythic trait of time as repetition. The second one, as registered in the fleeting evocation 
of the trope “im Taktischem” in the cryptic fragment “Phantasie”, is fused with a characteristic 
messianic nature, worked through eternal downfall. (The fragment on Shakespeare is resolved 
around this sensation of tactile dissolution.)  
  “In tactility”, in architectural sites of sensing-through (also the architectonics of 
translation, as we have seen in Part Three), the crossing of image and the philosophical 
“presentation of truth” (GS I:208, O 2) uncovers the realms of creaturely life and of natural 
history that abides in these forms. With this exposure (and the abundant procedures of 
unveiling indicate its ‘tactile’ impulse), the condition of remoteness from Creation and from 
the intervention of the Fall of language enters into a relation with (re)presentational forms. This 
aporetic stance flows from the about-face of the allegorical. Ultimately laid bare as secularised 
and sensed as overwhelming concretised history, the foldedness of the “spirit of the allegorical” 
proves itself not to be an arbitrary sign but rather, an historical one. Benjamin’s analysis betrays 
the opening distance or abyss of abstraction as becoming readable by dint of the death of the 
intention that lies buried in any act of signification or judgment. For meaning, the 
communicative element of language that is nevertheless external and foreign to it according to 
the account given by Benjamin, cannot be set apart from the sensing body nor from the relation 
it forms with the immeasurable imagelessness of its corporeality, its being also a Körper. If the 
having of a body is essentially an image-being (“bildliche[s] Sein”), it is thus also 
communicative and semiotic; and yet, projected into “one of the highest realms of language” 
(GS VI:67), as Benjamin says in the fragment “Wahrnehmung und Leib”, the body always 
gestures towards its authoritative functioning as a topos of unrepresentability.    
In “Franz Kafka, Zur zehnten Wiederkehr seines Todestages” (an essay published in 
the Jüdische Rundschau in 1934), Benjamin contends that Kafka’s attempt to “lead over 
literature into doctrine or teaching” (“Dichtung in die Lehre zu überführen”), was nothing but 
a failure – “Gescheitert”. This failed attempt is due to the fact that, as Benjamin asserts, “No 




faithfully” (GS II:427-28, SW 2:808). For Benjamin, it was with Kafka, with all his 
undertakings to represent the evasiveness of the law, that the bildlos has been translated into 
the highest law. And this predicament of translation is architecturally projected in Kafka’s 
writings, according to Benjamin. It is the imperative of translation, and with it, the supposition 
that translation is set to be always simultaneously before and after “pure language”, as 
Benjamin shows, that is in play in Kafka’s numerous revisions of the biblical tale of the Tower 
of Babel. Among them, the fragments of a parable such as “Der Turm zu Babel” (“The Tower 
of Babel”) and “Der Schacht von Babel” (“The Pit of Babel”)2 reflect the groundless foundation 
of the extended narrative of “Der Bau”. This is conveyed by the portrayals of topographical 
motion in these parables, which are led by the antithetical yet related processes of digging and 
building, of ascending and descending.3 As “Der Bau” envisions, building and dwelling, these 
dialectically enmeshed practices or conditions of being, are bound to be a failure 
[“Mißlingen”]; and in Kafka’s writings, architecture is a failure – the Tower will never be built, 
the castle cannot be visited, the door to the law will never be entered; it is left suspended, about 
to be shut. Nonetheless, it is under the sign of failure, a term that pervades Benjamin’s writings 
on Kafka, that “purity and beauty” could be most evidently ascribed to the writer and to his 
work, according to Benjamin.4  
In one of Benjamin’s numerous preparatory notes to his essays on Kafka, he relates 
what he frequently detects as this typical and peculiar trait of failure to the creaturely world 
that Kafka depicts in his stories: “the residuum [Bodensatze] of the lower stratum [Schicht] of 
the creature [Kreatur]”. It is “among the rats, dung-beetles and moles” that “the new 
constitution of humanity prepares itself, the new ear for new laws [das neue Ohr für die neuen 
Gesetze] and the new look [Blick] for new relations” (GS II:1196, my translation). In the last 
sentence of Kafka’s “Vor dem Gesetz”, it is the “failing hearing” (“vergehendes Gehör”) of 
the man from the country that prompts the doorkeeper to divulge the secret of the law and of 
 
2 “If it had been possible to build the Tower of Babel, without ascending it, the work would have been 
permitted”; “What are you Building? –– I want to dig a subterranean passage. Some progress must be made. My 
station up there is much too high. We are digging the pit of Babel.” Kafka, Parables and Paradoxes, pp. 34-35. 
3 See Ewa Płonowska Ziarek, The Rhetoric of Failure: Deconstruction of Skepticism, Reinvention of Modernism 
(Albany: State University of New York, 1995), pp. 142-143.   
4 In a letter to Scholem of 12 June,1938. The Correspondence of Walter Benjamin and Gershom Scholem, p. 
226. In his essay on Kafka, Kafka’s beauty of a failure is put forward in a pair of intertwined ‘tactile’ thinking 
images which he extracts out of the double meaning of the word “unfolding” (“Entfaltung”): “The word 
‘unfolding’ has a double meaning. A bud unfolds into a blossom, but the boat which one teaches children to 
make by folding paper unfolds into a flat sheet of paper. This second kind of “unfolding” is really appropriate to 
parable; the reader takes pleasure in smoothing it out so that he has the meaning in the palm of his hand. Kafka’s 
parables, however, unfold in the first sense, the way a bud turns into a blossom. That is why their effect is 





the door.5 With this, what emphatically reverberates with Benjamin’s comment is also his 
abovementioned characterisation of “perplexity” in Kafka’s texts. The “Ratlosigkeit”, the 
difficulty or despair that they invoke in their readers, carries the mark of the allegorical site of 
“confusion”, of the Schädelstätte, and with it, “the ear of lament” that was provoked by the 
dramatic form of the Trauerspiel. What emerged out of this intensification of the auditory is 
the blocked transmissions of language, exemplified by the paradoxical susceptibility of mute 
nature to lament. In Kafka, this sense of perplexity and confusion, says Benjamin, 
communicates itself in the most corporeal fashion through the art of building, the form of 
human art, that, in being the “most vital”, is the form in which the close connection of history 
to nature, of life to death, inheres, as in a Baroque ruin. Mediated through architectural figures, 
the German baroque was ultimately capable, by the faculty of ‘sensing-through’ (the key trope 
adopted here from Carl Linfert), of establishing a degenerated view of political theology (as 
shown in Part Two).  
For Hegel, to recall, architecture signals the original site of human activity of 
representation and engagement with nature; herein lies, unsettled, the archaic freedom of spirit. 
The convolution of natural history and the transmission of this intricacy could be discerned in 
one of Kafka’s singular phrasings from the fragment “Der Schacht von Babel”: “we are digging 
the pit of Babel”. In this parable, which is shaped as a conversation between two builders, the 
verb “bauen” keeps resonating in a state of difference with “graben”, as the latter word in the 
answer replaces the former in the question. The parable is what Ziarek calls an “emblem of 
translation”.6 The confusion of hearing echoes the confusion of speech, the 
“Sprachverwirrung”, that, although yet to come, as inferred from the activity of the building of 
Babel, uncannily transpires as an event that had already happened. Here, the pure auditory 
order of language coalesces as it were into the matter of architecture, and with it, a subjection 
to a powerful (‘gewaltig’) call from what is yet to come but also already encased or encrypted, 
to recall the formative sensation that underscores Berliner Kindheit (as sensed-through in Part 
Three). Kafka’s fragment of a parable is marked by an uncanny return, the phenomenon which, 
together with that of déjà vu, as indicated by Adorno, galvanizes the philosophical investigation 
of Naturgeschichte (as discussed in Parts Two and Three). Furthermore, the confusion of 
hearing and of speaking embodies a voice and an echo of the scene portrayed by Benjamin in 
the essay on language as the “turning away from things”. This “enslavement” (GS II:154, SW 
 
5 Parables and Paradoxes, p. 65.  




1:72), to echo Benjamin’s word, could also be put in terms of the coercion of building and of 
dwelling, i.e., the task of walling up against nature that is entailed by being outside the walls 
of Eden.  
As some of Kafka’s commentators have observed, his configuration of the law does not 
convey what kind of law is at issue – whether it is a moral, a political or a natural law, a law of 
state or Jewish law – only that is built around a paradox of power and impotence. As Vivian 
Liska notes, “Kafka’s narrative writings confirm the plight of the human condition of being 
ruled by an unattainable and powerful sovereign who is the author of the law.”7 But the 
unattainability of the sovereign as site of authorship also constantly undercuts its projections 
of power, for which the city, in Kafka’s writings, is a primal site.8 In a letter to Scholem, raising 
the question of how one is to conceive, in the Kafkan sense, of the “projection of the Last 
judgement into world history”, Benjamin reflects: “is it [die Projektion] devoted to raising the 
Law up high [Hebung], or to burying it [Verscharren]? Kafka, so I contend, had no answers to 
these questions.”9 The perplexity of the law is thus arrested in abeyance between building and 
digging, between “bauen” and “graben”, the tower and the pit. The connective tissue between 
these extremities of building and burying, the sign of the chiasmus they form, might be ascribed 
to the programmatic, topographic setup of the Trichter. Allied with divine violence, and hence, 
with the highest performance of language (and of the law), the funnel, projected into and 
projecting the memory piece “Der Mond”, is also evocative of the twisted, descending 
movement down Babel. Its violent movement figures a reverberance of the law of translation 
and of language, the law that is grafted into the architectures it ruins.   
It might be plausible, then, that when Benjamin comments in the “Kunstwerk” essay 
on the reception of architecture that comes about through a distracted collectivity, and that the 
laws (“Gesetze”) of such reception are “most instructive [sind die lehrreichsten]” – it is his 
interpretation of Kafka that is being echoed. It is precisely intransmissibility becoming a law 
(“Gesetz”) and a doctrine (“Lehre”), as meaning is let go, that Kafka’s stories and parables 
transmit most succinctly. This intransmissibility testifies to their fulfilment of historical time 
as earthly, natural historical time. And more specifically: the commentary on the adherence of 
the reception of the tactile and by implication, of the medium of architecture, to that which is 
only ever comparatively ‘more original’, and therefore never reaches identity with itself, could 
 
7 Liska, “Benjamin and Agamben on Kafka, Judaism and the Law”, in Towards the Critique of Violence: Walter 
Benjamin and Giorgio Agamben, pp. 201-214 (p. 201).  
8 See Andrew J. Webber, “The City”, in Franz Kafka in Context, ed. Carolin Duttlinger (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2017), pp. 233-240.  




be traced back to Kafka’s parable “Vor dem Gesetz”.10 The point of convergence would be the 
limitless and boundless Körper, the mode of existence that differs and thus leaves its imprints 
on the Leib, the body that is marked by its delimitation within the social, historical order.  
The law too, as conveyed by Kafka’s enigma of a parable, is spatially dispersed, 
unbounded and unlimited; it is literally too, located more originally in architecture, in “Der 
Architektur zuhause”, and yet the law could never be encountered as housed, nor as ‘being 
there’. The law, as projected and imagined in the “Vor dem Gesetz” parable, is sequestered and 
enclosed in the architectonics of endless successive halls; and the last one, it is said, is the locus 
of law. That the law looms as “Die taktische Dominante”, not least due to the connotations of 
violence that this figure bears, might be inferred from a closer look at the architecture that 
Kafka’s narrative features. The idea that the law is an excess of origin is accomplished through 
the law’s manifestation as a kind of sensing-through a continuum of halls (“Von Saal zu Saal”), 
each hall with its doorkeeper. To be “before the law”, Derrida has observed, means that “man 
is a subject of the law in appearing before it. This is obvious, but since he is before it because 
he cannot enter it, he is also outside the law (an outlaw).”11 Time itself, as the parable unfolds 
it, is spatialized. And although this amounts to secularised history, precisely because of that, it 
entails and thus demands to be deformed into a redemptive anticipation mixed with 
presentiment as prescribed by Benjamin’s postulation of the allegorical. Messianic historical 
perpetuation, as some interpretations of the parable suggest,12 flips over into nature which is 
historical, messianic in its downfall, as nature and history play off against each other. The 
ghostly dimension of the dwelling place of the law looms large as what Benjamin calls the 
“final phantasmagoria of the objective” (GS I: 406, O 232) since in fact, the whole setting is 
susceptible to immateriality. The Schauplatz in the parable consists of an open door; nothing, 
in effect is, or ever will be, ‘walled up’, and yet this architectural openness perplexingly stands 
for a block. The textual construction of the parable is predicated upon an architectural element, 
an open-and-closed door that uncannily endures in pointing to the no-place of the law. That is, 
it gestures in the same direction as does the open-and-closed balcony in the last section of the 
Trauerspiel book.  
 
 
10 Benjamin probably read the story around 1915. In the letter to Scholem from July 1925, he writes that he had 
read the “short story ‘Before the Law’” ten years ago. See Benjamin, Gesammelte Briefe vol. I, p. 397. 
11 Derrida, “Before the Law”, p. 104.   
12 For example, Derrida, “Before the Law” and Giorgio Agamben, “The Messiah and the Sovereign”, in 
Potentialities, pp. 172-174. For Agamben, the parable “is an allegory of the state of law in the messianic age, 




Thinking in images, and with it, the thinking of the image, serve Benjamin to give evidence of 
that which cannot be said or conceptualised as nevertheless inhabiting language. The tactile 
clings to the imagistic and yearns for it, and Benjamin’s thinking images are always haunted 
by its insistence. Tactility, as a key trait of Benjamin’s writing in and of images, in and of the 
powers and failures of language, bears on a kinship to that which cannot be seen or heard. This 
is what Benjamin is sensing-through in the scenographic working of his ideas of architecture: 
the refuse of history, the distortions of life, and the chiastic cross-binding of the two in the 
conditions of natural history. It is “life as it is lived in the village at the foot of the hill on which 








13 Benjamin in a letter to Scholem, August 11, 1934, The Correspondence of Walter Benjamin and Gershom 
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